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This thesis presents an empirical investigation at the intersection of human moral psychology—
people’s perceptions of good and bad, right and wrong—and human belief formation—how 
people evaluate evidence and update their beliefs. The investigation is divided into two parts. 
In Part I, across 6 studies I investigate (i) people’s beliefs about their own moral goodness 
relative to the average person—in particular, I ask whether and to what extent such beliefs are 
irrational—and (ii) people’s beliefs about the moral goodness of their political in-party relative 
to their political out-party. Using economic games, I subsequently test whether people’s beliefs 
regarding (i) and (ii) correlate with behavioural outcomes. Finally, I test whether people’s 
motivation to “do the morally right thing” underpins their prosocial behaviour. In Part II, also 
comprising 6 studies, I investigate several factors that are purported to influence belief 
formation in the morally-charged context of contemporary US politics. In particular, I study (i) 
whether belief updating is biased by the beliefs people already hold or by their desired political 
outcomes (or both), and (ii) the extent to which cognitive sophistication facilitates biased 
information processing such that people who are more sophisticated are more likely to form 
factual beliefs that are favourable to their political identities. I draw four main conclusions from 
my investigation. First, people’s beliefs about their own (vs. others') moral goodness, and about 
the moral goodness of their political in-party (vs. out-party), suggest a robust perception of 
“moral superiority”. Second, said perceptions of moral superiority are not reliably related to 
the behavioural outcomes I examine; more reliably related to these behavioural outcomes is 
people’s motivation to do what they perceive to be morally “right”. Third, belief formation is 
possibly biased by people’s desired outcomes and by their political identities, but the evidence 
is relatively undiagnostic on this front. The evidence is similarly undiagnostic as to whether 
cognitive sophistication facilitates such a bias. Fourth, and finally, following other scholars I 
conclude that reasonable inferences of “bias” in human belief formation demand evidence of 
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The research reported in this thesis was conducted during the time period 2015 through 2018. 
During that period, there were prominent changes in the political and (psychological) scientific 
landscape; changes that had an impact on the content, direction and calibre of the research that 
I conducted. Regarding the political changes, the election of Donald Trump in the United States 
and the EU referendum in Britain—both occurring in 2016—contributed to the development 
of studies in which I investigated factors hypothesized to affect belief formation in politics; 
such as people’s desired political outcomes, as well as their political identities and attachments. 
Furthermore, these events rendered in new light the importance of moral psychology in human 
perception, belief formation and decision-making. In the case of the British EU referendum, 
for example, people appeared willing to sustain material losses—in the form of probable 
damage to the British economy—for the principles of fairness, autonomy and self-governance 
(Crockett, 2016). Many people believed that their voting decision was right and good, while 
the decision of the other side was wrong and bad. My investigations of people’s moral beliefs 
about themselves and about others, and about their political in-party and political out-party, 
were conducted against this very salient backdrop; as, too, was my examination of how these 
beliefs relate to behavioural outcomes. 
 
The landscape of psychological science itself was also changing during this time—profoundly 
influencing the quality of the research that I conducted. In particular, there was an increasing 
awareness that previous research was not as robust or reliable as many perhaps thought 
(Camerer et al., 2018; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 
2011), and growing calls for open scientific practices and better understanding and use of 
statistical methods in psychology and other sciences (e.g., Munafò et al., 2017; Nosek, 
Ebersole, DeHaven, & Mellor, 2018; Nosek et al., 2015). To be sure, many of these were not 
new problems in psychology (e.g., see Meehl, 1967, 1978) but they had now entered 
mainstream scientific consciousness, and were building up a head of steam as I began my 
doctoral studies in 2015. To my estimation, these events positively and concretely affected my 
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research in at least three ways. First, foregoing my earlier training, I learned to script and 
document all my data analyses from scratch in the statistical programming language R (R Core 
Team, 2017); second, I began to publicly archive all raw data and analysis scripts underlying 
the studies that I conducted and the manuscripts that I authored; third, and finally, I transitioned 
to preregistering all confirmatory hypothesis tests that I performed. In my opinion, the quality 
of the research in this thesis is much improved for these practices (but I defer to the readers’ 
good judgment!), and I am tremendously grateful to all the people who directly or indirectly 
brought these issues to my awareness.  
 
Theoretical Context and Rationale 
 
This thesis lies at the intersection of two overlapping but ultimately distinct fields of research. 
The first, which I refer to here under the umbrella term “moral psychology”, concerns the study 
of human understanding of right and wrong, good and bad, and how these constructs relate to 
and affect perception, judgment and decision-making. The second, which I refer to as “belief 
formation”, concerns the study of how humans arrive at their beliefs about the world—through 
such processes as sampling information from their environments, reasoning about information, 
and incorporating new information into their existing beliefs (i.e., belief updating). As alluded 
to above, these distinct fields of research often find a common home in the domain of politics—
where people’s moral psychology appears very much interleaved with their consumption of 
information and the formation of their beliefs. For this reason, most—though not all—of the 
research that I report in this thesis was conducted in a political context. For example, in Part I 
of the thesis I report two studies which were conducted to test whether political partisans’ 
beliefs about the moral character of their own party vs. that of the other party predicts their 
behavioural hostility towards the latter. In Part II, along similar lines, I report a series of studies 
that investigated whether people’s belief formation is biased by their political identities—and, 
in particular, whether cognitive sophistication exacerbates said bias. In the following sections, 
I elaborate further on the theoretical linkages within each major part of my investigation, as 
well as highlighting briefly the rationale for the studies that I conducted. 
 
Part I: Moral Psychology and Moral Behaviour 
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Part I of this thesis comprises 6 studies set against the theoretical backdrop of moral psychology 
and self- and social perception. The broad linking theme of these studies is their focus on 
human perceptions of good and bad, and how those perceptions relate to beliefs about oneself 
and others, the nature of those beliefs, and whether the beliefs predict behaviour. Furthermore, 
there are subthemes shared between particular studies.  
 
For example, in Parts 1.1 and 1.2 I measure the same key outcome variable—people’s beliefs 
about their own moral goodness relative to the average person—but test different focal 
hypotheses. In particular, in Part 1.1 I examine the nature of these beliefs; specifically, whether 
and to what extent they evince irrationality or “bias” on behalf of the believers. The prevalence 
of the tendency for people to believe themselves to be superior to the average person (for a 
review, see Alicke & Govorun, 2005; for phenomenon boundaries, see Heine & Hamamura, 
2007; Kruger, 1999)—particularly on moral traits like “honesty” and “trustworthiness”—has 
been interpreted by some scholars to mean that these beliefs are irrational, but persist because 
they serve an adaptive function like protecting or enhancing mental wellbeing (Taylor & 
Brown, 1988). However, this interpretation is incommensurate with the empirical evidence, 
which is undiagnostic as to whether the beliefs are, in fact, irrational (Heck & Krueger, 2015; 
Krueger & Wright, 2011; see also Hahn & Harris, 2014). Thus, Part 1.1 takes up the challenge 
of better identifying (i) whether and to what extent these beliefs may be considered irrational, 
and (ii) whether they are correlated with indicators of positive mental health.  
 
In Part 1.2, in contrast, I investigate whether these beliefs predict behavioural outcomes; in 
particular, behaviours that are commonly considered moral—like freely helping others, and 
reciprocating trust. There are several reasons why beliefs about one’s moral superiority over 
the average person may predict such behaviour. On the one hand, for example, people with a 
strong sense of righteousness over others may be motivated to behave in ways that protect this 
positive social comparison—to maintain self-esteem and thus feel good about themselves 
(Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Wills, 1981). This generates the prediction that perceived moral 
superiority will be positively correlated with moral behaviour. On the other hand, insofar as a 
strong sense of righteousness over the average person reflects a pessimistic view of the morality 
of others—rather than a distinctly positive view of oneself (Van Damme et al., 2016)—there 
is reason to expect the opposite association; that is, a negative correlation. In particular, because 
evidence suggests that various types of moral behaviour (those that rest on interdependency) 
are less likely if people perceive that others will not behave in kind (Krueger & Acevedo, 
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2007). Given these (and other) competing predictions, in Part 1.2 I test the association between 
self-perceived moral superiority and moral behaviour. 
 
In Part 1.3, I stay with the theme of measuring perceived moral superiority. In this case, 
however, I extend this measurement to people’s beliefs about their political in-party and 
political out-party in the US context. Research in political science documents what is known 
as “affective polarization”, the tendency for Democrats and Republicans to view co-partisans 
positively and out-partisans negatively. A recent review of this phenomenon (Iyengar et al., 
2018) identifies significant gaps that remain in scholarly understanding; most notably, whether 
and to what extent affective polarization is related to behavioural hostility towards the out-
party, and whether it reflects a generalized evaluative discrepancy between partisans vs. a more 
domain-specific disparity—such as the belief that in-partisans are more trustworthy than out-
partisans. Drawing upon recent theoretical and empirical trends in psychology and political 
science, I hypothesize that moral polarization—the tendency for people to view co-partisans’ 
moral character positively, and opposing partisans’ moral character negatively—predicts 
behavioural hostility towards members of the out-party. I test this hypothesis using a 
behavioural economic game measure of out-party hostility and large samples of US partisans. 
 
A shortcoming in the designs of the studies in Parts 1.1-1.3 is that they provide correlational 
evidence only—that is, I do not randomly assign a sense of moral superiority, nor the 
motivation to choose the “moral” behaviour. In Part 1.4, by contrast, I conduct an experiment 
that uses framing effects to manipulate people’s moral behaviour. The rationale for this 
experiment was to conduct a refined test of the so-called morality preference hypothesis. This 
hypothesis challenges classic behavioural economic theory, which invokes outcome-based 
social preferences to explain anonymous, one-shot prosociality—such as giving money to a 
homeless person that one will never meet again. Famous examples of outcome-based social 
preferences include “inequity aversion” (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999); the notion that prosocial 
behaviour (of the kind above) is underpinned by people’s preference to avoid inequitable social 
outcomes. Rejecting this explanation, the morality preference hypothesis says that prosocial 
behaviour is a function of people’s preference for doing what they perceive to be the morally 
right action—not a preference for a particular social outcome. I identify significant confounds 
in recent work that purports to find evidence for this hypothesis (Capraro & Rand, 2018). In 
Part 1.4, I correct these confounds and extend the design to test whether the morality preference 
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Part II: Desires, Identities and Bias in Political Belief Formation 
 
Part II of this thesis also comprises 6 studies, set against the theoretical backdrop of belief 
formation in politics. The theme that links these studies together is their focus on the various 
factors that are hypothesized to bias political belief formation. In particular, the formation of 
beliefs about politically-relevant facts—that is, what is true “out there” in the world—distinct 
from preferences, attitudes or behavioural intentions.  
 
In Part 2.1, I investigate two distinct phenomena posited to bias belief updating. Here I refer to 
these phenomena as confirmation bias and desirability bias, respectively. The former 
phenomenon predicts that people’s prior beliefs bias their belief updating such that they tend 
to incorporate new information into their posterior beliefs to a greater extent if it confirms (vs. 
disconfirms) their existing beliefs (all else being equal). Arguably the most famous example of 
this phenomenon is a study reported by Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979). These authors provided 
people with mixed evidence about the efficacy of capital punishment in deterring crime. They 
found that proponents of capital punishment—those who believed it was effective in deterring 
crime—became more convinced of its effectiveness following the mixed evidence; while 
opponents—those who believed that it was ineffective—became more convinced of its 
ineffectiveness in deterring crime. The authors took this result to imply that people 
incorporated the belief-confirming information into their posterior beliefs to a greater extent 
than the belief-disconfirming information. This interpretation has received significant criticism 
and qualification since publication of the original study, however (Guess & Coppock, 2018; 
Kuhn & Lao, 1996; Miller et al., 1993; Munro & Ditto, 1997); a point to which I return in the 
General Discussion section of this thesis. 
 
The second phenomenon—referred to here as desirability bias—predicts that people’s desired 
outcomes bias their belief updating such that they tend to incorporate new information to a 
greater extent if it is desirable vs. undesirable (all else being equal). The empirical evidence for 
this phenomenon was recently reviewed in Sharot and Garrett (2016). Though there exists a 
substantial body of evidence purporting to demonstrate such a bias, much of this evidence was 
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obtained using a methodological paradigm that contains problematic confounds (reported on 
at length in Shah, Harris, Bird, Catmur, & Hahn, 2016). Added to this, it remains unclear 
whether and to what extent people’s desired outcomes bias their belief updating in the sense of 
causing systematic departures from rational updating, for example that prescribed by Bayes’ 
theorem (Hahn & Harris, 2014). I also discuss these and related issues at length in the General 
Discussion section of this thesis.  
 
The empirical predictions of these two phenomena—confirmation bias and desirability bias—
are often confounded. This is because people often hold beliefs that they would also prefer to 
be true. For example, in the case of the Lord et al. (1979) study, it is reasonable to assume that 
proponents of capital punishment would also prefer a world in which capital punishment deters 
crime—perhaps because this would validate their worldview or political commitments. The 
upshot is that providing evidence to people and measuring their belief updating confounds an 
effect of desired outcome (desirability bias) with that of existing beliefs (confirmation bias). In 
Part 2.1, I thus attempt to tease these factors apart—and measure their associations with belief 
updating—by conducting an experiment in the context of the 2016 US presidential election. 
 
The studies reported in Part 2.2 are related to the study in Part 2.1 insofar as they also 
investigate belief formation in the US political context. However, there are several key 
differences. For example, as well as the process of belief updating—changes in beliefs—I 
additionally study evidence evaluation; that is, how people judge the validity of the new 
evidence itself. Popular theoretical accounts of political belief formation assume that people’s 
political identities—typically construed as the political parties with which they identify—bias 
their information processing such that they are prone to form beliefs that are favourable to those 
identities (e.g., Kahan, 2016a; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). A counterintuitive and rather 
troubling hypothesis advanced on the basis of these accounts is that cognitive sophistication 
tends to exacerbate this bias in information processing (Kahan, 2013; Kahan et al., 2017); 
polarizing the beliefs of cognitively sophisticated partisans who identify with opposing 
political groups. In effect, the claim is that the distinct proficiencies of these partisans are used 
to form identity-congruent assessments of new evidence (Kahan, 2017). Over five studies, I 
put this claim to the test—measuring diverse outcome variables spanning the distinct processes 
of belief updating and evidence evaluation. In addition, as alluded to above, a particular 
shortcoming of the study in Part 2.1 is the lack of a normative benchmark against which to 
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evaluate putative bias in belief updating (cf. Hahn & Harris, 2014). Thus, the relevant studies 




































Sampling Population and Strategy 
 
The primary sampling population used in this thesis is Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 
MTurk is a US-based online marketplace where “requesters” post Human Intelligence Tasks 
(HITs) for “workers” to complete. Typically, HITs are basic, monotonous tasks that machines 
struggle to complete—such as composite image recognition—but which humans find trivial 
(hence the moniker “human intelligence tasks”). In recent years, however, increasing numbers 
of behavioural scientists have turned to MTurk as a source of relatively inexpensive and rapidly 
available data (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Rand, 2012; Stewart, Chandler, & 
Paolacci, 2017). Indeed, in all but one case (Study 4 in Part 2.2) I draw my study subjects from 
MTurk. In the following sections I thus outline in detail the strengths and weaknesses of MTurk 




The explosion in the use of MTurk in behavioural science has prompted extensive study of its 
sample characteristics. Such studies have revealed that, while workers are not demographically 
representative of the general US population—they tend to be younger, more educated, more 
liberal (politically) and disproportionately White (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016)—they are more 
diverse than the average nonprobability sample used in behavioural science (Berinsky, Huber, 
& Lenz, 2012; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). In other words, relative to undergraduate 
university students (the typical psychology study population), use of MTurk affords greater 
license to generalize results beyond the confines of the particular study in which they were 
obtained. Of course, engaging in confident generalization of results from any nonprobability 
sample of an unrepresentative population is fraught with difficulties, and, in general, should be 
avoided. I therefore consider the relative demographic diversity of MTurk—vs. the average 
behavioural science sample—a slightly-less-problematic weakness, than a strength per se. 
Indeed, I revisit sample diversity in the “Weaknesses” subsection below. 
 
MTurk provides access to an enormous pool of potential research subjects. While Amazon 
claims that there are over 500,000 registered worker accounts (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016), this 
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number is likely to be a considerable overestimate of those completing HITs; impartial analyses 
estimate that there are approximately 15,000 unique US worker accounts active at any one time 
(Stewart et al., 2015). Despite this radically lower estimate, however, MTurk still provides 
access to a number of potential research subjects that far surpasses that of the average research 
pool previously available to researchers; which, on a liberal estimate, was probably somewhere 
between 150-250 undergraduate psychology students (in a given academic year). Accordingly, 
a significant advantage of MTurk is the ability for researchers to recruit a higher number of 
study subjects and thus increase statistical power when testing hypotheses.  
 
This advantage is particularly acute in the case of between-subjects randomized experiment 
designs, where the required sample size to detect an effect size of r = .21 (the average effect 
size in social psychology, see Richard, Bond Jr., & Stokes-Zoota, 2003) with 80% statistical 
power is N = 1741. This sample size estimate reflects that required for a simple comparison 
between two groups; frequently, however, researchers (including myself in the studies in this 
thesis) desire to test second- and third-order interaction terms, meaning that N = 174 is likely 
to be a considerable underestimate of that required to test hypotheses common in psychology. 
Moreover, r = .21 is an estimate of the average effect size—implying that many effects that 
are studied in psychology will be smaller, and thus require even larger sample sizes to detect. 
Historically, most studies in psychology have had much smaller sample sizes than that required 
to detect the average effect size in the field; implying that numerous classic studies are severely 
underpowered. Combined with publication bias, optional stopping in data collection and other 
“questionable research practices” (Agnoli, Wicherts, Veldkamp, Albiero, & Cubelli, 2017; 
John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Simmons et al., 2011), this may help explain the low rates 
of replication observed in the research literature (Camerer et al., 2018; Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015). 
 
Much of the research reported in this thesis employs between-subjects randomized experiment 
designs—for example, the studies reported in Parts 1.4, 2.1 and 2.2. These studies involve focal 
statistical tests ranging from that on main effect terms (e.g., simple group comparisons, as 
above) to three- and even four-way interaction terms. The sample sizes range commensurately 
from N = 800 (Part 1.4) to N = 2000 (Part 2.2, Study 4), and, in all cases, are accompanied by 
                                                 
1 This sample size estimate was generated in G*Power (v. 3.1.9.2, Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2009) 
using the following parameters for an independent t-test: Two-tailed, d = 0.4296 (equivalent to r = .21),  = .05, 
 = .80, allocation ratio (i.e., the ratio of subjects in group 1 to group 2) = 1.  
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a priori power analyses or other principled justification for the sample size used (e.g., where I 
conduct replications of other scholars’ work, I recruit at least the original sample size, if not 
1.5-2 times greater). In most cases, without MTurk, these hypothesis tests would not have been 
feasible—or ethical—to conduct because of sample size constraints. I thus consider the size of 
the MTurk subject pool to be a substantial boon to the quality and content of the research in 
this thesis, and also to psychological science in general (whatever else may be said for MTurk). 
 
A final strength that I would like to highlight is the rapidity of data collection afforded by 
MTurk (and, in fact, any online data collection). It is not uncommon that studies with a sample 
size of several hundred or more are completed within a few hours of initializing data collection. 
In my experience, this allowed me to redirect time that I would otherwise have spent in the lab 
supervising subjects—for hundreds of hours or more given the number of subjects required—
to experiment design, reading articles and otherwise developing my research skills. Indeed, the 
knowledge that data collection would be so rapid meant that studies could remain in the design 
and analysis preregistration stage for considerably longer, and were thus more informative and 
of higher quality in the long run. Similarly, I was able to spend more of my time learning to 
use the statistical programming language R, preparing and documenting data and scripts for 
public archiving, and travelling to training courses and workshops to develop my research 
skills. In my estimation, these gains greatly improved the quality of the research reported in 
this thesis, and were in large part due to time saved not sitting in the lab supervising individual 
study subjects. Of course, not all research questions can be answered by collecting data online 
(and via MTurk in particular), but I was fortunate enough to work in a research area where this 




Given the politically left-leaning composition of MTurk, and the political focus of much of the 
research in this thesis, it is responsible to consider whether MTurk samples provide particular 
threats to inference in the case of my research. On the one hand, the relative lack of politically 
right-leaning workers in the MTurk subject pool clearly puts constraints on my ability to 
generalize some of my results to that population—for example, my results regarding political 
belief formation (e.g., Part II) (Kahan, 2013, 2016a). On the other hand, however, none of my 
primary hypothesis tests are focused on the political characteristics of right-leaning individuals 
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per se2. For example, whether they behave differently from left-leaning individuals (as in the 
line of research conducted by e.g., Jost and colleagues, 2003, 2017). Instead, my investigations 
focus on more general aspects of cognition and behaviour, and I use right- and left-leaning 
partisans—typically in conjunction—to test hypotheses of interest.  
 
Added to this, recent work from Clifford and colleagues (2015) suggests that the political left 
and political right on MTurk share similar psychological characteristics to the left and right in 
nationally representative samples. In particular, these authors find that they score similarly on 
measures of personality and values related to political ideology (ibid.). This suggests that 
political partisans recruited via MTurk are not psychologically incomparable to the average 
US partisan. This suggestion converges with recent work on the generalizability of results from 
convenience samples. In particular, there appears to be minimal heterogeneity in average 
treatment effects (ATE) estimated on MTurk samples vs. national probability samples of US 
adults. Coppock (2018) recently replicated 12 political science experiments on MTurk and 
found a correlation of r = .83 between the ATEs and ATEs obtained in nationally representative 
samples (see also Mullinix et al., 2015). Moreover, this relative homogeneity in ATEs across 
samples has been demonstrated to occur because the conditional average treatment effects—
that is, the ATEs among sample subgroups (e.g., Democrats and Republicans)—are strongly 
correlated across convenience and representative samples (Coppock, Leeper, & Mullinix, 
2018). Put more simply, diverse subjects in both types of samples tend to respond similarly to 
treatment effects. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that studies in which I estimate 
experimental effects are not strongly adversely affected by the political composition of MTurk.  
 
Of course, when estimating nonexperimental effects or interaction terms with covariates, the 
scarcity of right-leaning MTurk workers may have more strongly affected inferences. For 
example, in Study 4 of Part 2.2 I conducted a direct replication of the immediately-preceding 
Study (3). Whereas the latter’s sample was drawn from MTurk, the former drew from Lucid—
a survey platform whose population is more representative of the general US population 
(Coppock & McClellan, 2017). It is telling that I did observe some key differences in results 
between these two studies, differences which may have been due to the change in sampling 
population. However, I also observed key similarities, and it is equally plausible that the 
                                                 
2 In several cases, I test exploratory hypotheses that ask questions related to left-right differences in 
cognition/behaviour; for example, in Parts 1.3 and 2.1. These are clearly pointed out in the relevant studies. 
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aforementioned differences were due to minor changes in the design/procedure of the study 
and/or sampling variability (for more detail, I refer to Part 2.2 Study 4 Discussion).  
 
The popularity of MTurk as a sampling population has generated problems of itself. Most acute 
is the problem of nonnaiveté among study subjects, and what has been dubbed an emerging 
“tragedy of the commons” in data quality (Stewart et al., 2017; cf. Hardin, 1968). The crux of 
the problem is that many research labs now draw their study subjects from MTurk, and, in 
some cases, have done so for many years. Popular experimental paradigms, tasks, and other 
measures have thus become very familiar to a subset of MTurk workers; typically, those who 
are most active on the platform. One possible consequence of this increase in familiarity is a 
decrease in effect sizes obtained in experimental tasks (Chandler, Paolacci, Peer, Mueller, & 
Ratliff, 2015). Another consequence may be inflation of task performance through practice 
effects. 
 
Regarding the research reported in this thesis, studies in which task familiarity may pose a 
particular threat to inference include all of the studies in Part 2.2, as well as the studies in Parts 
1.2 and 1.4. In the former studies (Part 2.2), I used a task known as the “Cognitive Reflection 
Test” (CRT)—a 3-item behavioural measure of the propensity to think analytically (Frederick, 
2005). The 3-item CRT has been used extensively on MTurk, and many workers are now 
familiar with the items that comprise the test (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016); possibly 
upwardly biasing test scores (Stewart et al., 2017).  
 
Fortunately, there are several factors that allay concerns regarding threat to inference in the 
case of Part 2.2. First, in all relevant studies I use an updated version of the CRT—which 
lengthens the test to 7-items, and rewords the original three items so that they are less familiar 
(Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2012; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). In fact, introduction of 
these new items—combined with some residual familiarity among MTurk workers—meant 
that the scores on the test were approximately normally distributed in most of my samples (see 
Part 2.2, Supplemental Material). This stands in contrast to scores in the general population 
where over a third of people get none of the answers correct (e.g., Kahan, 2013). Given that 
scores on the CRT are typically correlated with other measures, the distributions in my samples 
actually provide statistically- and theoretically-favourable conditions for associations of 
interest to emerge. A related point is that the CRT appears to retain its predictive validity even 
despite nonnaiveté (Bialek & Pennycook, 2017; Meyer et al., 2018). In other words, while the 
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average score in a sample may increase with familiarity, the between-subjects ordering of the 
scores—which is relevant to the predictive validity of the CRT—does not change much. Since 
the studies in Part 2.2 concern the predictive validity of the CRT, I consider some familiarity 
with the items to be minimally problematic for inference. 
 
In Parts 1.2 and 1.4, I use classic behavioural economic games to measure prosocial behaviour. 
Specifically, Dictator Games (DG) and Trust Games (TG). Such games are commonly used on 
MTurk, and recent research has identified that subject behaviour tends toward the rational, 
game-theoretic optimum with experience (Rand et al., 2014). While I did not implement 
specific countermeasures in my studies to guard against prior experience with the DG and TG, 
I note that the results of the relevant studies are far from equivocal in any case. In particular, 
in the studies in Part 1.2, across a series of analytic techniques—including Bayesian analyses—
I observe robust evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. Similarly, in Part 1.4 I observe 
relatively compelling rejections of the null hypothesis—the relevant |z| and |t| values exceeding 
5 and 4, respectively. It strikes me as implausible that a (probably small) experience-driven 
shift in behaviour in the DG/TG would overturn such results in either of these cases (i.e., Parts 
1.2 and 1.4). Nevertheless, I admit that I cannot rule it out completely. 
 
A further potential threat to data quality on MTurk is highlighted by the recent discovery (in 
late summer 2018) of “server farms”, where would-be study subjects concealed their physical 
locations using virtual private servers—circumventing traditional techniques that prevent the 
same worker from completing the same study more than once (Dennis, Goodson, & Pearson, 
2018; TurkPrime, 2018). Moreover, the data quality provided by these subjects was found to 
be considerably lower than other subjects (ibid.). This episode illustrates the wider issue of 
data quality when data is collected online, and not under the supervision of the researcher. 
Fortunately, the latest data collection period for the research in this thesis was early summer 
2018—which likely missed the majority of the server farms episode. Beyond this, however, 
my primary countermeasures to poor data quality via inattentive responding were to (i) specify 
only those workers who met certain quality criteria (such as completing a certain number of 
HITs in the past, cf. Chandler & Shapiro, 2016) and (ii) implement subtle “attention checks” 
and comprehension questions during data collection—excluding check failures for my primary 
analyses. Moreover, in most studies reported in the thesis I also conduct a range of exploratory 
sensitivity analyses and robustness checks—to ensure that results do not depend upon particular 
exclusion criteria (even those that are preregistered). For example, in the studies in Part 1.3, 
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after conducting such sensitivity analyses and robustness checks I conclude that the primary 
preregistered result is not particularly robust, and any effect is likely to be small/tenuous.  
 
Measuring Outcomes: Self-Report and Behavioural Economic Games 
 
The majority of studies in this thesis measure outcomes via self-report scales, most commonly 
some form of Likert scale or other scale-type response. However, as already mentioned, in 
several studies I also measure outcomes in the form of decisions made in financially-
incentivized economic games. With respect to the content of research in this thesis—moral 
psychology and belief formation in politics—these alternative methods of measuring outcomes 
harbour different strengths and weaknesses, with implications for inference. I outline and 
discuss these below. 
 
Using self-report as a format for measuring outcomes presents a particular problem in the case 
of my studies that focus on moral psychology and self- and social perception. That is, because 
of socially desirable responding. Moral traits and behaviours are highly desirable (Van Lange 
& Sedikides, 1998), and, given the confines of individual studies, difficult to check against 
reality (Alicke & Govorun, 2005). As a result, study subjects face little disincentive—and 
significant incentive—to exaggerate their possession of moral traits, and their willingness to 
engage in moral behaviours, when providing these via self-report. Indeed, a series of studies 
conducted by Epley and Dunning (2000) shows that individuals consistently over-report their 
moral qualities. For example, in one study, 84% of subjects reported that they would cooperate 
with their partner in a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma game3; yet, when compared against another 
group of subjects (randomly assigned to actually play the game), only 61% of subjects chose 
to cooperate (ibid.). In another study from the same paper, individuals overestimated the 
likelihood that they would contribute to charity (through buying a daffodil) by a factor of 
almost 2-to-1 (84% predicted that they would, yet when the time came only 43% did so).  
 
                                                 
3 While cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma may not seem a particularly representative—or ecologically 
valid—example of “moral” behaviour, research finds that people strongly and consistently recognize 
cooperation as morally superior to defection in this and similar economic games (e.g., Krueger & Acevedo, 
2007; Krueger & DiDonato, 2010; Krueger et al., 2008). This indicates that cooperation in such games is 
considered a moral behaviour (at least, relative to defection) by the layperson. 
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This discrepancy between self-reported and actual behaviour in the study of moral psychology 
and self- and social perception is powerfully illustrated through the studies in Parts 1.2 and 1.3 
of this thesis. There, I find fairly convincing evidence that patterns of self- and social perception 
obtained via self-report do not strongly—or even moderately—predict relevant behavioural 
outcomes; the latter measured using financially-incentivized economic games. Specifically, in 
Part 1.2 I find that subjects’ self-perceptions of trait moral superiority over the average person 
do not predict their willingness to freely help others (in the Dictator Game), or reciprocate trust 
(in the Trust Game). I do find some evidence that subjects’ perceptions of their own moral 
goodness per se—that is, independent of their perceived superiority over others—predicts 
behavioural outcomes. But, even then, the effects are almost trivial in size (e.g., |r| < .15), and 
the estimates are fairly imprecise despite large samples (N > 400).  
 
In Part 1.3, similarly, I find considerable effects regarding the disparity between subjects’ 
moral trait ratings of their political in-party vs. political out-party; including on traits such as 
“trustworthy” and “honest”. Nevertheless, in the behavioural task (a modified version of the 
Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma), I find limited evidence that the disparities on trait ratings 
predict outcomes. These studies, once again, were powered to detect effect sizes arguably 
approaching triviality (e.g., Odds Ratio = 1.4, roughly equivalent to r = .09); and, thus, are 
robust to concerns about lack of statistical power. In sum, the results of the studies in Parts 1.2 
and 1.3 illustrate the value in not solely relying on self-report measures when investigating 
phenomena in the domain of moral psychology and self- and social perception. Furthermore, 
these behavioural results constrain possibly-wayward inferences that might have been made 
based on the self-report results alone—both here and by other scholars in the literature (e.g., 
see the Discussion in Part 1.3 for a particular example case). 
 
Concerns about the validity of self-report extends to Part II of this thesis. Recall that the studies 
in this section investigate political belief formation—and, in fact, in these studies I make 
exclusive use of self-report to elicit the beliefs of subjects. Recent investigations have 
suggested that individuals are prone to report insincere beliefs about political issues—that is, 
beliefs they do not actually hold—or to exaggerate said beliefs in order to “cheer” for their 
political party (Bullock, Gerber, Hill, & Huber, 2015; Khanna & Sood, 2018; Prior, Sood, & 
Khanna, 2015; Schaffner & Luks, 2018). Though some scholars have contested its prevalence 
(e.g., Berinsky, 2018), the weight of evidence appears in favour of the notion that self-reported 
political beliefs are contaminated by such partisan cheerleading. For example, offering small 
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amounts of money for honest answers to politically-relevant factual questions (including “don’t 
know” responses) diminishes estimates of partisan polarization over such questions (Bullock 
et al., 2015; Prior et al., 2015). This implies that “the apparent gulf in factual beliefs between 
members of different parties may be more illusory than real” (Bullock et al., 2015, abstract).  
 
The precise extent of contamination by partisan cheerleading is an empirical question that (to 
my knowledge) remains up for debate, and, indeed, probably varies according to the beliefs 
under investigation. However, it must be acknowledged that the studies I present in Part II—
in which I elicit the political beliefs of subjects via self-report—are likely to be contaminated 
to at least some degree. Given this, it is responsible to consider the implications for inference. 
On the one hand, a uniform effect of partisan cheerleading may serve to exaggerate effect sizes 
across the board. That is, insofar as the relevant hypothesis tests in Part II concern partisans’ 
beliefs about politically-favourable vs. politically-unfavourable stimuli, uniform cheerleading 
can be expected to generate a straightforward overestimate of the disparity between the two 
beliefs. This is not ideal, of course, but does not represent a fatal threat to inference in those 
studies; primarily because studies that find partisan cheerleading never find only that. In other 
words, effects that are indicative of sincere discrepancies in beliefs still remain after accounting 
for cheerleading (e.g., see Khanna & Sood, 2018).  
 
In any case, unlike in the aforementioned investigations (Bullock et al., 2015; Khanna & Sood, 
2018; Prior et al., 2015), financially incentivizing the reporting of beliefs is impractical or 
impossible in many of my studies. This is because the beliefs are measured by questions that 
are not transparently or obviously verifiable. For example, in Studies 3 and 4 in Part 2.2 I ask 
people how “valid” they consider a psychological test of open-mindedness—to some extent an 
inherently subjective belief. Hence, paying subjects for correct responses seems a non-starter.  
 
A final point is that—difficulties in implementation aside—from the perspective of ecological 
validity, financially-incentivizing responses is not necessarily preferable. For example, Kahan 
(2016b, p. 7) points out that, “In the real world, ordinary members of the public do not get 
monetary rewards for forming ‘correct’ beliefs about politically contested factual issues” 
(emphasis in the original). According to his theory, the only material stake individuals have in 
such beliefs is how those beliefs identify them vis-à-vis particular groups in society—the logic 
being that expressing the “wrong” belief amongst one’s peers can induce material (and 
psychological) costs in the form of ostracism and exclusion (see also Kahan, 2016a; Kahan, 
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2017). Given that the large majority of studies presented in Part II concern a direct test of 
Kahan’s theory, one could argue that the lack of financial incentives thus provides a fairer 
examination of that theory. 
 
Observational and Experimental Research Designs 
 
The studies reported in this thesis comprise a mix of observational and experimental research 
designs. From the perspective of causal inference, experimental designs are preferable (Gerber 
& Green, 2012). That is, because random assignment of treatments—provided said assignment 
meets several assumptions—allows the researcher to infer causal relationships between one 
variable and another. Often, however, random assignment is not feasible (or ethical). For 
example, in all of the studies in Part 2.2, a key measure that I employ is performance on the 
Cognitive Reflection Test—which I use as a proxy for individuals’ cognitive ability. Clearly, 
random assignment of cognitive ability is not feasible, and so observational measurement of 
this variable was necessary. While observational research does not altogether preclude causal 
inference, it massively complicates it (e.g., Rohrer, 2018). Where I use observational research 
designs, therefore, I am careful to respect this fact—and to resist the tendency to “slip” into 
using causal language.  
 
As a further remedy, where I use observational designs I try to point out and describe how 
subsequent research might improve on my design in order to test causal relationships between 
the variables of interest. For example, in Part 1.3 I use an observational design to test the 
hypothesis that moral polarization—that is, the tendency for people to view co-partisans’ 
moral character positively, and opposing partisans’ moral character negatively—predicts 
behavioural outcomes. In the Discussion section of that paper, I outline how future 
investigations might investigate whether such a relationship is causal. Specifically, I suggest 
that one might randomly assign moral characteristics to in-party and out-party members, and 
measure subsequent behaviour. Likewise, in the Discussion section of Part 2.2, I argue at length 
that many studies that report evidence of “motivated reasoning” do not randomly assign 
motivation—leaving the results of such studies open to various confounding factors, such as 
the prior beliefs of the reasoner (I refer to the Discussion of that paper for greater detail). 
 





All studies that I report in this thesis contain at least one a priori hypothesis test. Accordingly, 
all studies (but one) in this thesis are preregistered. That is, the hypothesis, sampling strategy, 
study design and analysis plan were specified ahead of data collection. The primary benefits of 
preregistration are the prevention of (i) undisclosed flexibility in data analysis (conscious or 
unconscious) (Nosek et al., 2018; van’t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016), and (ii) hypothesizing 
after the results are known (e.g., Kerr, 1998). Both of these practices violate the assumptions 
of null hypothesis significance testing; which require that researchers do not condition their 
analytic strategy on, or derive their hypothesis from, the observed data.  
 
There are now many routes and templates through which researchers can preregister their study 
designs and hypothesis tests (Nosek et al., 2018). The primary route I use in this thesis is the 
Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/), but I also use AsPredicted (https://aspredicted.org/); 
for shorter protocols, or protocols that were written early in my doctoral studies—before I 
transitioned to the OSF. In my experience, preregistration caused me to design better, more 
informative studies, and to think more clearly through each analysis plan—for example, exactly 
whether and how it provided a diagnostic test of the hypothesis in question. Of course, 
preregistration protocols can vary in quality, and even the most well-thought-out plans 
sometimes require deviations—given hindsight—once the data are in. Where such deviations 
are required, transparency in reporting is essential. As a case in point, in Studies 1-2 in Part 2.2 
I mis-specified the random effects structure in a linear mixed effects modeling strategy written 
into the preregistration. This mis-specification was only discovered after the data were 
collected and analysed. Thus, in the write-up of these studies I fit and report the models with 
both random effects structures; the preregistered, incorrect structure, and the correct structure 
identified after-the-fact. Fortunately, in this case the results do not change much, but the 
example illustrates that preregistration is not perfect—and is certainly not a straitjacket to 
conducting additional (or different) analyses if the preregistered analyses are suboptimal. It is 
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In Part I, I investigate (i) people’s beliefs about their own moral goodness relative to the 
average person—in particular, I ask whether and to what extent such beliefs are irrational—
and (ii) people’s beliefs about the moral goodness of their political in-party relative to their 
political out-party. Using economic games, I subsequently test whether people’s beliefs 
regarding (i) and (ii) correlate with behavioural outcomes. Finally, I test whether people’s 
motivation to “do the morally right thing” underpins their prosocial behaviour in economic 
games. 
 
Specifically, in Part 1.1 I report a study in which people were asked to rate themselves and the 
average person on various moral and nonmoral traits. A positive disparity between self-ratings 
and ratings of the average person has been referred to as “self-enhancement”, and such positive 
disparities are widespread. On this basis, previous researchers have inferred irrationality on the 
part of self-enhancing individuals. Following others, I argue that this inference is premature 
because it does not respect the uncertainty inherent in social perception, nor does it attempt to 
take account of this uncertainty. Adapting a recently-developed method, I attempt to account 
for this uncertainty and to isolate residual, “irrational” self-enhancement. My central finding is 
that such irrational self-enhancement is largest in the moral domain. However, contrary to 
influential theory, magnitude of moral self-enhancement was not correlated with self-esteem. 
 
In Part 1.2, I report two studies in which I investigated whether the magnitude of moral self-
enhancement identified in Part 1.1 predicts prosocial behaviour. Specifically, whether it 
predicts behaviours commonly considered moral—like freely helping others, and reciprocating 
trust. I model these behaviours using economic games; the Dictator Game and Trust Game, 
respectively. Through a combination of analytic approaches, I find a convincing lack of 
evidence that moral self-enhancement predicts behaviour in these games. However, I find some 
evidence that individuals’ beliefs about their moral goodness per se—irrespective of their 
perceived superiority over others—weakly predicts behavioural outcomes. I conclude that 
moral self-enhancement (superiority) lacks predictive validity because of its dual constituent 
parts (i.e., self and other evaluation).  




In Part 1.3, I report two studies in which I extended the investigation of moral superiority to 
Democratic and Republican partisans in the US. In particular, in these studies I tested whether 
the disparity in moral evaluation between the in-party and out-party—referred to here as moral 
polarization—predicts behavioural hostility toward the out-party. I model this behaviour using 
a variant of the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma. Though I find that moral polarization per se is 
large—larger than polarization in nonmoral domains of evaluation—I observe unconvincing 
evidence that it predicts behavioural expressions of out-party hostility. These results strike an 
optimistic chord and converge with recent work in political science on the limits of partisan 
prejudice. 
 
Finally, in Part 1.4 I report a study in which I conducted an improved and extended test of the 
morality preference hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, prosocial behaviour is motivated 
by people’s preference for “doing the morally right thing”. I identify important confounds and 
unresolved questions in recent work that purports to find support for this hypothesis. In my 
study, I correct these confounds and extend the design to answer the unresolved questions. I 
convincingly replicate support for the morality preference hypothesis. However, through my 
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1.1. The Illusion of Moral Superiority4 
 
Abstract 
Most people strongly believe they are just, virtuous, and moral; yet regard the average person 
as distinctly less so. This invites accusation of irrationality in moral judgment and perception—
but direct evidence of irrationality is absent. Here, we quantify this irrationality, and compare 
it against the irrationality in other domains of positive self-evaluation. Participants (N=270) 
judged themselves and the average person on traits reflecting the core dimensions of social 
perception: morality, agency, and sociability. Adapting new methods, we reveal that virtually 
all individuals irrationally inflated their moral qualities, and the absolute and relative 
magnitude of this irrationality was greater than that in the other domains of positive self-
evaluation. Inconsistent with prevailing theories of overly positive self-belief, irrational moral 
superiority was not associated with self-esteem. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
moral superiority is a uniquely strong and prevalent form of “positive illusion”, but the  















                                                 
4 The work presented in this section was conducted in collaboration with Ryan McKay (supervisor) and is 
published in Social Psychological and Personality Science: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1948550616673878 





Most people believe they are just, virtuous, and moral. These beliefs demand scientific 
attention for several reasons. For one, in contrast to other domains of positive self-belief, they 
likely contribute to the severity of human conflict. When opposing sides are convinced of their 
own righteousness, escalation of violence is more probable, and the odds of resolution are 
ominously low (Pinker, 2011; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Moreover, self-righteousness 
is not confined to conflict situations; a substantial majority of individuals believe themselves 
to be morally superior to the average person. Compared to “above average” beliefs in other 
domains (e.g., see Alicke & Govorun, 2005), distinct lines of evidence suggest widespread 
moral superiority may be particularly irrational—yet direct empirical support for this is absent. 
In the present study, we quantify this irrationality. We find that moral superiority represents a 




In their seminal review, Taylor and Brown (1988) advanced the case for a triad of positive 
illusions—the first of which was overly positive self-evaluation. They regarded these 
phenomena as reflecting inaccuracies in social perception, persisting as a result of their 
beneficial effect upon human wellbeing. The common means of inferring the presence of 
positive illusions is to ask individuals how they compare with respect to the average person 
along some dimension. This method consistently reveals that an implausibly high number of 
people believe that they are above average—a phenomenon dubbed the “better-than-average 
effect” (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; or “self-enhancement”, Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). Though 
this phenomenon emerges across a range of characteristics, the magnitude of self-enhancement 
is strongest for moral qualities.  
 
Across four studies, Alicke and colleagues (2001) reported evidence that desirable moral traits, 
such as honesty and trustworthiness, are associated with the largest difference between 
judgments of the self and the average person. A similar pattern has been found for undesirable 
traits—clearly moralized terms such as “liar” produce the strongest asymmetries in self-other 
judgment (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995). Multiple studies 
converge on the same conclusion: magnitude of self-enhancement is stronger for moral 
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characteristics—like honesty—than for other desirable but non-moral characteristics, such as 
competence (Brown, 2012; Möller & Savyon, 2003), wisdom (Zell & Alicke, 2011), ambition 
(Alicke et al., 2001) and intelligence (Van Lange & Sedikides, 1998). Moreover, whereas self-
enhancement of various non-moral traits may diminish with age, the self-other asymmetry for 
moral traits remains consistently large throughout the lifespan (Zell & Alicke, 2011). Such is 
the extent of this phenomenon that violent criminals consider themselves more moral than law-
abiding citizens living in the community (Sedikides, Meek, Alicke, & Taylor, 2014). 
 
The Ubiquity of Virtue 
 
To compound the paradox of widespread moral superiority, most individuals appear assured of 
the loftiness of their virtuous qualities (relative to their other qualities).  Desirable moral traits 
are perceived to be highly descriptive of oneself—more so than other desirable but non-moral 
traits. For example, in a vast cross-national sample of 187,957 participants spanning 11 
European countries, Gebauer and colleagues (2013) reported that, of two distinct trait 
dimensions, the one comprising desirable moral terms such as “faithful” and “honest” was 
judged as more self-descriptive than the one which included non-moral terms such as “clever” 
and “wise”. Additional cross-cultural data converge on the same conclusion. In a similarly 
sized sample comprising participants from 54 countries and all fifty US states, the moral 
characteristics of “honesty” and “fairness” were ranked consistently highly in individuals’ self-
description (Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2006). Wojciszke and Bialobrzeska (2014) compared 
two distinct trait dimensions, one including desirable moral characteristics—such as “fair, 
“honest”, and “loyal”—and the other including desirable non-moral characteristics such as 
“intelligent”, “knowledgeable”, and “logical”. Across six diverse cultures, they found that the 
traits in the former dimension were judged to be more descriptive of the self (also see 
Wojciszke, Baryla, Parzuchowski, Szymkow, & Abele, 2011). Indeed, numerous studies have 
shown that individuals believe they possess, on average, more honesty and trustworthiness than 
any other characteristic, including intelligence, modesty, friendliness, determination, and 
independence (e.g., Alicke et al., 2001; Brown, 2012; Sedikides, 1993). Finally, individuals 
anticipate that, whereas desirable non-moral traits will come and go throughout the course of 
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Taken together, the preceding lines of evidence present a striking asymmetry. Most people 
consider themselves paragons of virtue; yet few individuals perceive this abundance of virtue 
in others. As a descriptive phenomenon, this pattern is perhaps unsurprising. Previous research 
indicates that self-enhancement emerges most strongly for traits that are both desirable and 
ambiguous (e.g., Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989)—a product of the increased 
degrees of freedom for self-favouring construal of the traits in question.  That self-enhancement 
is strongest in the moral domain is directly consistent with this evidence. Morality traits are 
highly desirable (Van Lange & Sedikides, 1998) yet difficult to check against reality (Alicke 
& Govorun, 2005), and there is significant variability in the behaviours considered indicative 
of a “moral” person (Graham, Meindl, Beall, Johnson, & Zhang, 2016). 
 
However, normatively speaking, moral superiority may reflect significant incoherence in social 
judgment and perception. To illustrate why, consider a typical individual, Jane, tasked with 
judging the morality of herself and the average person. The reviewed evidence suggests Jane 
construes her morality in very positive terms—in part by capitalizing on trait ambiguity. In 
contrast, her judgment of the average person is decidedly less positive. This suggests that Jane 
foregoes the corollary that high trait ambiguity permits a majority of others to be equally as 
moral as she, albeit in their own idiosyncratic ways (Dunning et al., 1989). Unfortunately, 
Jane’s double standard incurs a cost to her judgment accuracy. Self-judgments act as valid cues 
to what the average person is like—justified by the fact that most people are in the majority 
most of the time. Indeed, appropriately gauging the prototypicality of one’s own characteristics 
improves accuracy in judgments of ill-defined others (e.g., Hoch, 1987; Krueger & Chen, 
2014); neglecting this prototypicality may thus amount to a failure of inductive reasoning 
(Krueger, Freestone, & MacInnis, 2013). Consequently, given that most people consider 
themselves highly moral, if Jane strongly self-enhances her morality—as the evidence indicates 
she will—this may also compromise the accuracy of her social perception. 
 
The Present Study 
 
There is mounting support for the idea that moral superiority is an especially potent positive 
illusion. However, the term “illusion” specifically implies irrationality in belief—an accusation 
that lacks decisive evidence (Krueger & Wright, 2011). Prevailing measures of self-
enhancement do not discriminate between the rational (i.e., defensible) and irrational 
(indefensible) components of self-enhancement (Heck & Krueger, 2015). To our knowledge, 
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there have been no attempts to quantify and compare the irrationality in moral self-
enhancement with that in other domains of self-enhancement. The present study addresses this 
lacuna. We adapt a novel method (Heck & Krueger, 2015) to isolate and quantify the irrational 
component of moral superiority, and compare it against the irrationality in other domains of 
self-enhancement. We also examine whether the irrational component of moral superiority is 
associated with wellbeing, as the prevailing conception of positive illusions (Taylor & Brown, 






We sought to recruit 265 participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com) to 
achieve greater than 90% power to detect a small effect of d=0.2 (at α = .05) in our primary 
analyses of variance and paired samples t-tests. We over-recruited by 15% to account for data 
exclusions; bringing our collected sample size to 308 participants (153 male; Mage = 37.81, SD 
= 11.77). Data from 20 participants were excluded from all analyses due to failing at least one 
attention check (8 participants) and/or providing incomplete responses (15 participants). A 
further 18 participants were excluded from the final regression analyses due to lack of variation 
in judgments of the self, the average person, and/or trait desirability—leaving a sample size of 
270 for the primary analyses. 
 
Procedure & Materials  
 
Procedure. After providing online consent, participants were presented with a list of 30 traits, 
comprising ten trait terms each for the dimensions’ morality, agency, and sociability. They 
were asked to judge the extent to which each trait described (a) themselves, (b) the average 
person, and (c) the social desirability of each trait. Participants rated all 30 traits according to 
either (a), (b), or (c), before moving onto the next set of ratings, and the order of these three 
sets of judgments was counterbalanced across participants (any order effects were presumed to 
be trivial). The presentation order of the traits themselves was randomized across each rating 
set and participant. Rating judgments for the self and the average person were provided on a 
scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much so). Social desirability judgments were also provided 
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on a seven-point scale, ranging from -3 (Very undesirable) to +3 (Very desirable). Following 
the trait judgments, participants completed four other measures (counterbalanced, detailed 
below) and provided simple demographic information.  
 
Traits. The core dimensions of social perception, communion/warmth and agency/competence, 
are associated with traits related to benevolence and ability, respectively (Fiske, Cuddy, & 
Glick, 2007). Recently it has been empirically demonstrated that the communion/warmth 
dimension is comprised of distinct morality and sociability components—the former 
describing honesty, trustworthiness, and sincerity, the latter warmth, friendliness, and 
likeability (e.g., Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). Thus, drawing upon a comprehensive 
norming study of trait adjectives (Goodwin et al., 2014, Experiment 1), we selected 5 positive 
(desirable) and 5 negative (undesirable) traits for each of the three dimensions’ morality, 
agency, and sociability; providing a total of 30 traits for the present study. Traits were carefully 
chosen to minimize dimension overlap (see the Supplemental Material for details of the trait 
selection procedure). 
 
Other Measures. Self-esteem was measured using the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965). Three additional measures were included, but were not part of the primary 
analyses and are thus not reported further in the main text (see the Supplemental Material for 
relevant analyses). These were the 16-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Ames, Rose, & 
Anderson, 2006), and the Moral Identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and Need-To-Belong (Leary, 
Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2013) scales. 
 
Projection-Based Index of Self-Enhancement 
 
Prevailing measures of self-enhancement conflate defensible (or “rational”) self-enhancement 
with indefensible (or “irrational”) self-enhancement (Krueger & Wright, 2011). For instance, 
given that individuals have more information about themselves than about others, they will be 
relatively less certain about what the average person is like. As a consequence, judgments of 
the average person are likely to be less extreme than self-judgments; with the former tending 
towards the midpoint of the judgment scale (Moore & Small, 2007). The corollary is that 
observed self-other differences in trait judgment—ostensibly indicative of self-enhancement—
may actually reflect rationally cautious judgments made under uncertainty. In order to estimate 
the irrational component of self-enhancement, it is therefore necessary to first account for this 
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rational component. To this end we adapted the Social Projection Index of self-enhancement 
(SPI, Heck & Krueger, 2015).  
 
To estimate what proportion of conventional self-enhancement may be considered rational, the 
SPI first asks how an individual might infer the characteristics of the average person. One 
strategy is to draw upon a relative abundance of self-knowledge. Indeed, in the absence of 
salient diagnostic information about others, one’s own characteristics act as cues to what others 
are like. Decades of research has shown that individuals readily project their own 
characteristics onto others, and that this process—termed social projection—typically 
increases accuracy in judgments of what unknown others are like (for reviews see Krueger, 
2007; Robbins & Krueger, 2005). However, projection may be too weak or too strong—
individuals may under-perceive or over-perceive the similarity between themselves and others, 
respectively. Somewhere in between is the optimal amount of projection, which tracks the 
actual similarity among people. While individuals are unlikely to perceive this similarity with 
complete precision, the researcher can. The similarity may be quantified as the correlation 
between individual self-judgments and the average of all self-judgments in the group (Hoch, 
1987; Krueger et al., 2013). This correlation “coefficient of similarity” thus describes how 
typical of the average a particular individual is, and, importantly, a fully rational perceiver may 
weight their self-judgments by this coefficient to maximize accuracy in their judgments of what 
the average person is like (Hoch, 1987; Krueger & Chen, 2014). Computation of the 
coefficients of similarity therefore provides a rational benchmark against which to evaluate the 
observed self-enhancement of individuals (i.e., the difference between their self-judgments and 
their judgments of the average person). 
 
To illustrate, consider the following example. An individual whose self-judgments are highly 
typical of the average should project more, as their self-judgments are highly diagnostic of 
what the average person is like. In contrast, an individual whose self-judgments are highly 
atypical of the average should project less, as their self-judgments are only weakly diagnostic 
of what the average person is like. In the former case, judgments of the average person are 
expected to be minimally regressive with respect to self-judgments—resulting in a smaller 
latitude for defensible (rational) self-enhancement. In contrast, in the latter case, judgments of 
the average person are expected to be relatively more regressive with respect to self-
judgments—resulting in a larger latitude for defensible (rational) self-enhancement. Crucially, 
in either case, the SPI explicitly models the fact that informational uncertainty mandates that a 
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proportion of conventional self-enhancement be considered rational—avoiding the pitfall of 
earlier measures.  
 
Computationally speaking, the logic outlined above allows researchers to generate rational 
predicted judgments of the average person, by weighting individuals’ self-judgments by their 
respective coefficient of similarity. As Heck and Krueger (2015) point out however, this 
conceptualizes self-enhancement as diminishment of others. Alternatively, it is possible to 
reverse-predict what self-judgments should have been, if rationally projecting individuals 
derived their empirically observed judgments of the average person from their self-judgments. 
These reverse-predicted self-judgements may be labelled inferred self-judgments, and they 
yield a more conceptually appropriate interpretation of self-enhancement as positive self-
inflation.  
 
Determining the rational and irrational components of conventional self-enhancement thus 
requires self-judgments, judgments of the average person, and computed inferred self-
judgments. Then, in a final step, the SPI exploits the empirical observation that most 
individuals possess a positive self-image; ascribing positive traits more readily to themselves 
than to others (and vice versa for negative traits). Accordingly, self-enhancement is modelled 
as the relationship between trait desirability and trait judgment5, meaning that (a) conventional 
self-enhancement is given as the difference between how well trait desirability predicts self-
judgments compared to how well it predicts judgments of the average person; (b) the rational 
component of self-enhancement is the difference between how well trait desirability predicts 
inferred self-judgments compared to how well it predicts judgments of the average person; and, 
finally, (c) the irrational component of self-enhancement is the difference between how well 







                                                 
5 This index of self-enhancement is psychometrically equivalent to a conventional difference-score index (see 
Heck & Krueger, 2015). 
THE INTERSECTION OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & BELIEF FORMATION 
 
36 
Table 1 displays the list of 30 traits, their mean self (S), average person (or “Other”, O), and 
desirability (D) judgments, as well as the respective domain reliability coefficients. Table 2 
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Table 1. Mean Self, Other and Desirability Trait Judgments and Domain Reliability 
Coefficients. 
Trait Self Other Desirability 
Agency - - - 
Hard-working 5.71 (1.24) 4.44 (1.09) 6.54 (0.77) 
Knowledgeable 5.66 (1.03) 4.27 (1.08) 6.37 (0.91) 
Competent 5.89 (1.04) 4.49 (1.07) 6.48 (0.89) 
Creative 4.87 (1.63) 3.94 (1.11) 5.90 (1.02) 
Determined 5.66 (1.32) 4.54 (1.16) 6.18 (0.94) 
Lazy 2.59 (1.54) 3.56 (1.29) 1.64 (1.04) 
Undedicated 2.08 (1.36) 3.20 (1.21) 1.63 (0.91) 
Unintelligent 1.63 (1.00) 3.34 (1.26) 1.56 (0.93) 
Unmotivated 2.42 (1.50) 3.30 (1.22) 1.57 (0.93) 
Illogical 2.02 (1.24) 3.56 (1.40) 1.72 (1.11) 
M: 3.85 (1.83) 3.87 (0.53) 3.96 (2.47) 
Reliability (α): .88 .93 .88 
Sociability - - - 
Sociable 4.31 (1.72) 4.99 (0.91) 6.25 (0.94) 
Cooperative 5.50 (1.29) 4.64 (1.09) 6.41 (0.79) 
Warm 5.13 (1.49) 4.48 (1.09) 6.41 (0.85) 
Family-orientated 4.98 (1.89) 4.83 (1.12) 5.87 (1.17) 
Easy-going 5.31 (1.45) 4.31 (1.02) 6.01 (1.02) 
Cold 2.54 (1.57) 3.13 (1.15) 1.60 (1.02) 
Disagreeable 2.38 (1.34) 3.32 (1.24) 1.49 (0.91) 
Rude 2.14 (1.33) 3.34 (1.28) 1.29 (0.75) 
Humorless 1.88 (1.24) 3.01 (1.12) 1.68 (1.02) 
Uptight 2.47 (1.44) 3.47 (1.23) 1.83 (1.10) 
M: 3.66 (1.50) 3.95 (0.77) 3.88 (2.44) 
Reliability (α): .89 .88 .82 
Morality - - - 
Honest 5.93 (1.06) 4.44 (1.19) 6.55 (0.81) 
Trustworthy 6.10 (0.98) 4.30 (1.26) 6.67 (0.78) 
Fair 5.94 (0.99) 4.51 (1.13) 6.51 (0.85) 
Respectful 5.88 (1.12) 4.55 (1.15) 6.52 (0.75) 
Principled 5.63 (1.23) 4.26 (1.15) 6.16 (0.98) 
Insincere 1.80 (1.02) 3.32 (1.31) 1.49 (0.90) 
Prejudiced 2.12 (1.32) 3.78 (1.38) 1.51 (1.00) 
Disloyal 1.65 (0.89) 3.06 (1.23) 1.31 (0.69) 
Manipulative 2.10 (1.26) 3.39 (1.28) 1.60 (1.06) 
Deceptive 2.07 (1.30) 3.34 (1.29) 1.44 (0.85) 
M: 3.92 (2.09) 3.89 (0.58) 3.98 (2.65) 
Reliability (α): .88 .93 .88 
M (total): 3.81 (1.76) 3.90 (0.61) 3.94 (2.43) 
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Note: For desirability judgments, the -3 to +3 scale was converted to 1 to 7. Standard deviations are 




Table 2. Zero-Order Correlations among Mean Self, Other and Desirability Judgments for Each 
Trait Domain. 
Mean judgment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Agency, self -         
2. Agency, other .30 -        
3. Agency, desirability .39 .19 -       
4. Sociability, self .63 .47 .30 -      
5. Sociability, other .24 .83 .15 .38 -     
6. Sociability, desirability .36 .20 .66 .40 .21 -    
7. Morality, self .65 .32 .38 .69 .27 .43 -   
8. Morality, other .23 .87 .16 .43 .89 .20 .30 -  
9. Morality, desirability .39 .20 .74 .35 .16 .74 .46 .20 - 
Note: For meaningful interpretation, the coefficients are based upon means calculated after reverse-




Rational and Irrational Self-Enhancement 
 
To compute the rational and irrational components of self-enhancement, we first calculated the 
similarity between individual self-judgments and the average of all self-judgments in the group 
(i.e., the coefficients of similarity for each participant). Thus, for each participant, we regressed 
the average self-judgments made by all participants for the traits in a given dimension onto the 
self-judgments of the focal participant for the traits in that dimension. Estimating unique 
coefficients for each dimension acknowledges that individuals may be more similar on some 
dimensions compared to others. We thus obtained three coefficients of similarity and their 
corresponding intercepts for each participant. As outlined above, the SPI posits that these 
coefficients may be used to weight S judgments to generate rational predicted O judgments, P. 
P is thus given as:  
 
𝑃 =  𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑆 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 +  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 
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However, following Heck and Krueger (2015), we instead computed inferred self-judgments, 
I, by rewriting the regression equation:  
 
𝐼 =  
𝑂 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
 +  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 
 
We computed I judgments for each trait over all participants, using the mean6 coefficient of 















+ 1.77   [𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑠] 
 
Thus, at this stage, each participant had four sets of judgments for the 30 traits: their empirically 
observed S, O, and D judgments, and the new I judgments computed according to the method 
outline above. For each dimension, we then regressed S, O, and I on D judgments over each 
participant. We also regressed O on S judgments to cross-check the assumption of social 
projection (a positive association constitutes evidence for social projection; Krueger, 2007). 
Table 3 displays the relevant means. We first draw attention to the evidence of social 
projection; across all trait dimensions, S judgments positively predicted O judgments (mean 
bSO = .23-.30). We then examined whether social projection increased judgment accuracy. For 
each dimension, we computed an accuracy index by correlating other judgments with average 
self-judgments over all participants and traits corresponding to that dimension. Correlating this 
index with magnitude of social projection revealed the expected pattern. Accuracy of other 
judgments was positively associated with social projection across all trait dimensions, r (268) 
= .63-.85, all ps<.001. As projection increased, accuracy of other judgments improved. This is 
                                                 
6 While a more fine-grained approach is to generate inferred-self judgments using the participants’ 
idiosyncratic coefficients of similarity—rather than the mean—these different approaches yield equivalent 
results overall (see e.g., Heck & Krueger, 2015). 
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consistent with previous research (Hoch, 1987; Krueger & Chen, 2014) and confirms the 




Table 3. Mean Slopes and Intercepts from Primary Regression Analyses. 
 Unstandardized  Standardized 
 Slope (b)  Intercept  Beta  95% CI 
 M SE  M SE  M  LL UL 





   
 RSD 0.70 0.02  1.06 0.09  .80  0.76 0.83 
 ROD 0.21 0.02  3.04 0.10  .38  0.30 0.45 
 RSO 0.23 0.02  3.01 0.10  .36  0.29 0.44 
 RID 0.28 0.03  5.17 0.14  .38  0.30 0.45 
Sociability           
 RSD 0.56 0.02  1.48 0.09  .67  0.61 0.72 
 ROD 0.30 0.02  2.78 0.09  .55  0.49 0.61 
 RSO 0.30 0.02  2.81 0.10  .45  0.39 0.51 
 RID 0.57 0.04  7.13 0.17  .55  0.49 0.61 
Morality           
 RSD 0.76 0.02  0.92 0.07  .88  0.85 0.90 
 ROD 0.21 0.02  3.02 0.09  .41  0.33 0.48 
 RSO 0.25 0.02  2.90 0.10  .41  0.34 0.48 
 RID 0.25 0.03  4.17 0.11  .41  0.33 0.48 
Note: R = regression; S = self; O = other; D = desirability; I = inferred-self. SE = standard error; 
CI = Confidence Interval; LL = Lower Limit; UL = Upper Limit. Unstandardized slopes (b) are 




Next, we note the expected observation of conventional self-enhancement. Across all 
dimensions, trait desirability predicted self-judgments (mean bSD) better than it predicted other 
judgments (mean bOD); for morality (.76 vs .21), t (269) = 22.08, p<.001, d=1.34 95% CI [1.18, 
1.51], agency (.70 vs .21), t (269) = 18.75, p<.001, d=1.14 [0.99, 1.29], and sociability (.56 vs 
.30), t (269) = 10.21, p<.001, d=0.62 [0.49, 0.75]. To compare across dimensions, we computed 
a difference measure of conventional self-enhancement as bSD – bOD and conducted a repeated 
measures analysis of variance with Dimension as the single factor: F (2, 538) = 71.70, p<.001, 
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ƞ² = .21. Conventional self-enhancement was greater for morality (.54) than agency (.49), t 
(269) = 2.01, p=.045, d=0.12 [0.00, 0.24], and sociability (.26), t (269) = 11.04, p<.001, d=0.67 
[0.54, 0.80]. Agency was also greater than sociability, t (269) = 8.42, p<.001, d=0.51 [0.39, 
0.64].  
 
What proportion of conventional self-enhancement is accounted for by rational and irrational 
components? To determine the rational component, we examined how well trait desirability 
predicted inferred-self judgments (mean bID) compared to other judgments (mean bOD). 
Sociability had the largest magnitude of rationally defensible self-enhancement: .57 vs .30, t 
(269) = 14.33, p<.001, d=0.87 [0.73, 1.01]. The magnitude for agency was substantially smaller 
(.28 vs. 21), but still non-trivial, t (269) = 3.19, p=.002, d=0.19 [0.07, 0.31]. In contrast, the 
rational component of self-enhancement in the moral domain was trivial in size; .25 vs .21, t 
(269) = 1.72, p=.087, d=0.10 [-0.02, 0.22].  
 
This indicates that irrational self-enhancement is strongest in the moral domain. Indeed, this 
was the case. Examining how well trait desirability predicted actual self-judgments (mean bSD) 
compared to inferred-self judgments (mean bID) revealed the largest discrepancy for morality; 
.76 vs .25, t (269) = 18.17, p<.001, d=1.11 [0.95, 1.26]. Though smaller, agency comprised a 
substantial magnitude of irrational self-enhancement; .70 vs .28, t (269) = 12.97, p<.001, 
d=0.79 [0.65, 0.93]. In stark contrast, there was no evidence for irrationality in self-
enhancement of sociability traits—desirability predicted self and inferred-self judgments 
equally well; .56 vs .57, t (269) = -0.32, p=.750, d=-0.02 [-0.14, 0.10]. In other words, the 
average magnitude of conventional self-enhancement along the dimension of sociability was 
fully accounted for by rational projection-based other judgment. As before, we compared 
irrationality across dimensions by computing a difference measure, bSD – bID, and conducting 
a repeated measures analysis of variance with Dimension as the single factor: F (2, 538) = 
187.19, p<.001, ƞ²=.41. Morality (.50) comprised the greatest magnitude of irrational self-
enhancement, compared with agency (.42), t (269) = 3.33, p=.001, d=0.20 [0.08, 0.32], and 
sociability (-.01), t (269) = 18.04, p<.001, d=1.10 [0.95, 1.25]. Agency was also greater than 
sociability, t (269) = 13.25, p<.001, d=0.81 [0.67, 0.94]. The complete pattern is displayed in 
Figure 1 as the percentage of conventional self-enhancement magnitude accounted for by 
rational and irrational components.  
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Corroborating the analysis of magnitude, the data also show that more individuals irrationally 
self-enhanced (bSD > bID) for moral traits (243, 90% of sample), compared with agency traits 
(218, 81%), χ² (270) = 14.05, p<.001, and sociability traits (134, 50%), χ² (270) = 103.22, 
p<.001. Individuals were also more likely to irrationally self-enhance for agency traits than for 





Figure 1. Percentage of conventional self-enhancement (bSD – bOD) magnitude accounted for 





Ubiquity of Virtue 
 
What accounts for the strength and prevalence of irrationality in moral self-enhancement? 
Consistent with the ubiquity of virtue, prototypicality of individual self-judgments was highest 
in the moral domain—self-judgments tracked average self-judgments better for morality traits 
(mean b = .85) than agency traits (.73), t (269) = 5.96, p<.001, d=0.36 [0.24, 0.49], and 
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sociability traits (.52), t (269) = 12.94, p<.001, d=0.79 [0.65, 0.92]. In other words, as expected, 
the strongest consensus in self-judgment emerged in the moral domain. Importantly however, 
strength of projection to others was not adequately adjusted to reflect this consensus. Projection 
from self to other was no stronger in the moral domain (mean bSO = .25) than in the agency 
domain (.23), t (269) = 1.51, p=.133, d= 0.09 [-0.03, 0.21], and was in fact weaker than 
projection in the domain of sociability (.30), t (269) = 3.07, p=.002, d=0.19 [0.07, 0.31]. Thus, 
trait desirability predicted moral self-judgments to a much greater extent than it predicted moral 
other-judgments, and, taken in conjunction with the ubiquity of virtue, this discrepancy is 
classified as largely irrational.  
 
Inaccuracy and Wellbeing 
 
The prevailing conception of positive illusions (Taylor & Brown, 1988) encompasses two 
central claims about strongly positive self-evaluations. The first is that they reflect an 
inaccurate perception of reality (i), and the second is that this inaccuracy contributes to 
wellbeing (ii).  
 
To examine (i), for each dimension we correlated the previously-computed accuracy index with 
magnitude of irrational self-enhancement in that dimension. As expected, accuracy was 
negatively associated with irrational self-enhancement; for morality, r (268) = -.73, p<.001, 
agency, r (268) = -.71, p<.001, and sociability r (268) = -.65, p<.001. The aforementioned 
accuracy index denotes discrimination accuracy only; thus, we also examined bias—i.e., 
absolute discrepancies in judgment (Epley & Dunning, 2006). For each dimension, we 
computed a discrepancy index of accuracy as the average difference between other judgments 
and the average of all self-judgments over traits and participants. We entered these scores into 
a repeated measures analysis of variance with Dimension as the single factor: F (2, 538) = 
122.67, p<.001, ƞ²=.31. Judgments of others’ morality (1.56) were the most discrepant; 
compared with agency (1.40), t (269) = 5.55, p<.001, d=0.34 [0.22, 0.46], and sociability 
(1.10), t (269) = 15.11, p<.001, d=0.92 [0.78, 1.06], judgments. The most inaccurate judgments 
of others occurred in the domain with the strongest irrationality in self-enhancement. Thus, 
both accuracy analyses support claim (i).  
 
Moving onto (ii), we conducted partial correlations between irrational self-enhancement and 
self-esteem—controlling for the confounding influence of the corresponding rational, and the 
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other dimensions’ rational and irrational, components of self-enhancement. Magnitude of 
irrational self-enhancement in the moral domain was not associated with self-esteem; r (263) 
= -.02, p=.701, whereas irrational self-enhancement in the agency and sociability domains was 





The present study revealed two key findings. The first was that moral superiority comprised a 
substantial irrational component; the absolute and relative magnitude of which was greater than 
that observed in other domains of self-enhancement. Indeed, virtually all individuals 
irrationally inflated their moral qualities. The second key finding was that, unlike the other 
domains of self-enhancement, irrational moral superiority was not associated with self-esteem. 
Taken together, these results suggest a uniquely strong and prevalent illusion of moral 
superiority, and raise intriguing questions about the function of this phenomenon. 
 
The irrationality of moral superiority was borne out of the ubiquity of virtue—almost everyone 
reported a strong positive moral self-image—and individuals’ ignorance of this ubiquity when 
making judgments of the average person. Indeed, neglecting the prototypicality—and thus cue 
validity—of one’s own self-judgments may signal an error in inductive reasoning (Krueger et 
al., 2013). Of course, self-judgments themselves may not accurately reflect genuine moral 
character—for example, compared to behaviour (Back & Vazire, 2012). However, given the 
substantial degrees of freedom in what constitutes “moral” behaviour (Alicke & Govorun, 
2005; Graham et al., 2016), it seems probable that claims of positive moral character are 
equally legitimate (or illegitimate) for a large majority of people. In most cases, it would be 
difficult to make the argument that one moral self-image is more genuine than another. A 
fallacy thus arises when individuals do not apply to others the same degrees of freedom they 
invoke in their moral evaluation of themselves (Dunning et al., 1989). Insofar as this fallacy 
compromises the accuracy of social judgment and perception, it may be deemed erroneous 
(Heck & Krueger, 2015). 
 
Despite finding strong support for the illusory nature of moral superiority, we found that the 
irrational component of moral self-enhancement was not correlated with self-esteem. This is 
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inconsistent with the prevailing conception of positive illusions (Taylor & Brown, 1988), and 
is especially pronounced given that self-esteem was positively associated with magnitude of 
irrational superiority in both the agency and sociability domains. Furthermore, our result is at 
odds with previous evidence that high self-esteem individuals possess a stronger belief in moral 
superiority (Campbell et al., 2002). However, the latter inconsistency may be accounted for by 
measurement differences. Campbell and colleagues assessed superiority using a “comparative” 
measure; that is, they directly asked individuals how much better than average they are. These 
measures correlate most strongly with self-judgments, and only weakly with judgments of 
others (Klar & Giladi, 1999; Krueger & Wright, 2011)—the corollary being that the measure 
used by Campbell and colleagues may have assessed (absolute) moral self-image rather than 
(relative) moral superiority. Support for this proposition is recovered from our own data; self-
esteem did positively correlate with moral self-image (morality bSD), r (268) = .34, p<.001.  
 
As an indicator of wellbeing, self-reported self-esteem is far from exhaustive; it is necessary 
to measure wellbeing by more objective means to decisively test the theory of positive illusions 
(Heck & Krueger, 2015). Nevertheless, the lack of a relationship between self-esteem and the 
irrational component of moral superiority invites speculation as to why this illusion is so 
pervasive (cf. Taylor & Brown, 1988). Though a full discussion is beyond the scope of this 
article, we note that, from other perspectives, moral superiority may not be considered 
irrational at all (cf. Boudry, Vlerick & McKay, 2015). For example, error management theorists 
(e.g., Haselton & Buss, 2000) might view underestimating the morality of others as quite 
rational. Mistaking another person as trustworthy, when in fact they are not, may be associated 
with greater fitness costs than the reverse error. Under such conditions, individuals may tolerate 
decreased judgment accuracy for gains made elsewhere (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2006; but 
see McKay & Efferson, 2010). On this account, moral superiority may persist, in part, as a 
function of the adaptive value of presuming modest morality in unknown others.  
 
The findings of the present study are limited in that they do not reveal the behavioural 
consequences of an illusion of moral superiority. While we advance the case that moral 
superiority is dubious partly because “morality” may be defined by many different behaviours 
(Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Graham et al., 2016), it would be practically useful to know whether 
the illusion of moral superiority predicts certain types of moral behaviour—for example, 
dishonesty for monetary gain. On the basis of existing research there is scope for competing 
predictions. Given the evidence that affirmation of moral image “licenses” subsequent immoral 
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behaviour (Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015), feeling morally superior may promote 
greater dishonesty. Alternatively, to the extent that people value belief-behaviour consistency 
(Festinger, 1962), moral superiority may be associated with a greater likelihood of honest 
behaviour. We defer to future research to test these hypotheses. 
 
The belief that one is morally superior to the average person appears robust and widespread. 
Our examination of this belief revealed substantial irrationality; beyond that observed in other 
domains of positive self-evaluation. On this basis, moral superiority represents a uniquely 
































Procedure & Materials 
 
Traits. Goodwin et al. (2014, Experiment 1) asked 1,048 respondents how useful trait 
adjectives (170 total) were in providing information about higher-level person 
characteristics—such as “ability”, “morality”, and “character”. Participants also rated the 
valence of the traits. For the present study, we selected traits from this dataset according to the 
following procedure. First, we averaged across relevant characteristics to obtain composite 
mean ratings for morality (“morality/immorality”, “character”), agency (“ability”, “agency”), 
and sociability (“warmth”, “communion”) dimensions. Next, for each dimension we identified 
10 traits with high composite mean ratings for that dimension; 5 positively valenced (i.e., 
desirable) and 5 negatively valenced (undesirable). We selected both desirable and undesirable 
traits for the present study because the regression-based index of self-enhancement that we 
adapted (outlined in the main text) model’s self-enhancement as the relationship between trait 
desirability and trait judgment. Thus, including desirable and undesirable traits generates the 
required variability in trait desirability judgments. We avoided traits that had a strong overlap 
across dimensions—for example, “compassionate” garnered an equally high composite rating 
for morality (7.55) and sociability (7.71), and was therefore not selected for either dimension. 
We also avoided direct antonyms (e.g., inclusion of both “honest” and “dishonest”) and 
synonyms (e.g., “unintelligent”, “stupid”). Two traits, “manipulative” and “deceptive”, were 




Self-Centrality Breeds Self-Enhancement 
 
Gebauer and colleagues (2013) reported evidence that domain self-centrality predicts stronger 
magnitude of conventional self-enhancement in that domain. Thus, we explored whether the 
self-centrality of a given trait domain would predict greater magnitude of irrational self-
enhancement in that domain. Based upon the rationale behind the constructs, we included the 
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Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI-16, Ames et al., 2006), Need-to-belong (NTB, Leary 
et al., 2013) and Moral Identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) scales as measures of the self-centrality 
of agency, sociability, and morality, respectively. All scale items loaded onto their predicted 
number of factors (all factor loadings ≥.36.), and the scales demonstrated acceptable 
reliabilities (α’s = .86-.92). We thus computed sum scores for each scale following the authors’ 
respective instructions. 
 
We then conducted partial correlations7 between construct scores and their respective irrational 
self-enhancement domain. Neither the internalization subscale nor overall moral identity 
scores were related to magnitude of irrational self-enhancement in the moral domain, r (263) = 
.08, p=.174, and r (263) = -.08, p=.208, respectively. Interestingly, the symbolization subscale 
demonstrated a small negative association with irrational moral superiority; r (263) = -.17, 
p=.005. We also found that scores on the NPI positively correlated with irrational self-
enhancement in the domain of agency; r (263) = .35, p<.001. This is consistent with previous 
research which reported that narcissists most strongly self-enhance their agency characteristics 
(e.g., Campbell et al., 2002). Finally, irrational self-enhancement of sociability traits did not 
relate to NTB scores, r (263) = .03, p=.645. Thus, we found limited evidence that self-













                                                 
7 Controlling for the corresponding rational, and other dimensions’ rational and irrational, components of self-
enhancement. 
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1.2. Investigating the Relationship between Self-Perceived Moral Superiority 
and Moral Behaviour Using Economic Games8 
 
Abstract 
Most people report that they are superior to the average person on various moral traits.  The 
psychological causes and social consequences of this phenomenon have received considerable 
empirical attention. The behavioral correlates of self-perceived moral superiority, however, 
remain unknown. We present the results of two preregistered studies (Study 1, N=827; Study 
2, N=825) in which we indirectly assessed participants’ self-perceived moral superiority, and 
used two incentivized economic games to measure their engagement in moral behavior. Across 
studies, self-perceived moral superiority was unrelated to trust in others and to trustworthiness, 
as measured by the Trust Game; and unrelated to fairness, as measured by the Dictator Game. 
This pattern of findings was robust to a range of analyses, and, in both studies, Bayesian 
analyses indicated moderate support for the null over the alternative hypotheses. We interpret 















                                                 
8 The work presented in this section was conducted in collaboration with Ryan McKay (supervisor) and is 
published in Social Psychological and Personality Science: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1948550617750736  





Self-perceptions of moral superiority appear robust and relatively widespread. In numerous 
studies, majorities of people rate themselves as fairer, more trustworthy, more honest—more 
moral—than the average person (Epley & Dunning, 2000; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2006; 
Klein & Epley, 2016, 2017; Tappin & McKay, 2017; Van Lange & Sedikides, 1998). Under 
the broader phenomenon of “self-enhancement” (Alicke & Sedikides, 2011), past work has 
investigated (i) psychological explanations for (Sedikides et al., 2014; Tappin & McKay, 2017; 
Van Lange & Sedikides, 1998), and (ii) interpersonal consequences of (Barranti et al., 2016; 
Heck & Krueger, 2016) self-perceived moral superiority. There is a conspicuous lack of 
evidence, however, for how these perceptions relate to engagement in behaviors commonly 
considered moral—such as freely helping others, or reciprocating trust. In the present article, 
we report an initial investigation of this relationship. 
 
Self-Perceived Moral Superiority and Engagement in Moral Behavior 
 
There exists much debate over whether the prevalence of self-superiority phenomena is best 
explained by motivational or non-motivational processes (Brown, 2012; Chambers & 
Windschitl, 2004; Taylor & Brown, 1988). This offers a useful framework for speculating on 
how self-perceived moral superiority may relate to engagement in moral behavior.  
 
Consider people who perceive themselves to be strongly morally superior to the average 
person. As a function of their strong sense of righteousness relative to other people, these 
individuals may be motivated to behave in (moral) ways to protect this positive social 
comparison. According to various reviews, self-protection is a fundamental human motivation 
(Sedikides et al., 2015), and social comparison a common process by which people derive 
positive self-evaluation (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Wills, 1981). Moral traits, moreover, are 
held in high regard (Van Lange & Sedikides, 1998), and morality appears to be central to 
notions of identity (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014, 2015). Individuals who possess a weaker 
sense of righteousness over the average person, then, may accordingly possess a relatively 
weaker motivation to protect the (less positive) social comparison. This implies that self-
perceived moral superiority may be positively associated with engagement in moral behavior.  
 
THE INTERSECTION OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & BELIEF FORMATION 
 
51 
Another motivational process that might predict a positive association is sensitivity to the 
charge of hypocrisy. Hypocrites are loathed—more so than people who are honest about their 
moral limitations (Jordan et al., 2017)—and especially so when the hypocrite considers 
themselves to be superior to others (Alicke et al., 2013). Heck and Krueger (2016) recently 
reported evidence that agents who made inaccurate claims of moral self-superiority received 
the strongest moral condemnation from observers; stronger, even, than agents who accurately 
reported being less moral than the average person. Put another way, observers punished people 
most when their self-reported moral superiority was shown to be false by their behavior. These 
findings imply added motivation for such people to behave morally, so to avoid harsh social 
censure. Consistent with this suggestion is evidence that individuals behave more prosocially 
after criticizing another person (Simpson et al., 2013). 
 
Some non-motivational processes, on the other hand, may lead us to expect a negative 
association between self-perceived moral superiority and engagement in moral behavior. 
Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009, 2010) provide evidence that individuals underestimate the 
moral goodness (specifically, trustworthiness) of other people due to an informational 
asymmetry in the social environment. If person A decides to trust person B, this occasionally 
results in surprising and costly betrayal by person B. In contrast, when person A decides not to 
trust person B, this necessarily precludes person A learning that person B was, in fact, 
trustworthy. The implication is that individuals learn asymmetrically about the trustworthiness 
of other people; an asymmetry which may underlie cynicism about the moral goodness of 
others more generally (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2010; Miller, 1999).  
 
Such a mechanism could help explain the prevalence of self-perceived moral superiority. 
Specifically, because the lion’s share of the variance in self-perceived moral superiority likely 
derives from variance in how people perceive the moral goodness of others, rather than 
themselves. There is relatively limited variance in the latter—people seem largely in agreement 
that they themselves are morally virtuous (for a brief review, see Tappin & McKay, 2017). 
Taking this in conjunction with evidence that—in interdependent contexts—individuals’ moral 
behavior is conditional on whether they think others will behave in kind (Krueger & Acevedo, 
2007) implies that greater cynicism—and, thus, greater self-perceived moral superiority—may 
be associated with less moral behavior. 
 
Overview 




Given the uncertainty over how self-perceived moral superiority relates to engagement in moral 
behavior, we set out to investigate this relationship. Specifically, across two studies, we used 
canonical economic games as measures of moral behavior, and indirectly assessed how moral 




The preregistered protocols, analysis scripts and data for both studies are available on the Open 
Science Framework (OSF): https://osf.io/p42mp/. Because of their similarity, we present the 
methods and results of these studies together. 
 
Engagement in Moral Behavior 
 
To measure engagement in moral behavior, we used two incentivized, one-shot, anonymous 
economic games (with no deception); the Trust Game (TG, Study 1) and Dictator Game (DG, 
Study 2). These games are typically taken as providing measures of trust in others and 
trustworthiness, and fairness9, respectively (see below for descriptions of the games).  
 
While a general prosocial preference is likely to underpin behavior in both the TG and DG 
(Peysakhovich et al., 2014), past work suggests that trusting behavior in the TG is distinct from 
giving in the DG (Brülhart & Usunier, 2012), and, indeed, a recent large investigation reported 
that the shared variance between trusting behavior in the TG, and behavior in the DG, was 
relatively modest at 12% (Peysakhovich et al., 2014). The relationship between DG behavior 
and trustworthy behavior in the TG was estimated to be somewhat higher—at 25% shared 
variance with behavior in the DG. In both cases, however, there was evidence of unique 
variance between the games. This suggests that inclusion of both the TG and DG provided us 
with three somewhat overlapping but distinct measures of behavior. 
 
We used economic games to measure engagement in moral behavior because numerous studies 
indicate that people subjectively imbue choices in these games with moral weight. For 
                                                 
9 We refer to the DG as measuring “fairness” throughout, but note that giving in the DG is also consistent with 
altruism (Rand et al., 2016). In analyses, we find little difference in the results depending on how the DG 
measure is construed. 
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example, recent evidence suggests that prosocial behavior in economic games is driven by an 
explicit preference for behaving morally (Capraro & Rand, 2017), and behaving prosocially in 
such games is consistently and strongly judged to be morally superior to behaving self-
interestedly (Krueger & Acevedo, 2007; Krueger & DiDonato, 2010; Krueger et al., 2008). 
The inclusion of the TG and DG thus provided a straightforward decision environment with a 




In our TG, participants are anonymously paired and assigned the role of either “Trustor” or 
“Trustee”. Both participants are given $0.20 as a starting endowment, and the Trustor has the 
option to transfer any amount of their endowment to the Trustee (from $0.00 to $0.20 in 
increments of $0.01). Any amount they transfer is tripled on its way to the Trustee, and the 
Trustee is then able to decide how much, if any, of this tripled amount they would like to 
transfer back to the Trustor (from 0 to 100%). Since the Trustor takes a risk by sending money 
to the Trustee, their decision is usually taken as a measure of trust. The Trustee, on the other 
hand, has the option to reciprocate the trust placed in them by the Trustor, by sending some 
amount of money back to the Trustor. The Trustee decision is thus usually taken as measure of 




In our DG, participants are anonymously paired and assigned the role of either “Dictator” or 
“Receiver”. The Dictator is given $0.30 as a starting endowment, whereas the Receiver starts 
with nothing. The Dictator then has the option to transfer any amount of their endowment to 
the Receiver (from $0.00 to $0.30 in increments of $0.01). Since the Dictator’s decision is 
unilateral, with no possibility of reciprocation (or punishment) from the Receiver, they have 
no financial incentive to share the money. As such, the Dictator’s decision to share money is 
usually taken as a measure of fairness (more technically, inequity aversion, see Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999). 
 
Self-Perceived Moral Superiority 
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To measure self-perceived moral superiority10, we used a regression-based index of trait self-
superiority developed and described in detail elsewhere (Heck & Krueger, 2015; Tappin & 
McKay, 2017). In brief, participants are asked to judge the extent to which 10 moral traits 
describe (i) themselves and (ii) the average person. They also rate (iii) the social desirability of 
the traits. The moral traits are presented in Table 1. Conventional measures of self-superiority 
typically compare how positive self-judgments are with respect to judgments of the average 
person. However, this overestimates the magnitude and frequency of people who harbor 
perceptions of self-superiority. The current measure accounts for this overestimation by 
estimating—and allowing the researcher to remove—a component of self-superiority that may 
be deemed “defensible” because of the uncertainty people face when making judgments of the 
average person. Below we describe the computational steps of the measure only (for more 




Table 1. Positive and Negative Moral Traits Used in Studies 1 and 2. 
Positive moral traits  Negative moral traits 
Honest  Insincere 
Trustworthy  Prejudiced 
Fair  Disloyal 
Respectful  Manipulative 
Principled  Deceptive 




Step 1. We first estimate how similar each participant’s moral self-judgments are to those of 
the average participant in the sample. To do so, we calculate the average self-judgment for each 
moral trait over all participants, and then regress these averages on the moral self-judgments 
made by each individual participant. This provides a moral “coefficient of similarity” 
(unstandardized slope, b) and intercept for each participant. Higher coefficient values indicate 
that the participant is more like the average participant in the sample. We then compute the 
mean moral coefficient of similarity and intercept across participants. 
                                                 
10 In both preregistrations, this construct is referred to as “self-righteousness”. This was relabelled to “self-
perceived moral superiority” during the review process for better linguistic and conceptual clarity. The measure 
is identical to that described in the preregistrations. 




Step 2. Next, we generate inferred moral self-judgments (I) by weighting participants’ 
empirically-observed moral judgments of the average person (O) by the mean coefficient of 
similarity and intercept, using the formula: 
 
𝐼  =   
𝑂
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
  +   𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 
 
Inferred self-judgments represent self-judgments an ideal judge would have made. That is, a 
judge who perceives how morally similar people are, and uses this information to weight their 
judgment of the average person to make a more accurate self-judgment. (The basic rationale is 
this: the more similar people are—defined here by the mean coefficient of similarity—the less 
participants’ self-judgments are expected to deviate from their judgments of the average 
person; see Heck & Krueger, 2015; Tappin & McKay, 2017). At this stage, then, each 
participant has four sets of judgments for the 10 moral traits. Their empirically observed self-
judgments (S), judgments of the average person (O), and social desirability judgments (D), and 
the new inferred self-judgments (I) computed according to the preceding method. 
 
Step 3. In the final step, we regress S, O, and I on D judgments for each participant. This 
produces three unstandardized slopes per participant. These slopes express how well moral trait 
desirability predicts their (i) moral self-judgments (bSD), (ii) judgments of the average person 
(bOD), and (iii) inferred self-judgments (bID). In other words, bSD describes the positivity of 
participants’ moral self-perception, bOD describes the positivity of participants’ perception of 
the average person’s morality, and bID describes the positivity of the participants’ moral self-
perception presupposing they were an ideal judge.   
 
The index of self-perceived moral superiority is computed as the difference between bSD and 
bID (specifically, bSD - bID). This index represents self-perceived moral superiority, but is more 
conservative than conventional measures because it partitions out a “defensible” component of 
self-superiority (which is defined by the difference between bID and bOD)11. 
 
Samples 
                                                 
11 We report correlations between the “defensible” component of self-perceived moral superiority and 
economic game behavior in the SM (section 5). 




We sought to recruit 824 participants in each study, providing approximately N=412 in each 
role. Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Amir & Rand, 2012; Arechar 
et al., 2018; Chandler & Shapiro, 2016; Rand, 2012). Sample sizes were determined via power 
analyses: Our smallest effect size of interest was r=.15, which we required N=343 to achieve 
80% power (=.05) to detect in each of our three primary linear regression analyses (Faul et 
al., 2009). We deliberately oversampled by approximately 20% to guard against power loss 
due to planned data exclusions. Sample sizes after data collection were: Study 1 N=827 
(50.18% female, Mage=38.35 SDage=12.97; Trustor N=413, Trustee N=414), Study 2 N=825 




The procedure in both studies was substantively identical, and we recruited separate samples 
in each case (Study 1 participants were identified via their unique Mechanical Turk ID and 
blocked from participating in Study 2).  All participants provided informed consent, before 
being assigned their role in their respective economic game (Study 1: TG, trustor or trustee, 
Study 2: DG, dictator or receiver, role assignments were counterbalanced). All participants 
then completed (i) the trait judgment task, and (ii) the economic game (counterbalanced), 
except for those assigned the role of receiver in the DG. These participants always completed 
the DG first, and then completed an unrelated task (receivers are entirely passive and so 
collecting their trait judgments was unnecessary).  
 
In the trait judgment task, participants were presented with the list of 10 moral traits alongside 
20 additional, nonmoral filler traits (inclusion of the nonmoral traits allowed us to replicate the 
primary results reported by Tappin & McKay, 2017; see SM section 6). Participants were asked 
to judge (i) the extent to which each trait described themselves, (ii) the extent to which each 
trait described the average person, and (iii) the social desirability of each trait. Participants 
rated all 30 traits according to either (i), (ii), or (iii), before moving onto the next set of ratings, 
and the order of these three sets of judgments was counterbalanced across participants. The 
presentation order of the traits themselves was randomized in each rating set and for each 
participant. Rating judgments for the self and the average person were provided on a seven-
point scale, ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much so). Social desirability judgments were 
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also provided on a seven-point scale, ranging from -3 (Very undesirable) to +3 (Very 
desirable).  
 
In the economic games, participants read instructions and completed three comprehension 
questions assessing their understanding of the payoff structure. Failure to answer all three 
comprehension questions correctly after two attempts resulted in participants being prevented 
from completing the survey. After these questions, we revealed which role the participant had 
been assigned, and they made their decision. We informed them that pairs of decisions would 
be combined and their bonus calculated and awarded after the survey had concluded (which 
was true). In addition to bonuses, all participants received a base fee of $0.50 for taking part. 
At the end of the survey, participants completed simple demographic questions, provided 
feedback on their experience, and were asked whether they had previously taken part in a 




All analyses were conducted in the R environment (R Core Team, 2016). Only dictators are 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics from Studies 1 and 2. 
  Study 1 (TG)  Study 2 (DG) 
  Slope (b)  Intercept  Slope (b)  Intercept 
 M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Components             
 RSD 0.74 0.27  0.98 1.15  0.76 0.26  0.90 1.09 
 ROD 0.19 0.34  3.13 1.47  0.18 0.36  3.15 1.50 
 RID 0.22 0.41  4.38 1.75  0.21 0.41  4.14 1.72 
             
  M  SD  M  SD 
Index of SPMS 0.52  0.41  0.55  0.44 
             
Transfer amount            
 Trustors (c) 13.38  7.28  -  - 
 Trustees (%) 35.24  24.44  -  - 
 Dictators (c) -  -  10.39  6.96 
Note. Components are within-participant regressions involved in computing the index of self-
perceived moral superiority, according to the procedure outlined in the methods section. TG = Trust 
Game, DG = Dictator Game; R = regression; S = self-judgments; D = desirability judgments; O = 
other (average person) judgments; I = inferred-self judgments; SPMS = self-perceived moral 






All data exclusions were preregistered. Before computing the self-perceived moral superiority 
index, we excluded responses that contained duplicate IP addresses (Study 1: n=8, 0.97%, 
Study 2: n=2, 0.48%) and/or one or more failed attention checks (there were three embedded 
in the trait judgment task) (Study 1: n=28, 3.39%, Study 2: n=22, 5.33%). We then proceeded 
to compute the index as outlined in Steps 1-3 in the methods section. During Step 1, those 
participants who responded uniformly on moral self-judgments were excluded (Study 1: n=0, 
0%, Study 2: n=4, 0.97%), because the regression analyses in this step require at least some 
variation. During Step 3, for the same reason, we additionally excluded participants who 
responded uniformly on moral judgments of the average person (Study 1: n=54, 6.53%, Study 
2: n=19, 4.60%), and/or social desirability judgments (Study 1: n=1, 0.12%, Study 2: n=4, 
0.97%). Sample sizes for the primary analyses were thus, Study 1: Trustors N=369, Trustees 
N=367, Study 2: Dictators N=369.  
 
Self-Perceived Moral Superiority and Trust in Others 
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Preregistered analyses. We first regressed trustor decisions on self-perceived moral superiority 
scores (Figure 1). Self-perceived moral superiority was trivially related to transfer amount, 
model summary: F (1, 367) = 0.14, p=.706, R=.02 [predictor summary: b=-0.34, se=0.89, t=-
0.38]. Because the decision data were non-normally distributed, we also conducted a 
Spearman’s rank correlation with the same two variables. The results mirrored the parametric 
analysis: rs=-.05, p=.326. Magnitude of self-perceived moral superiority was not meaningfully 
associated with trusting behavior in the TG. 
 
Exploratory analyses. We conducted several exploratory analyses to test the robustness of this 
conclusion. First, we dichotomized the trustor decisions by assigning them a value of 1 if they 
were greater than the median transfer amount of 15c, and a value of 0 if they were equal to or 
less than this amount. A total of 179 (48.51%) participants transferred greater than the median 
amount of 15c. A binary logistic regression predicting the probability of an above median 
transfer, based on self-perceived moral superiority scores, corroborated the preregistered 
analyses: Odds Ratio (OR) = 0.90, 95% CI [0.55, 1.46], p=.669 (Figure 1). That is, self-
perceived moral superiority was not meaningfully associated with the probability of 
transferring greater than the median transfer amount. For all DVs, we also explored whether 
prior experience with the games was masking an association between self-perceived moral 
superiority and decision behavior in our sample (it wasn’t) (cf. Chandler et al., 2015; see SM 
section 2 for these analyses).  
 
Given these results, we sought to quantify the relative strength of evidence in favor of the null 
hypothesis. We conducted a Kendall’s tau Bayesian correlation analysis using JASP software 
(JASP Team, 2017). Under a uniformly distributed prior, we obtained a Bayes Factor (BF) of 
8.23 in favor of the null hypothesis. That is, the BF indicated moderate support for the null 
over the alternative hypothesis. The BF in favor of the null remained moderate-to-strong over 
a wide range of priors (see SM section 1). The results of the exploratory analyses support those 
of the preregistered analyses. 
 
Self-Perceived Moral Superiority and Trustworthiness 
 
Preregistered analyses. As before, we began by regressing trustee decisions on self-perceived 
moral superiority scores (Figure 1). Self-perceived moral superiority was trivially related to 
back-transfer amount: F (1, 365) = 0.04, p=.851, R=.01 [b=0.60, se=3.17, t=0.19]. Because the 
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decision data were again non-normally distributed, we followed with a Spearman’s rank 
correlation. The results mirrored the parametric analysis: rs=-.004, p=.931. Magnitude of self-
perceived moral superiority was not meaningfully associated with trustworthiness behavior in 
the TG. 
 
Exploratory analyses. Once again, we conducted several exploratory analyses to investigate 
the robustness of this conclusion. We first dichotomized the trustee decisions by assigning 
them a value of 1 if they were greater than the median back-transfer amount of 50%, and a 
value of 0 if they were less than this amount. A total of 55 (14.99%) participants back-
transferred greater than the median amount of 50%. A binary logistic regression predicting the 
probability of an above median back-transfer, based on self-perceived moral superiority scores, 
corroborated the preregistered analyses: OR=0.64 [0.31, 1.32], p=.233 (Figure 1). That is, self-
perceived moral superiority was not meaningfully associated with the probability of an above 
median back-transfer. As before, a Kendall’s tau Bayesian correlation analysis conducted in 
JASP (uniformly distributed prior) returned a BF of 14.58 in favor of the null hypothesis. That 
is, the BF indicated strong support for the null over the alternative hypothesis. The BF remained 
moderate-to-strong over a wide range of priors (see SM section 1). The results of the 
exploratory analyses thus support those of the preregistered analyses. 
 




Figure 1. Relationship between self-perceived moral superiority and transfer amounts in 
studies 1 (A, B) and 2 (C). Scatter points are raw data with slight jitter for visibility and the 
shaded regions denote 95% confidence intervals. (A) Left panel: Preregistered analysis 
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regressing trustor transfer amount on self-perceived moral superiority (b = -0.34, se = 0.89). 
Right panel: Exploratory binary logistic regression analysis of the probability that trustor 
transfer was greater than the median transfer amount (15c), based on self-perceived moral 
superiority scores (OR = 0.90 [0.55, 1.46]). N = 369. (B) Left panel: Preregistered analysis 
regressing trustee back-transfer amount on self-perceived moral superiority (b = 0.60, se = 
3.17). Right panel: Exploratory binary logistic regression analysis of the probability that 
trustee back-transfer was greater than the median back-transfer amount (50%), based on self-
perceived moral superiority scores (OR = 0.64 [0.31, 1.32]). N = 367. (C) Left panel: 
Preregistered analysis regressing dictator transfer amount on self-perceived moral superiority 
(b = -0.62, se = 0.83). Right panel: Exploratory binary logistic regression analysis of the 
probability that dictator transfer was fair (15c), based on self-perceived moral superiority 




Self-Perceived Moral Superiority and Fairness 
 
Preregistered analyses. We began by regressing dictator decisions on self-perceived moral 
superiority scores (Figure 1). Self-perceived moral superiority was trivially related to transfer 
amount: F (1, 367) = 0.57, p=.452, R=.04 [b=-0.62, se=0.83, t=-0.75]. Because the decision 
data were non-normally distributed, we conducted a Spearman’s rank correlation with the same 
two variables. The results mirrored the parametric analysis: rs=-.05, p=.345. We quantified the 
relative strength of evidence in favor of the null by conducting a Bayesian correlation analysis 
in JASP. We preregistered our intention to conduct a Pearson’s rho Bayesian correlation, but, 
given the severe non-normality of the decision data, a Kendall’s tau Bayesian correlation is 
more appropriate. For transparency, we report both. The BFrho was 11.57, and BFtau was 8.38 
in favor of the null hypothesis (uniformly distributed priors). Both indicated moderate-to-
strong support for the null over the alternative hypothesis. In SM section 1, we report BFtau 
over a wide range of priors (it remained moderate-to-strong in favor of the null).  
 
Next, to account for the fact that transfer amounts of greater than 15c—that is, greater than half 
the dictator’s endowment—are technically “unfair” (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), rather reflecting 
altruism or “hyper-fairness” (Henrich et al., 2006; Rand et al., 2016), we repeated the above 
analyses with a truncated sample of dictators—excluding those who transferred greater than 
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15c (Nexcluded=15, 4.07%). The truncated analyses thus tested whether self-perceived moral 
superiority was associated with fairness behavior, where unfair behavior was defined as 
inequity in favor of oneself (i.e., the dictator). The pattern of results was the same as in the full 
sample, regression: F (1, 352) = 0.87, p=.351, R=.05 [b=-0.73, se=0.78, t=-0.93], Spearman’s 
rank correlation: rs=-.06, p=.235, Bayesian correlation: BFrho=9.75 and BFtau=5.88 in favor of 
the null (uniform priors; BFtau robust over a range of priors, see SM section 1). Magnitude of 
self-perceived moral superiority was not meaningfully associated with fairness behavior in the 
DG. 
 
Exploratory analyses. To check robustness, we dichotomized the dictator decisions by 
assigning them a value of 1 if they were equal to 15c, and a value of 0 if they were greater than 
or less than this amount. Fairness was thus strictly defined as rejection of inequity in favor of 
either oneself (dictator) or the other person (receiver). A total of 187 (50.68%) participants 
split the money fairly, transferring exactly 15c. A binary logistic regression predicting the 
probability of fair transfer, based on self-perceived moral superiority scores, corroborated the 
preregistered analyses: OR=0.72 [0.45, 1.15], p=.174 (Figure 1). That is, self-perceived moral 
superiority did not meaningfully predict the probability of a fair transfer. The results of the 




We investigated how self-perceived moral superiority related to behavior in two canonical 
economic games—the Trust Game (TG) and Dictator Game (DG). Across two studies, self-
perceived moral superiority was not associated with magnitude of trust in others, 
trustworthiness, or fairness, as these behaviors are measured in the games. This pattern of 
results was robust to a variety of analyses, and, for each of the three dependent variables, 
Bayesian analyses indicated relatively strong support for the null vs. alternative hypothesis.  
 
The findings are inconsistent with our hypotheses: that self-perceived moral superiority would 
be associated with (i) more, or with (ii) less, moral behavior. Whereas some evidence suggests 
that perceptions of nonmoral self-superiority are associated with (Blanton et al., 1999; Heck & 
Krueger, 2015), and possibly facilitate (O’Mara & Gaertner, 2017) behavioral performance, 
we found that self-perceived moral superiority was not associated with behavior in canonical 
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economic games—in which moral motivation appears reliably engaged (Capraro & Rand, 
2017), and where morally superior decisions are readily discerned (Krueger & Acevedo, 2007; 
Krueger & DiDonato, 2010; Krueger et al., 2008).  
 
Why was self-perceived moral superiority unrelated to behavior in the games? One explanation 
is that our measure was domain general. That is, participants provided judgments for a range 
of moral traits, which fed into a single score indexing their self-perceived moral superiority. It 
is possible that superiority perceived on specific moral traits is associated with behavior 
representative of those traits, but that our domain general measure obscured these relationships. 
We examined this possibility by computing raw difference scores between participants’ self-
judgments and their judgments of the average person for the traits “trustworthy” and “fair” 
only, and correlating these scores with trustee decisions, and dictator decisions, respectively 
(SM section 3). These coefficients were also trivial in size (|rs| <.03)—suggesting that the 
domain-generality of our measure does not account for the current pattern of results. 
 
An interesting and related question is whether individuals’ moral self-perception—not their 
perceived superiority over others—was associated with absolute magnitude of monetary 
transfer in the games. Exploratory correlations suggested a small but consistently positive 
association between moral self-perception (bSD) and transfer amount across dependent 
variables; trust in others (rs=.12), trustworthiness (rs=.15), and fairness (rs=.06). We observed 
some evidence for self-knowledge—those people who had a more positive view of their own 
morality tended to transfer more money to their partners. This is consistent with prior evidence 
that self-perceptions are at least somewhat diagnostic of behavior/reality (Epley & Dunning, 
2000; Vazire & Carlson, 2010), and that self-reported traits correlate with prosociality in 
economic games (Hillbig et al., 2013). This raises the question of what role moral judgments 
of the average person had in participants’ behavior. 
 
It is plausible that the magnitude of self-perceived moral superiority is driven primarily by 
variance in how people view the morality of other people, not themselves (cf. Tappin & 
McKay, 2017), and that greater moral cynicism about others is associated with lower 
engagement in certain types of moral behavior (Krueger & Acevedo, 2007). This provides one 
explanation for why the above positive associations between moral self-perception and 
behavior did not emerge for self-perceived moral superiority. Specifically, because they were 
cancelled out by the cynicism disproportionately driving the latter.  




We subjected this speculation to the data. First, comparing the shared variance between self-
perceived moral superiority scores and both (i) moral self-perceptions (bSD), and (ii) 
perceptions of the average person’s morality (bOD), revealed that the latter explained, on 
average, 64% variance in the scores, whereas the former accounted for less than a quarter of 
this amount (SM section 4). Second, perceptions of the average person’s morality were weakly 
but consistently positively related to transfer amount across dependent variables; trust in others 
(rs=.11), trustworthiness (rs=.12), and fairness (rs=.08). In other words, self-perceived moral 
superiority was mainly driven by how individuals viewed the morality of other people, not 
themselves, and greater moral cynicism about these others tended to be associated with lower 
monetary transfers. This supports our speculation on both counts, and is consistent with two 
areas of prior work: the first, that observers interpret expressions of self-superiority as 
condemnation of others, rather than egregious self-flattery (Van Damme et al., 2016; Van 
Damme et al., 2017), and, the second, that individuals condition their behavior in these games 
on whether they think others will behave in kind (Krueger & Acevedo, 2007).  
 
Based on this, we suggest that, despite the robust observation that most people rate themselves 
as morally superior to the average person, this phenomenon has limited predictive validity due 
to the seemingly opposed behavioral influences of self- and other-perception that comprise its 
measurement. That said, we note there is mixed evidence over whether economic games are 
valid analogues of behavior in the real world (Benz & Meier, 2008; Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2011; 
Franzen & Pointner, 2013; Galizzi & Navarro-Martinez, 2017). It is thus reasonable to ask 
whether our results would generalize to more ecologically valid cases of moral behavior. This 
represents an interesting avenue for future research. Furthermore, there is evidence that East 
Asian samples do not report self-superiority perceptions to the same extent as Western samples 
(Heine & Hamamura, 2007); indicating our results may differ along these specific cultural 
lines.  
 
We do expect, however, that our results will be robust to variations in the economic game 
environment—in particular, changes to the size of the monetary stakes. Indeed, meta-analytic 
reviews indicate that game behavior tends to differ rather minimally over variance in stake size 
(Engel, 2011; Johnson & Mislin, 2011). In addition, both our measure of self-perceived moral 
superiority, and our analytic approach, were comprehensive—comprising a variety of validated 
moral traits (see Tappin & McKay, 2017), and a range of robustness checks, respectively. We 
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expect conceptual replications that use alternative measures of moral superiority and 
alternative analytic approaches to produce similar results to those we observed here. We have 
no reason to believe that the results depend on other characteristics of the participants, 
materials, or contexts (Simons et al., 2017). 
 
Here, we investigated how self-perceived moral superiority related to moral behavior as 
measured in canonical economic games. We observed robust evidence that self-perceived 
moral superiority is not associated with magnitude of trust in others, trustworthiness, or 
fairness, as defined by the games; a result seemingly produced by the opposite behavioral 

































All Bayesian analyses were Kendall’s tau Bayesian correlation pairs conducted in JASP. Below 
we report the robustness checks (displayed graphically) for each Bayesian analysis reported in 
the main text. 
 
Self-Perceived Moral Superiority and Trust in Others 
 
Figure S1. Bayes Factor robustness check: Trustors. Relative support for the null over 
alternative hypothesis as a function of prior width. The BF indicates moderate to strong 
support over a range of priors. 
 
 








Self-Perceived Moral Superiority and Trustworthiness 
 
Figure S2. Bayes Factor robustness check: Trustees. Relative support for the null over 
alternative hypothesis as a function of prior width. The BF indicates moderate to strong 
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Self-Perceived Moral Superiority and Fairness 
 
Figure S3. Bayes Factor robustness check: Dictators. Relative support for the null over 
alternative hypothesis as a function of prior width. The BF indicates moderate to strong 
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Self-Perceived Moral Superiority and Fairness (Truncated Sample) 
 
Figure S4. Bayes Factor robustness check: Dictators (truncated). Relative support for the 
null over alternative hypothesis as a function of prior width. The BF indicates moderate to 






Previous Experience with Economic Games 
 
For all DVs (trustor transfers, trustee transfers, dictator transfers), we explored whether prior 
experience with the games was masking an association between self-perceived moral 
superiority and decision behavior (cf. Chandler et al., 2015). Below we present these analyses 
in the order of DVs present in the main text.  




Excluding trustors who reported having previously seen the TG (Nexcluded=125, 33.88%), and 
repeating the preregistered regression analysis, corroborated the preregistered and other 
exploratory analyses: F (1, 242) = 0.41, p=.522, R=.04 [b=-0.66, se=1.03, t=-0.64]. Similarly, 
excluding trustees who reported having previously seen the TG (Nexcluded=114, 31.06%), and 
repeating the preregistered regression analysis revealed similar results to those in the full 
(nonnaive) sample: F (1, 251) = 0.01, p=.929, R=.01 [b=0.35, se=3.89, t=0.09]. Finally, 
excluding dictators who reported having previously seen the DG (Nexcluded=140, 37.94%), and 
repeating the preregistered regression analysis, produced the same pattern of results as those in 
the full (nonnaive) sample: F (1, 227) = 0.35, p=.555, R=.04 [b=-0.64, se=1.08, t=-0.59]. All 
these exploratory analyses are consistent with the preregistered and exploratory analyses 
reported in the main text; specifically, indicating that prior experience with the economic 




The Domain-Generality of Our Measure 
 
To explore the possibility that the domain-generality of the self-perceived moral superiority 
measure was obscuring any relationship between perceived superiority on specific moral traits 
(e.g., trustworthiness, or fairness) and behavior representative of those traits, we first computed 
difference scores between participants’ given self-judgments (s) and their judgments of the 
average person (o) for the traits “trustworthy” and “fair” only. We then conducted Spearman’s 
rank correlations between these scores and trustee decisions (Study 1), and dictator decisions 
(Study 2), respectively. Perceived superiority on the trait “trustworthy” was trivially related to 
trustee back-transfer amount: rs = -.03, p = .588. Similarly, perceived superiority on the trait 
“fair” was trivially related to dictator transfer amount: rs = -.002, p = .973. These results mirror 




Explaining Variance in Self-Perceived Moral Superiority 
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We explored whether self-perceived moral superiority scores were better explained by (i) moral 
self-perceptions (bSD), or (ii) perceptions of the average person’s morality (bOD). Separately 
correlating (i) and (ii) with self-perceived moral superiority scores indicated that the latter 
explained, on average, 64.20% variance in these scores (Study 1: r = -.79, p <.001, 62.16% 
variance explained, Study 2: r = -.81, p <.001, 66.24% variance explained). Whereas, the 
former accounted for less than a quarter of this amount (average variance explained: 14.06%, 
Study 1: r = .35, p <.001, 12.35% variance explained, Study 2: r = .40, p <.001, 15.77% 




Defensible Self-Perceived Moral Superiority and Economic Game Behavior 
 
We explored whether the “defensible” component of self-perceived moral superiority—as 
given by the regression-based index—was associated with behavior in the economic games. 
This component is defined by bID – bOD; or, the amount of self-superiority that may be justified 
by the fact that individuals have limited information about the average person (Heck & 
Krueger, 2015; Tappin & McKay, 2017). Defensible self-perceived moral superiority was 
weakly but positively correlated with transfer amount for those in the role of trustor [rs = .11, 
p=.034], trustee [rs = .12, p=.023], and dictator [rs = .08, p=.110]. This provides some intuitive 
rationale for labeling the index “defensible”, but we emphasize that caution must be used when 





Replication of Tappin & McKay (2017) (The Illusion of Moral Superiority) 
 
We included 20 nonmoral filler traits in the trait judgment task—10 of which pertained to the 
domain of agency, and 10 to the domain of sociability (also drawn from Tappin & McKay, 
2017)—and we were thus able to replicate the primary results reported in Tappin and McKay 
(2017) (Table S1 displays the full list of traits). Specifically, in their study they found that self-
perceived moral superiority—measured using the same regression-based index as in the current 
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studies—was larger in magnitude, and more frequent, than perceived superiority in nonmoral 
domains of social perception. Thus, in the following section we reproduce the primary analyses 
reported in Tappin and McKay (2017) (p.6, para beginning: “This indicates that irrational self-
enhancement is strongest in the moral domain.”)12. For consistency, we use their terminology 




Table S1. Full List of Traits Used in Studies 1 and 2. 
Domain Positive traits  Negative traits 
Morality Honest  Insincere 
 Trustworthy  Prejudiced 
 Fair  Disloyal 
 Respectful  Manipulative 
 Principled  Deceptive 
Agency Hard-working  Lazy 
 Knowledgeable  Undedicated 
 Competent  Unintelligent 
 Creative  Unmotivated 
 Determined  Illogical 
Sociability Sociable  Cold 
 Playful  Disagreeable 
 Warm  Rude 
 Family-orientated  Humorless 
 Easy-going  Uptight 







We first investigated the magnitude of irrational self-enhancement in each trait domain by 
examining how well trait desirability predicted actual self-judgments (mean bSD) vs. inferred 
self-judgments (mean bID). In both studies, replicating Tappin and McKay (2017), paired t-
tests revealed that magnitude of irrational self-enhancement was largest in the moral domain, 
                                                 
12 Note: we replicate the magnitude and frequency analyses of Tappin and McKay (2017) only, not the 
analyses with self-esteem (since we did not collect self-esteem data in the current studies). Also, sample N’s 
differ from those reported in the preregistered analyses because, prior to replicating Tappin & McKay (2017), 
we had to additionally exclude uniform responders in the nonmoral trait domains. 
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Study 1: Morality (0.74 vs. 0.23), t (727) = 33.52, p <.001, Cohens d = 1.24 95% Confidence 
Interval [1.15, 1.34], Agency (0.73 vs. 0.28), t (727) = 24.50, p <.001, d = 0.91 [0.82, 0.99], 
and Sociability (0.61 vs. 0.52), t (727) = 4.17, p <.001, d = 0.15 [0.08, 0.23]; Study 2: Morality 
(0.76 vs. 0.21), t (361) = 23.60, p <.001, d = 1.24 [1.10, 1.38], Agency (0.72 vs. 0.28), t (361) 
= 17.10, p <.001, d = 0.90 [0.78, 1.02], and Sociability (0.63 vs. 0.49), t (361) = 5.49, p <.001, 
d = 0.29 [0.18, 0.39]. 
 
We confirmed statistically that Morality was the largest by computing the difference measure 
(bSD – bID) for each trait domain, and conducting paired t-tests between trait domains. In both 
studies, replicating Tappin and McKay (2017), the moral domain comprised the largest 
magnitude of irrational self-enhancement, Study 1: Morality (0.52) vs. Agency (0.46), t (727) 
= 4.00, p <.001, d = 0.15 [0.08, 0.22], and vs. Sociability (0.09), t (727) = 25.36, p <.001, d = 
0.94 [0.85, 1.03]; Study 2: Morality (0.55) vs. Agency (0.44), t (361) = 5.04, p <.001, d = 0.27 
[0.16, 0.37], and vs. Sociability (0.15), t (361) = 17.16, p <.001, d = 0.90 [0.78, 1.02]. 
 
Finally, corroborating the analysis of magnitude, and again replicating Tappin and McKay 
(2017), McNemar’s Tests showed that more individuals irrationally self-enhanced (bSD > bID) 
in the moral domain than in either of the nonmoral domains, Study 1: Morality (n = 659, 
90.52%) vs. Agency (n = 611, 83.93%), 2 (df = 1, N = 728) = 26.94, p <.001, and vs. 
Sociability (n = 396, 54.40%), 2 (df = 1, N = 728) = 249.61, p <.001; Study 2: Morality (n = 
331, 91.44%) vs. Agency (n = 302, 83.43%), 2 (df = 1, N = 362) = 16.68, p <.001, and vs. 
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1.3. Moral Polarization and Out-Party Hate in the US Political Context13 
 
Abstract 
Affective polarization describes the phenomenon whereby people identifying as Republican or 
Democrat tend to view opposing partisans negatively and co-partisans positively. Though 
extensively studied, there remain important gaps in scholarly understanding of affective 
polarization. In particular, (i) how it relates to the distinct behavioural phenomena of in-party 
“love” vs. out-party “hate”; and (ii) to what extent it reflects a generalized evaluative disparity 
between partisans vs. a domain-specific disparity in evaluation. Here, we report the results of 
an investigation that bears on both of these questions. Specifically, drawing on recent 
theoretical and empirical trends in political science and psychology, we hypothesize that moral 
polarization—the tendency to view opposing partisans’ moral character negatively, and co-
partisans’ moral character positively—is associated with behavioural expressions of out-party 
hate. We test this hypothesis in two preregistered studies comprising behavioural measures and 
large convenience samples of US partisans (total N=1354). Our results strike an optimistic 
chord: Taken together, they suggest that the hypothesized association is probably small and 
somewhat tenuous. Though moral polarization per se was large—likely exceeding prior 
estimates of generalized affective polarization—even the most morally polarized partisans 
appeared reluctant to engage in a mild form of out-party hate behaviour. These findings 
converge with recent evidence that polarization—moral or otherwise—has yet to translate into 









                                                 
13 The work presented in this section was conducted in collaboration with Ryan McKay (supervisor) and is 
posted as a preprint on PsyArXiv: https://psyarxiv.com/4fxb3/   





Animosity between Republicans and Democrats is a salient feature of American political life. 
This animosity has been dubbed affective polarization; that is, the “tendency for people 
identifying as Republican or Democrat to view opposing partisans negatively and co-partisans 
positively” (p. 691, Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Affective polarization is in evidence across 
a range of measures, and has been increasing over time (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar 
et al., 2018). For example, time series data from the American National Election Study indicate 
that the disparity in “warmth” that Democrats and Republicans (hereafter, partisans) express 
for their own party vs. the other party was greater in 2012 than at any point during the 34 
preceding years; almost doubling in size since 1978 (Iyengar et al., 2012). Indeed, according 
to more recent analysis using this measure, the average partisan now feels almost three times 
more positive about the in-party than out-party (cf. Figure 1 in Iyengar et al., 2018).  
 
Of course, affective polarization inferred from placement on these “feeling thermometers” (or 
other self-report measures) says little about the behavioural manifestations and consequences 
of the phenomenon. In their recent review of affective polarization, Iyengar and colleagues 
(2018) cite and discuss evidence of such ramifications. In particular, partisans are liable to 
allocate more money to the in-party than to the out-party in behavioural economic games, 
(Carlin & Love, 2013; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), and are more likely to pursue online dating 
opportunities with politically similar others (Huber & Malhotra, 2017). Furthermore, the 
magnitude of affective polarization positively correlates with avoidance of opposing partisans 
in a group problem-solving task (Lelkes & Westwood, 2017). Despite this evidence, Iyengar 
and colleagues (2018) note that it remains unclear (i) precisely how affective polarization 
relates to the distinct behavioural phenomena of “love” for the in-party (i.e., ingroup 
favouritism) vs. “hate” for the out-party (outgroup hostility) (cf. Brewer, 1999); and (ii) to what 
extent affective polarization reflects a generalized evaluative disparity between partisans vs. a 
more domain-specific disparity in evaluation (e.g., that out-partisans are less trustworthy than 
in-partisans). 
 
In this paper, we report the results of an investigation that bears on both of these questions. 
Specifically, we draw on recent theoretical and empirical trends in psychology and political 
science to hypothesize that moral polarization—that is, the tendency for people to view 
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opposing partisans’ moral character negatively, and co-partisans’ moral character positively 
(cf. Iyengar & Westwood, 2015)—is associated with behavioural expressions of out-party hate. 
We test this hypothesis in two preregistered studies comprising behavioural economic game 
measures and large samples of US partisans. 
 
1.1. Group Identity and Moral Psychology in American Politics 
 
Generally speaking, political (or ideological) conflict entails disagreement over which set of 
shared beliefs, values and practices make for a good and desirable society, and how this can be 
achieved (Jost et al., 2009). On this basis, even mild political disagreement is likely to be 
characterized by the belief that the in-party is more “moral” than the out-party; in other words, 
moral polarization. While the average American is not particularly committed to one 
ideological viewpoint over another, they do appear committed to a partisan group identity; that 
is, for the average American voter, politics may be more a case of Us vs. Them, than “our 
policy” vs. “their policy” (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). This can be expected to exacerbate moral 
polarization insofar as the human mind is primed to distinguish between ingroups and 
outgroups, and to interpret the social world in moral terms (Brewer, 1999; Haidt, 2012). Indeed, 
this proposition is consistent with the putative importance of both group identity and moral 
psychology in contemporary American politics.  
 
Mason (2016, 2018), for example, documents that party identity in the US is increasingly in 
alignment with various other group identities, including race-, ideological-, and religious-based 
identities. Such “social sorting” may facilitate identification with the in-party and reduce the 
tempering influence of cross-cutting identities on out-party hostility (Mason & Wronski, 2018; 
Roccas & Brewer, 2002). At the same time, Ryan (2014) and Koleva and colleagues (2012) 
report evidence to suggest that moral psychological factors play an important and distinct role 
in the political preferences and behaviour of US partisans. In particular, the latter report that 
endorsement of a small number of “moral foundations” explains variance in attitudes across a 
wide range of US political issues—including gun control, immigration, same-sex marriage and 
abortion—beyond other relevant factors such as age, gender, ideology and interest in politics 
(Koleva et al., 2012). Ryan (2014), corroborating these results, finds that moral conviction is 
common in partisans’ policy attitudes—even for putatively nonmoral policy issues—and may 
undergird both political activism and political antagonism (see also Ryan, 2017; Skitka et al., 
2005). Finally, recent work using data from Twitter suggests that posts about US political 
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issues spread over the (ingroup) network to a greater extent if they contain moral-emotional 
language (vs. nonmoral-emotional language) (Brady et al., 2017). 
 
In summary, the suffusion of group identities and moral psychology in contemporary American 
politics suggests that moral polarization—the tendency for people to view opposing partisans’ 
moral character negatively, and co-partisans’ moral character positively—may be particularly 
prominent among US partisans. We now consider the possible behavioural manifestations and 
consequences of moral polarization. 
 
1.2. Moral Polarization and Out-Party Hate 
 
Though they are often conflated, ingroup “love” and outgroup “hate” are distinct phenomena 
(Brewer, 1999). Whereas the former represents adulation for—and favouritism towards—
members of one’s own group, the latter represents hatred of—and hostility towards—members 
of other groups. Thus, as the distinction makes clear, people can exhibit ingroup love without 
exhibiting hostility towards a relevant outgroup (we note that the reverse case—outgroup hate 
in the absence of ingroup love—appears less plausible a phenomenon). Encouragingly, where 
the two are appropriately disentangled, ingroup favouritism often takes psychological and 
behavioural primacy over outgroup hate. That is, most people—given the chance—opt only 
for behaviours that benefit the ingroup, rather than opting for behaviours that both benefit the 
ingroup and harm the outgroup (e.g., Brewer, 1999; Halevy et al., 2008; Weisel & Böhm, 
2015). However, in some contexts individuals exhibit both love for the ingroup and hostility 
towards a relevant outgroup (extreme examples include suicide terrorism, war, etc.).  
 
Recent work suggests that outgroup hate behaviour of this kind (if not severity) is more 
common when group identities are defined—and the relevant groups divided—along morality-
based lines (Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013; Weisel & Böhm, 2015). For example, using a 
novel behavioural economic game with subjects in Germany, Weisel and Böhm (2015) find 
that game decisions indicative of hostility toward the outgroup are more common towards 
supporters of the National Democratic Party (NPD)—considered neo-Nazi and widely morally 
opposed—than towards supporters of other political parties in Germany. While the NPD are 
arguably unique in their moral, cultural and historical significance in Germany, this result 
suggests that behavioral expressions of out-party hate may increase in conjunction with moral 
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polarization in the United States. In other words, as the perceived moral “gap” between in- and 
out-party widens, behavioural expressions of out-party hate increase in frequency. 
 
This hypothesis is corroborated by the conjunction of two phenomena identified in analyses of 
real-world ideological conflict. First, analysis of the patterns of thinking in militant extremism  
(Giner-Sorolla et al., 2012; Saucier et al., 2009), violent political and religious conflict (Ginges 
et al., 2011), and genocidal regimes (Koonz, 2003; Reicher et al., 2008) identifies the extolling 
of ingroup virtue as a persistent theme. This is intuitive: To eschew self-interest and contribute 
to ingroup ends, would-be contributors must presumably feel sufficiently persuaded of the 
righteousness of their comrades, and of their cause. When the ingroup and its cause are 
perceived as just, personal costs may be tolerable or even desirable (Saucier et al., 2009). 
Second, moral demonization of the outgroup is another recurring theme in real-world 
ideological conflict (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2012; Halperin, 2008; Reicher et al., 2008; Saucier et 
al., 2009). In genocides, for example, propaganda depicting outgroup targets as nefarious 
agents with hostile intentions is reputedly commonplace, and is thought to be a deliberate 
strategy to rally public support for genocidal policy (Bilewicz & Vollhardt, 2012). Morally 
demonized outgroups may be perceived as an existential threat to the ingroup (Giner-Sorolla 
et al., 2012), and, in contexts where the latter is morally championed, this feeds a compelling 
Manichean survival narrative of good against evil (Reicher et al., 2008; Saucier et al., 2009). 
Under such conditions, expressions of outgroup hate can become morally mandated (Skitka & 
Mullen, 2002).  
 
1.3. Overview of Studies 
 
Following the preceding analyses, we hypothesized that moral polarization would be associated 
with behavioural expressions of out-party hate in the US political context. In particular, as the 
perceived moral “gap” between in- and out-party widens, behavioural expressions of out-party 
hate increase in frequency. We tested this hypothesis in two preregistered studies—an initial 
study and a close replication—comprising large samples of US partisans, and a behavioural 
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Both studies were preregistered on AsPredicted: https://aspredicted.org/e3hw9.pdf (link to 
Study 1 protocol); https://aspredicted.org/tiuw7.pdf (Study 2 protocol). To avoid unnecessary 
repetition—Study 2 was a close replication of Study 1—we present the methods and results of 




We sought to recruit 450 subjects in Study 1 and 900 subjects in Study 2. Subjects were 
supporters of the US Republican or Democratic Party, recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk), an online labour market commonly used for psychological research (Arechar et 
al., 2018; Chandler & Shapiro, 2016; Rand, 2012). Subjects recruited on MTurk cannot be 
considered demographically representative of the wider US population; for example, they are 
more educated and more liberal/Democrat, among other demographic differences (Chandler & 
Shapiro, 2016). Despite this, there is evidence that political partisans recruited via MTurk are 
psychologically similar to partisans in nationally representative samples of US adults (Clifford 
et al., 2015). In particular, they score similarly on measures of personality and values related 
to political ideology (ibid.). Therefore, while there are documented constraints on the 
generalizability of results obtained from MTurk samples, the results of Clifford and colleagues 
(2015) suggest that subjects recruited via MTurk are not psychologically incomparable to the 
average US partisan. 
 
The sample size for Study 1 was determined by power analysis (Faul et al., 2009), according 
to which we required N = 391 to detect an odds ratio of 1.4 in our primary binomial logistic 
regression analysis (key parameters: Two-tailed test;  = .05; power = 0.9; Pr(Y=1|X=1) H0 = 
0.5). We oversampled by approximately 15% to guard against power loss due to planned data 
exclusions. Sample size after data collection was NS1 = 454 in Study 1 (52.86% female, Mage 
= 36.73, SDage = 12.64). Slight oversampling is the result of subjects not submitting their 
completion code on MTurk despite completing the study (i.e., meaning additional subjects 
were able to complete the study). In Study 2, we doubled the target sample size of Study 1 and 
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2.2.1. Out-Party Hate 
 
Subjects played a six-person behavioural economic game; the positive variant of the Intergroup 
Prisoner’s Dilemma-Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD) game (Halevy et al., 2008; Weisel & 
Böhm, 2015). Each subject was assigned to a subgroup with two other supporters of the same 
party; that is, the in-party. This subgroup was matched with another subgroup of three 
supporters of the opposite party; the out-party. This formed a collective group of six players in 
total. Each player in the game was given three options about how to allocate money. Option 
one conferred 5 Monetary Units (MU, 1 MU = USD $1) to the focal subject, but nothing to any 
other players in the game. Option two conferred 2.5 MU to the subject and to each of their two 
in-party members, but nothing to the three out-party players. Option three conferred 2.5 MU 
to each player in the game. The decision options (as they were shown to Democratic Party 
subjects) are displayed in Figure 1. The decision option relevant to our hypothesis is Option 2. 
This decision option evinces a willingness to pay a personal cost to benefit the in-party (i.e., 
forsaking Option 1; self-interest), while simultaneously refusing to benefit members of the out-
party at no extra cost to oneself or to members of one’s in-party (forsaking Option 3; the 
collective interest). Following Weisel and Böhm (2015), we thus interpret decision Option 2 
as an expression of out-party hate14.  
 
 
                                                 
14 In the preregistered protocols, we referred to this decision option as “parochial altruism”. However, here we 
refer to it as “outgroup (out-party) hate” to clearly distinguish between our focus—which is simply those 
instances where ingroup “love” and outgroup “hate” appear in conjunction (such as in suicide terrorism and 
war)—and the parochial altruism hypothesis—which concerns the evolutionary origins of this conjunction. 
While the latter hypothesis has received recent criticism (e.g., Rusch et al., 2016; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2016), 
these criticisms do not contest the existence of ingroup love/outgroup hate, but, rather, the proposition that the 
conjunction of these behaviours manifests (i) consistently at the individual-level (i.e., as a within-individual 
correlation) and (ii) as a result of group-level selection pressure (for more detailed discussion, we refer to Rusch 
et al., 2016; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2016). We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point. 





Figure 1. Decision Options in the Positive Variant of the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Maximizing-Difference Game used in Studies 1 and 2. Self-identified Democrats saw the 
displayed decision option screen. For subjects who identified as Republicans, the Republican 
and Democrat labels were reversed (i.e., Republicans were indicated as “your” group, and 




2.2.2. Moral Polarization 
 
To measure this variable, subjects completed a trait judgment task. Each subject was asked to 
judge the extent to which 5 positive and 5 negative moral traits described each of two targets: 
(i) the “average Democratic Party voter” and (ii) the “average Republican Party voter”. 
Subjects also rated the social desirability of each trait. All trait ratings were provided on a 1-7-
point scale. The target ratings were anchored from “Not at all” to “Very much so”; the 
desirability ratings were anchored “Very undesirable” to “Very desirable”. The traits 
comprised personality descriptors such as trustworthy, fair, manipulative and prejudiced, and 
were embedded alongside a mix of 20 nonmoral traits. Table 1 displays the full list of traits 
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used in Studies 1 and 2. The traits used in Study 1 were taken from prior work (Tappin & 
McKay, 2017) and were chosen to represent the fundamental domains of social perception: 
morality, agency, and sociability (Leach et al., 2007). The traits used in Study 2 were slightly 
modified from the set used in Study 1. In particular, we replaced several of the traits with new 
traits from a large dataset of normed trait adjectives (Goodwin et al., 2014, Study 1). We did 
this to minimize any residual overlap between trait domains. That is, we wanted to maximally 
differentiate between the distinct trait domains of morality, agency and sociability. 
 
Subjects’ moral evaluation of each target (i.e., the average Democratic and Republican Party 
voter) was computed as the correlation between (i) their social desirability ratings for the moral 
traits, and (ii) their Democratic/Republican target ratings for the moral traits. Thus, each subject 
had two “coefficients of moral evaluation”, describing the extent to which they ascribed 
desirable and undesirable moral traits to each target. Positive coefficient values indicate that 
the ascription of moral traits to the target positively correlated with the perceived desirability 
of those traits. In contrast, therefore, negative coefficient values indicate that the ascription of 
moral traits negatively correlated with the desirability of the traits. Because each subject rated 
the desirability of each trait, the coefficient values—representing subjects’ moral evaluation of 
the targets—are sensitive to subjects’ idiosyncratic beliefs about the desirability of the moral 
traits. This has the advantage of allowing for individual differences in which moral traits people 
consider more vs. less desirable when computing their coefficients of moral evaluation for each 
target. This is important because previous work suggests foundational differences in the moral 
preferences of Democrats (or “liberals”) and Republicans (or “conservatives”) (e.g., Graham 
et al., 2009). 
 
Finally, whether the subject identified as Democrat or Republican informed which coefficient 
represented moral evaluation of the in-party (rinParty) and out-party (routParty). For example, for 
a self-identified supporter of the Republican Party, rinParty corresponded to the coefficient of 
moral evaluation for the Republican target, and routParty for the Democratic target (and vice 
versa for subjects who identified as supporters of the Democratic Party). The difference 
between these coefficients of moral evaluation (rinParty – routParty) was taken as the discrepancy 
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Table 1. Traits used in Studies 1 and 2. 
Trait domain Positive traits Negative traits 
Morality   
 Honest Insincere 
 Trustworthy Prejudiced 
 Fair Disloyal 
 Respectful (Just) Manipulative (Violent) 
 Principled Deceptive (Greedy) 
Agency   
 Hardworking (Intelligent) Lazy 
 Knowledgeable Undedicated (Incompetent) 
 Competent (Organized) Unintelligent (Unproductive) 
 Creative Unmotivated 
 Determined Illogical (Weak) 
Sociability   
 Sociable Cold (Negative) 
 Cooperative (Playful) Disagreeable 
 Warm (Happy) Rude (Reckless) 
 Family-orientated (Funny) Humorless 
 Easygoing Uptight 
Note. Traits outside of parentheses are used in Study 1. Traits inside parentheses replaced the preceding 




2.2.3. Other Variables 
 
We collected additional variables after the behavioural economic game and trait rating task. 
These variables were collected for the purpose of secondary preregistered and exploratory 
analyses. First, we asked each subject which of the three decision options they believed their 
two in-party members, and three out-party members, had chosen. Second, we asked subjects 
to rate the extent to which they believed that their out-party (i) threatened the “power, 
resources, or safety of the US and its citizens”, and (ii) threatened the “values or identity of the 
                                                 
15 In the preregistered protocols, we referred to this variable as “inframoralization”. However, here we 
changed the label to “moral polarization” for descriptive clarity and consistency with concepts as defined in 
closely relevant work (Iyengar et al., 2012; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). The variable is unchanged in all other 
respects. We are grateful to Mark Brandt for emphasizing the relevance of this work to the present investigation. 
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US and its citizens” (Stephan et al., 2011). Lastly, we asked subjects to rate (iii) the extent to 
which they believe the Democratic and Republican Party are in “direct competition”. Ratings 
for (i), (ii), and (iii) were provided on 7-point Likert scales, anchored from 1 = “Not at all” to 




The procedure in both studies was substantively identical and we recruited unique samples in 
each (i.e., subjects who took part in Study 1 were prevented from taking part in Study 2). All 
subjects provided informed consent, before completing a brief screening questionnaire. This 
questionnaire identified whether the subject was a supporter of the Democratic Party or the 
Republican Party, and included other demographic questions such as age, gender, religious 
affiliation, and ethnicity. Importantly, subjects were not made aware of the specific purpose of 
the screening questionnaire (to minimize false responding). Subjects who identified with either 
the Democratic Party or Republican Party were eligible to continue with the study, whereas 
supporters of a political party other than these (including “none”) were directed to an end-of-
study message and were unable to continue. The Study 1 sample was skewed Democrat (Study 
1 = 67.62% Democrat). In Study 2, we balanced the number of Democrats and Republicans by 
recruiting approximately equal numbers of each (Study 2 = 50.11% Democrat). 
 
Eligible subjects then completed the trait judgment task. They judged the extent to which each 
of 30 traits (see Table 1) described (i) the “average Democratic Party voter” and (ii) the 
“average Republican Party voter”. They also rated (iii) the social desirability of the traits. 
Subjects rated all 30 traits according to either (i), (ii), or (iii), before moving onto the next set 
of ratings, and the order of these three sets of judgments was counterbalanced across subjects. 
The presentation order of the traits themselves was randomized across each rating set and 
subject.  
 
Following this task, subjects took part in the economic game. They read instructions detailing 
the structure of the game and were shown an example set of decisions (and the resultant pay 
offs). Those who identified as Republican were presented with instructions specifying two 
other Republicans as their subgroup members (and three Democrats as members of the other 
subgroup), and vice versa for Democrats. After these instructions, subjects made their decision 
about which option to choose (i.e., Option 1, 2, or 3). We informed them that six individual 
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decisions (three from Democrats, three from Republicans) would be combined, and the 
calculated bonuses paid out to one group of six—selected at random—after the survey had 
ended (which was true). After making their own decision, each subject indicated which 
decision they believed each of the other players had chosen, and responded to the threat and 
competition questions described above. Finally, at the end of the study, subjects were asked 
whether they had adequately understood the economic game before making their decision 
(yes/no), and they provided feedback on the study. In addition to any bonuses, all subjects were 




All analyses were conducted in the R environment (v. 3.4.0, R Core Team, 2017), using R 
Studio (v. 1.1.423, RStudio Team, 2016). The R packages used in data analysis were: scales 
(v. 1.0.0, Wickham, 2018), coin (v. 1.2-2, Hothorn et al., 2008), gridExtra (v. 2.3, Auguie, 
2017), ggthemes (v. 3.4.0, Arnold, 2017), dplyr (v. 0.7.7, Wickham et al., 2018), ggplot2 (v. 
3.0.0, Wickham, 2016), reshape (v. 0.8.7, Wickham, 2007), plyr (v. 1.8.4, Wickham, 2011), 
metafor (v. 2.0-0, Viechtbauer, 2010) and datatable (v. 1.10.4-3, Dowle & Srinivasan, 2017). 
The raw data and analysis scripts to reproduce the results and figures reported in this paper are 
available online via the project hub on the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/mceqh/. 
Because Study 2 was a close replication of Study 1, after reporting each of the study-specific 
effect size estimates in the primary and sensitivity analyses, we also report the corresponding 
meta-analytic estimate (i.e., computed across studies). We note that (i) all meta-analytic 
estimates are fixed effects estimates, and (ii) the meta-analyses were not preregistered. 
 
3.1. Key Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 displays the frequency and corresponding percentages of choices made in the IPD-MD 
game in Studies 1 and 2 (the full samples are displayed i.e., before any data exclusions—see 
section 3.2 below for details of data exclusions). Table 3 displays the median values of the 
coefficients of moral evaluation. In particular, we display the median coefficients pertaining to 
evaluation of the Democrat and Republican targets, separately for Democratic- and 
Republican-identifying subjects. Also displayed are the median coefficient values pertaining 
to in-party and out-party targets (that is, collapsing across Democratic and Republican 
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targets/subjects, as described in the Methods). We compare the coefficients using Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests. The distributions of the coefficients are shown in Figure 2. The values in 
Table 3 and Figure 2 reveal a robust discrepancy in moral evaluation for the in-party vs. out-
party—that is, strong evidence of moral polarization—among both Democratic- and 















(Option 3) Total 
Study 1      
 Republican 40 (27.2%) 22 (15.0%) 85 (57.8%) 147 (100%) 
 Democrat 72 (23.6%) 54 (17.7%) 179 (58.7%) 305 (100%) 
 Total 112 (24.8%) 76 (16.8%) 264 (58.4%) 452 (100%) 
Study 2      
 Republican 113 (25.3%) 72 (16.1%) 262 (58.6%) 447 (100%) 
 Democrat 131 (29.6%) 57 (12.9%) 255 (57.6%) 443 (100%) 
 Total 244 (27.4%) 129 (14.5%) 517 (58.1%) 890 (100%) 
Note. The numbers outside parentheses are frequencies and the numbers inside parentheses are row-
wise percentages. N=2 observations are missing from Study 1 and N=10 observations from Study 2 due 






















Study 1       
 Republican -.34 .89 -0.94***    
 Democrat .88 -.50 1.10***    
 Combined    .88 -.46 1.04*** 
Study 2       
 Republican -.34 .85 -0.91***    
 Democrat .90 -.42 1.08***    
 Combined    .88 -.37 0.99*** 
Note. Values for targets are the median correlations between ratings of trait desirability and trait 
ascription. The pseudo-difference is computed by Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Study 1 N = 442 (N = 12 
subjects could not be included due to uniform responding on the trait judgment task); Study 2 N = 874 
(N = 26 subjects were not included due to uniform responding and/or missing values on the trait 
judgment task). * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001. 






Figure 2. Distribution of the Coefficients of Moral Evaluation for In-Party and Out-Party 
Targets in Studies 1 and 2. Each subject has one value corresponding to the in-party target 




3.2. Data Exclusions 
 
As specified in the preregistered protocols, for the primary analysis we excluded subjects who 
fulfilled one or more of several criteria. First, we excluded those who failed one or more of 
three attention checks that were embedded in the trait judgment task (NS1 = 23 (5.07%); NS2 = 
28 (3.11%)). Second, those who provided incomplete data in the trait judgment task (NS1 = 1 
(0.22%); NS2 = 7 (0.78%)) or IPD-MD game (NS1 = 2 (0.44%); NS2 = 10 (1.11%)). Third, those 
who clicked through the IPD-MD game instructions too quickly to read them; defined as a 
recorded page submission time of less than 10 seconds on one or more of three instructions 
pages (NS1 = 74 (16.30%); NS2 = 175 (19.44%)). Fourth, those who reported that they did not 
understand the IPD-MD game instructions (NS2 = 8 (1.76%); NS2 = 17 (1.89%)). Fifth, and 
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finally, those subjects who responded uniformly on the trait judgment task—that is, recorded 
zero variance for any type of moral trait judgment (i.e., ratings for the Democratic target, 
Republican target, and/or social desirability) (NS1 = 12 (2.64%); NS2 = 22 (2.44%)); this was 
necessary because a lack of variance prevents correlation coefficients—required for the key 
measure of moral polarization (see Methods)—from being computed.  
 
In addition to these preregistered exclusion criteria, we identified and excluded duplicate 
responses (i.e., multiple responses from the same subject) via subjects’ unique MTurk IDs (NS1 
= 1 (0.22%); NS2 = 26 (2.89%)). After all data exclusions, we thus retained NS1 = 354 and NS2 
= 671 for the primary preregistered analyses. 
 
3.3. Primary Preregistered Analyses 
 
We fitted binomial logistic regression models to the data. Recall that the outcome of interest is 
choosing Option 2—expression of out-party hate—in the IPD-MD game (coded 1; the other 
two choice options were coded 0). The predictor variable is moral polarization, computed as 
the difference between subjects’ coefficient of moral evaluation for the in-party and that for 
the out-party (rinParty - routParty); higher values therefore correspond to relatively greater moral 
polarization (MS1 = 1.08, SDS1 = 0.69; MS2 = 0.96, SDS2 = 0.73, possible range = [-2, 2]). 
Consistent with our hypothesis, moral polarization was positively associated with out-party 
hate in the IPD-MD game, in both studies: Odds RatioS1 (ORS1) = 1.73, p = .027, 95% CI [1.06, 
2.81]; ORS2 = 1.51, p =.025 [1.05, 2.17]. These odds ratios are plotted in Figure 3 (indexed by 
“Primary Preregistered” on the y-axis). The meta-analytic OR was 1.59, p =.002 [1.19, 2.12]. 
 
According to the models, subjects at the upper limit of moral polarization – i.e., a score of 2 
(indicating a coefficient value of +1 for the in-party and -1 for the out-party) – had a predicted 
probability of 0.21 (Study 1) and 0.17 (Study 2) of expressing out-party hate, respectively. In 
contrast, subjects whose moral evaluation of the in-party and out-party were similar – a score 
of 0 on the moral polarization variable (indicating no difference in coefficient values for the 
in-party and out-party) – had a predicted probability of 0.08 of expressing out-party hate (in 
both Study 1 and Study 2). 
 
 




Figure 3. Results of Preregistered and Exploratory Sensitivity Analyses in Studies 1 and 2. 
Panels display Odds Ratios (with 95% confidence intervals) from different models with moral 
polarization predicting out-party hate. Models are indexed on the y-axis.  
 
 
3.4. Sensitivity Analyses 
 
We conducted a series of preregistered and exploratory sensitivity analyses as a check on the 
robustness of the primary result. These are reported below. 
 
3.4.1. Instructions Page Exclusion Criterion 
 
As reported in the data exclusions subsection (3.2), the number of subjects excluded for 
clicking through one or more of the IPD-MD game instructions too quickly (< 10 seconds) was 
relatively high in both studies. We thus repeated the primary preregistered analyses after 
implementing a more conservative exclusion criterion. Specifically, in one exploratory analysis 
we reduced this exclusion criterion to < 5 seconds (i.e., “5 sec. Criterion” models), and, in 
another, we removed this particular criterion altogether (“0 sec. Criterion” models). 
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Consequently, in the 5 sec. Criterion models, the sample sizes increased to NS1 = 388 and NS2 
= 751, respectively. As plotted in Figure 3 (“5 sec. Criterion”), in these models the ORs for the 
moral polarization variable remained similar in size and statistically significant. The meta-
analytic OR was 1.59, p <.001 [1.22, 2.08]. In the “0 sec. Criterion” models, sample sizes 
increased to NS1 = 411 and NS2 = 805. The ORs for the moral polarization variable in these 
models are also plotted in Figure 3 (“0 sec. Criterion”). In contrast to Study 1, in Study 2 the 
OR decreased noticeably in size and was no longer statistically significant (p >.05). The meta-
analytic OR was 1.26, p =.049 [1.00, 1.59]. Overall, we conclude that the primary preregistered 
result was robust to more conservative specifications of the instructions page exclusion 
criterion. 
 
3.4.2. Nonmoral Polarization 
 
Recall that subjects also rated nonmoral traits in the trait judgment task, corresponding to the 
domains of agency and sociability. We preregistered our intention to investigate whether moral 
polarization was associated with out-party hate independent of polarization in these nonmoral 
domains of evaluation. We thus computed polarization scores for traits in the agency and 
sociability domains (in the same fashion as the moral polarization variable was computed), and 
entered these new variables as additional predictors in the primary preregistered models. As 
can be seen in Figure 3 (“Nonmoral Polarization”), the confidence intervals on the ORs for 
moral polarization increased in size after modelling the two nonmoral polarization variables; 
thus, the ORs were no longer statistically significant (at p <.05) in either study. The meta-
analytic OR was 1.35, p =.207 [0.85, 2.15]. This complicates the inference that moral 
polarization per se – distinct from nonmoral polarization – was associated with out-party hate 
in the IPD-MD. We return to this point in the discussion. 
 
3.4.3. Beliefs about Others 
 
Recall that, after subjects made their own choice in the IPD-MD, they reported their beliefs 
about what option each other player in the game—their two in-party members, and three out-
party members—had chosen. Previous research suggests that patterns of ingroup favouritism 
are underpinned by beliefs about the differential behaviour of one’s ingroup members vs. 
outgroup members (Brewer, 1999; Yamagishi et al., 1999). We thus preregistered our intention 
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to investigate whether moral polarization was associated with out-party hate distinct from 
subjects’ beliefs about the behaviour of the other players.  
 
We created two new variables for this analysis. To create these variables, we first dummy-
coded whether the subject believed that each in-party and out-party member expressed out-
party hate (coded 1) or not (0). We then summed these dummy variables separately for the in-
party and out-party members: producing one score between 0-2, indexing the subjects’ belief 
about the number of in-party members expressing out-party hate (MS1 = 0.72, SDS1 = 0.84; 
MS2 = 0.66, SDS2 = 0.81); and another score between 0-3, indexing subjects’ belief about the 
number of out-party members expressing out-party hate (MS1 = 0.84, SDS1 = 1.08; MS2 = 0.80, 
SDS2 = 1.08). We entered these two new variables as additional predictors in the primary 
preregistered models. The ORs from these models are plotted in Figure 3 (“Beliefs about 
Others”), and show that the association between moral polarization and out-party hate in the 
IPD-MD slightly increased in size (and remained statistically significant) in both Study 1 and 
2. The meta-analytic OR was 1.82, p <.001 [1.30, 2.55]. Interestingly, these models revealed 
that subjects’ beliefs about the expressed out-party hate of their two in-party members (but not 
out-party members) strongly predicted their own expression of out-party hate. We return to this 
result in a later analysis (section 3.5.1). 
 
3.4.4. Difference Score of Moral Polarization 
 
Recall that the preregistered measure of moral polarization was based on correlations between 
the ascription of moral traits to the Democratic/Republican targets, and the social desirability 
ratings given to the traits. As outlined in the Methods, this had the advantage of allowing for 
individual differences in which moral traits subjects considered more vs. less desirable when 
we computed their coefficient of moral evaluation for each target. Nevertheless, an arguably 
simpler measure of moral polarization is a difference-in-differences score that first takes the 
raw difference between the positive and negative moral traits ascribed to each target, and then 
compares these differences.  
 
We created such a measure in three steps. In step 1, we computed the mean moral trait rating 
for each target (in-party, out-party), split by the valence of the traits (positive, negative). In 
step 2, for each subject we computed the difference between their mean positive and mean 
negative trait rating for each target. Thus, if the difference in means was > 0, subjects ascribed 
THE INTERSECTION OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & BELIEF FORMATION 
 
93 
positive traits more strongly than negative traits (on average) to that target; if the difference in 
means was < 0, the reverse was true. Finally, in step 3 we subtracted the out-party difference 
score from the in-party difference score to produce an alternative measure of moral 
polarization. As with the preregistered measure, therefore, higher values corresponded to 
relatively greater moral polarization (MS1 = 3.84, SDS1 = 3.29, rangeS1 = [-3.6, 12]; MS2 = 3.81, 
SDS2 = 3.31, rangeS2 = [-11.8, 12]). This new measure was strongly correlated with the 
preregistered measure of moral polarization, rS1 (440) = .82, p <.001, 95% CI [.79, .85]; rS2 
(872) = .85, p <.001 [.83, .86].  
 
We fitted binomial logistic regression models with this measure as the predictor variable and 
out-party hate as the outcome variable (as before). Before fitting the model, we rescaled this 
new measure of moral polarization to lie between [-2, 2], to facilitate comparison with the 
preregistered measure of moral polarization. In both Study 1 and 2, the ORs were similar in 
size compared to the primary preregistered analysis, and remained statistically significant at p 
<.05 (plotted in Figure 3, “Difference Score IV”). The meta-analytic OR was 1.62, p <.001 
[1.24, 2.12]. 
 
3.4.5. Interaction Term 
 
Recall that the preregistered measure of moral polarization is a single value (per subject) 
indexing the difference between moral evaluation of the in-party and moral evaluation of the 
out-party. Use of this measure thus prevents identification of whether moral championing of 
the in-party, moral demonization of the out-party, or some combination of both is responsible 
for the association with out-party hate in the IPD-MD. We therefore tested the interaction 
between the two constituent variables of the moral polarization index—that is, the interaction 
between moral evaluation of the in-party and moral evaluation of the out-party—in predicting 
expression of out-party hate. This is arguably a more appropriate test of our key hypothesis. In 
these models, odds ratios consistent with our hypothesis would be less than 1 (because the 
upper limit of moral polarization is defined by coefficients of +1 for the in-party and -1 for the 
out-party). In both Studies 1 and 2, the ORs on the interaction term were < 1—consistent with 
our hypothesis and the primary preregistered result—but in both cases the confidence intervals 
overlapped zero; indicating that the ORs were not statistically significant (at p <.05, plotted in 
Figure 3, “Interaction Term”). The meta-analytic OR was 0.39, p =.060 [0.14, 1.04]. 
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3.5. Additional Exploratory Analyses 
 
Our data afforded a series of exploratory analyses regarding supplemental questions of interest. 
These are reported below. We note that, for each of these exploratory analyses, we exclude 
only those respondents with missing values on the relevant variables, as well as duplicate IDs. 
 
3.5.1. Beliefs about In-Party Behaviour 
 
As revealed in the sensitivity analysis of our primary preregistered result, subjects’ beliefs 
about the out-party hate expressed by in-party members strongly predicted their own out-party 
hate in the IPD-MD. To examine this relationship distinct from the moral polarization variable, 
we fitted a binomial logistic regression model where the outcome variable was out-party hate 
(dummy coded as usual); and the only two predictor variables were belief about the number of 
(i) in-party members (0-2), and (ii) out-party members (0-3) expressing out-party hate. As in 
the analysis with moral polarization, the former predictor variable was strongly associated with 
out-party hate in both studies: ORS1 = 5.44, p <.001, 95% CI [3.67, 8.06]; ORS2 = 4.81, p <.001 
[3.64, 6.36]. In other words, the belief that one’s in-party members expressed out-party hate 
shared a strong positive association with expressing out-party hate oneself. Figure 4 displays 
the data upon which the models are based, and illustrates the starkness of the result. We 
consider this result further in the discussion. In contrast to beliefs about the in-party, subjects’ 
beliefs about the number of out-party members expressing out-party hate did not significantly 
predict their own expression of out-party hate, in either study: ORS1 = 1.08, p =.583 [0.83, 
1.40]; ORS2 = 1.09, p =.379 [0.90, 1.32]. 
 
3.5.2. The Ideological “Prejudice Gap” 
 
Our data contribute to debate over the ideological “prejudice gap” (Brandt et al., 2014; Sibley 
& Duckitt, 2008). In particular, the ideological-conflict hypothesis (Brandt et al., 2014) 
predicts that people on the ideological left and ideological right exhibit approximately 
symmetrical levels of prejudice toward groups that hold values at odds with their own; as 
contrasted against the hypothesis of a left-right asymmetry in prejudicial behavior (Sibley & 
Duckitt, 2008). We tested these competing hypotheses by comparing rates of out-party hate 
between Democratic-identifying and Republican-identifying subjects. To maximize statistical 
power, we pooled the data from Study 1 and Study 2 before conducting this comparison 
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(combined N = 1,354). Among Democratic-identifying subjects, N = 111 (14.6%) expressed 
out-party hate; among Republican-identifying subjects, N = 94 (15.8%) expressed out-party 
hate. According to a chi-squared test, the difference was not statistically significant: χ² (1) = 






Figure 4. Proportion of Choices in the IPD-MD Game as a Function of Subjects’ Beliefs 
about the Number of In-Party Members Expressing Out-Party Hate. Study 1 N = 449 (belief 
0 group N = 240; belief 1 group N = 98; belief 2 group N = 111); Study 2 N = 864 (belief 0 




3.5.3. Perceived Threat Posed by the Out-Party 
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We examined the association between the perception that the out-party posed a threat to the 
United States and its citizens and moral evaluation of the out-party. Recall that we collected 
two threat perception variables from subjects (both scored from 1-7); one concerning the 
“realistic” threat posed by the out-party i.e., threat to the power, safety, and resources of the 
US, and the other concerning “symbolic” threat; that is, threat to the values and identity of the 
US. The two variables were strongly correlated: rS1 (451) = .78, p <.001, 95% CI [.74, .81]; rS2 
(872) = .83, p <.001 [.81, .85]. Thus, we combined them into a single threat perception variable 
by taking their mean (variable: Perceived threat). Perceived threat was strongly negatively 
correlated with moral evaluation of the out-party (i.e., with the coefficient of moral evaluation 
for the out-party target), in both studies: rS1 (441) = -.58, p <.001 [-.64, -.52]; rS2 (850) = -.51, 
p <.001 [-.56, -.46]. In other words, more negative beliefs about the moral character of the out-
party were associated with a stronger belief that they posed a threat to the safety and values of 
the US and its citizens.  
 
3.5.4. Moral vs. Nonmoral Polarization 
 
Recall that we measured nonmoral traits (as well as moral traits) in the trait judgment task. We 
sought to compare the magnitude of moral polarization to the magnitude of nonmoral 
polarization among partisans. We did this in two ways. First, we computed the mean rating 
given on each individual trait (i.e., for each trait in Table 1) as they were ascribed to each target 
(in-party, out-party). These mean ratings are plotted in Figure 5 as a function of the trait domain 
(agency, morality, sociability) and trait valence (negative, positive) (denoted by the faded small 
data points). We also plot the subsequent mean computed over these individual trait rating 
means (denoted by the solid large data points). As can be seen in the figure, across all trait 
domains, when rating the in-party target subjects ascribed positive traits more strongly than 
negative traits. However, across studies this valence gap appeared to be slightly larger in the 
agency and morality domains vs. the sociability domain. When rating the out-party target, in 
contrast, subjects tended to ascribe negative traits more strongly than positive traits; but only 
in the morality and sociability domains (in the agency domain, a similar valence gap was not 
evident).  
 
To formally compare the domain-specific magnitudes of polarization, we conducted Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests between the measures of polarization corresponding to each of the three trait 
domains. That is, we compared the preregistered measure of moral polarization with the 
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corresponding measures of polarization computed using the agency and sociability traits (e.g., 
see Methods section 2.2.2, and Results section 3.4.2). Recall that higher values on all these 
measures correspond to relatively greater polarization (that is, a greater in-party-favoring 
difference in trait evaluation). In Study 1, moral polarization (Median = 1.16, IQR = 1.26) was 
larger than polarization in the domain of agency (Median = 0.58, IQR = 1.03), p <.001; but not 
significantly different from polarization in the domain of sociability (Median = 1.16, IQR = 
1.08), p = .141. In Study 2, in contrast, moral polarization (Median = 1.12, IQR = 1.24) was 
larger than polarization in both agency (Median = 0.61, IQR = 1.16) and sociability (Median 
= 0.99, IQR = 1.23) domains, p <.001 in both Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. These results 
corroborate the data plotted in Figure 5, and, taken together, show that moral polarization was 
larger in magnitude than polarization manifested in the nonmoral domains.  
 
3.5.5. Robustness in Multiple Regression 
 
Given the number of inter-correlated variables reported throughout the results section that 
plausibly share a relationship with out-party hate, in a final exploratory analysis we fitted a 
binomial logistic regression model where out-party hate was the dummy-coded outcome 
variable (as usual) and a multitude of variables were entered as predictors (including 
demographics). The odds ratios corresponding to each predictor variable in this joint model are 
displayed in Figure 6. As shown in the figure, across studies only beliefs about the in-party’s 








Figure 5. Mean Trait Ratings as a Function of Party Target (In-Party, Out-Party), Trait 
Valence (Negative, Positive) and Trait Domain (Agency, Morality, Sociability) in Studies 1 
and 2. The faded small data points denote the mean rating for the individual traits in each 
valence/domain category (see Table 1 for the traits). The data points are horizontally jittered 
to aid visibility. Each individual trait mean is computed over N = 453 subjects in Study 1 and 
over N = 874 in Study 2. The solid large data points denote the mean computed over the 










Figure 6. Results of Exploratory Multiple Regression Analyses in Studies 1 and 2. Panels 
display Odds Ratios (with 95% confidence intervals) from binomial logistic regression models 
with multiple variables predicting out-party hate. Variables are indexed on the y-axis. M. 
Polarization = preregistered moral polarization variable; Threat = perceived threat posed by 
out-party; Competition = perceived competition between in-party and out-party; Age was 
measured in years; Female & White are dummy-coded; In-Party/Out-Party Choice = belief 
about number of in-party/out-party members expressing out-party hate. Threat, Competition, 






We hypothesized that moral polarization would be associated with behavioural expressions of 
out-party hate in the US political context. In two studies, we tested this hypothesis with large 
samples of US partisans and a behavioural economic game measure of outgroup hate (Weisel 
and Böhm, 2015). The primary preregistered analyses were consistent with our hypothesis: 
Expressions of out-party hate increased in conjunction with moral polarization (meta-analytic 
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odds ratio = 1.59, 95% CI [1.19, 2.12]). In a series of subsequent preregistered and exploratory 
sensitivity analyses, we tested the robustness of this result. While these analyses indicated that 
the primary result was somewhat robust, they also highlighted important constraints on the 
inference that moral polarization is associated with out-party hate in the US political context. 
We consider the implications of these and our various other results below. 
 
We observed important exceptions to the general robustness of our primary preregistered 
result. Most notably, after accounting for (i) polarization observed in nonmoral domains of 
evaluation (e.g., see Figure 4), and (ii) demographic and other relevant predictor variables 
(Figure 6), the association between moral polarization and out-party hate was reduced in size 
and statistically non-significant. In addition, the interaction between the constituent variables 
of the moral polarization index—that is, the interaction between moral evaluation of the in-
party and moral evaluation of the out-party—did not convincingly cohere with the primary 
preregistered result (meta-analytic odds ratio = 0.39, 95% CI [0.14, 1.04]; recall that, for the 
interaction term, odds ratios < 1 are consistent with our hypothesis). The test of the interaction 
term is arguably the more appropriate test of our hypothesis—which was that behavioural 
expressions of out-party hate would be most common as the perceived moral “gap” between 
in- and out-party widened. Taking this together with the large sample sizes in our studies, and 
the rather mild form of out-party hate afforded by the IPD-MD, overall our results suggest that 
the association between moral polarization and out-party hate in the US political context is 
probably small and somewhat tenuous.  
 
In this respect, our results converge with recent work on partisan prejudice and affective 
polarization. Lelkes and Westwood (2017) find evidence that even those partisans who are the 
most affectively polarized are generally unwilling to endorse overtly discriminatory behaviour 
against the political opposition. Our results extend their findings in two ways. First, by showing 
that the same pattern holds when using an incentivized, behavioural measure of out-party hate, 
rather than self-report (as those authors used). Second, we measured moral polarization, rather 
than generalized affective polarization. Given that (i) we found moral polarization to be greater 
in magnitude than polarization in nonmoral domains of evaluation (see section 3.5.4 and Figure 
5), and (ii) affective polarization is greatest among partisans who view politics through a moral-
psychological lens (Garrett & Bankert, 2018), it is reasonable to assume that ours was an even 
easier test for the affective polarization-partisan prejudice hypothesis to pass—and, yet, still it 
did not pass this test (at least, not convincingly).  




Notwithstanding this convergence in findings, however, there is a particular limitation of our 
studies that warrants mention and precludes a strong interpretation of our results along the 
foregoing lines. That is, our sampling population. We recruited subjects from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, a survey platform whose subjects are known to fall short of demographically-
representing the wider US population (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016). As highlighted in the 
introduction, Mason (2016, 2018) finds that US party identity is increasingly in alignment with 
demographic identities (e.g., race, religiosity), and, importantly, that this alignment may serve 
to weaken barriers to out-party hostility (Mason & Wronski, 2018; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). 
For this reason, insofar as our subjects did not faithfully represent the demographic identities 
of the wider US population, it is possible that our analyses mis-estimated the population-level 
association between moral polarization and out-party hate in IPD-MD. Ultimately, though, we 
consider this minimally problematic for our overall interpretation of our results, given that (i) 
there is no evidence that a more faithful demographic representation would have strengthened 
the hypothesized association—it may just as well have attenuated it—and (ii) the results of 
Lelkes and Westwood (2017), that converge with our own, are based on representative samples 
of US adults. 
 
In contrast to the equivocal association between moral polarization and out-party hate, we 
observed compelling evidence of moral polarization per se. That is, on both the preregistered 
measure (see Table 3 & Figure 2) and exploratory trait-summary measure (Figure 5), moral 
polarization among US partisans was large and robust. Moreover, we found evidence that 
moral polarization was greater than polarization observed in the nonmoral domains of 
evaluation (see section 3.5.4). We consider two interpretations of these results as they relate to 
the phenomenon of affective polarization (Iyengar et al., 2012; Iyengar et al., 2018).  
 
One interpretation is that moral polarization is simply a more proximate indicator of whatever 
underlying construct is manifesting as affective polarization. For example, assuming that 
domain-general partisan animosity is the underlying construct (e.g., as in Lelkes & Westwood, 
2017), one would expect moral polarization to be stronger than nonmoral polarization for the 
reason that moral traits share a stronger relationship with liking and respecting other 
people/groups than do nonmoral traits (Hartley et al., 2016). In other words, partisans express 
their dislike of the out-party and liking of the in-party through whichever route is available; 
and moral (vs. nonmoral) evaluation just happens to be more “cathartic” in this sense.  




On the other hand, it seems clear that moral evaluation also causes the (dis-)liking of other 
people/groups. This is implied by a long programme of research showing that moral content 
guides—and, in fact, dominates—humans’ global evaluations of other people and groups, 
primarily for the reason that the moral character/benevolence of others can have a very direct 
and consequential impact on one’s own wellbeing (reviewed in Wojciszke, 2005). On this 
view, affective polarization in general may be a function of moral polarization in particular. 
That is, partisans “like” the in-party and “dislike” the out-party in part because the former are 
perceived to be fairer, more trustworthy, less prejudiced—in other words, more benevolent—
than the latter. This perspective accords well with the distinct role of moral psychology in 
contemporary American politics, as outlined in the introduction (Brady et al., 2017; Koleva et 
al., 2012; Ryan, 2014, 2017), as well as the apparent moderating effect of moral conviction on 
affective polarization (Garrett & Bankert, 2018). Unfortunately, which of the foregoing 
interpretations is ultimately correct cannot be determined on the basis of the current data. 
Future work might adjudicate by experimentally assigning moral and nonmoral characteristics 
to in- and out-party targets, and observing affective polarization. At the very least, though, our 
results do illustrate that estimates of the magnitude of affective polarization depend non-
trivially on the method by which evaluation of the in- and out-party is measured. 
 
We observed a strong positive association between subjects’ beliefs about the number of in-
party members expressing out-party hate and their own expression of out-party hate (e.g., see 
Figure 4 & section 3.5.1). Though this association was observed in exploratory analyses—and 
must be interpreted as such—we note that the relevant odds ratios in both studies survive 
Bonferroni-corrections of 1 x 1014 to the p-values; implying that the association is rather robust. 
We offer two explanations for this intriguing result. The first—and we think more likely—
explanation is that subjects projected their own behaviour in the IPD-MD onto their judgment 
of what the in-party members would do. A long line of research demonstrates that people 
engage in “social projection” of this kind when asked to make information-deprived judgments 
of other people (reviewed in Krueger, 2008; Robbins & Krueger, 2005). The logic behind the 
utility of social projection is that—because most people are in the majority most of the time—
projection allows people to make quick and reasonably accurate judgments (on average) about 
unknown others (Krueger, 2008; Krueger & Chen, 2014). Indeed, in our studies subjects 
received only sparse information about the other players (i.e., only their political party 
membership); providing good conditions for social projection.  




An alternative explanation for the result is that subjects tailored their own out-party hate 
behaviour to what they believed the other players in the IPD-MD would do. Specifically, to 
whether they believed the in-party would express out-party hate; akin to a reciprocation- or 
conformity-type effect. We think this explanation is less likely than social projection. Primarily 
because a large body of evidence shows that projection to ingroup members is typically greater 
than projection to outgroup members (for a meta-analysis, see Robbins & Krueger, 2005). This 
is strongly consistent with our results, where subjects’ beliefs about the out-party hate 
expressed by out-party members were only trivially associated with their own out-party hate 
behaviour (see section 3.5.1 & Figure 6). The alternative explanation—that is, the notion that 
subjects tailored their behaviour to the expected behaviour of the other players—appears less 
able to explain this non-association. This is because, assuming this alternative explanation is 
right, one would expect that beliefs about the expressed out-party hate of the out-party 
members would, to some extent at least, also affect subjects’ own choice to express out-party 
hate. For example, it is reasonable to expect that they would be positively correlated—
reflecting a desire for “pre-emptive strike” (Böhm et al., 2016; Simunovic et al., 2013). That 
we did not observe such an association provides some evidence that subjects were not tailoring 
their own out-party hate behaviour to what they believed the other players in the IPD-MD 
would do. 
 
Regardless of which explanation is actually right, the result itself highlights a potentially 
fruitful avenue by which to predict—ahead of time and with reasonable accuracy—the out-
party hate behaviour of partisans. That is, query whether they believe that the typical in-party 
member would express out-party hate. This may be a particularly useful strategy to identify 
those most likely to express out-party hate where there exist disincentives to answering in the 
affirmative oneself. We leave it to future research to explore this idea. 
 
In this paper, we investigated the association between moral polarization—that is, the tendency 
for people to view opposing partisans’ moral character negatively, and co-partisans’ moral 
character positively—and behavioural expressions of out-party hate in the US political context. 
Our results strike an optimistic chord: Taken together, they suggest that the hypothesized 
association is probably small and somewhat tenuous. Though moral polarization per se was 
large—and may exceed prior estimates of generalized affective polarization—in our sample 
even the most morally polarized partisans appeared reluctant to engage in a rather mild form 
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of out-party hate behaviour. These findings converge with recent evidence that polarization—
moral or otherwise—has yet (at the time of data collection) to translate into the average US 
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1.4. Doing Good vs. Avoiding Bad in Prosocial Choice: A Refined Test and 
Extension of the Morality Preference Hypothesis16 
 
Abstract 
Prosociality is fundamental to human social life, and, accordingly, much research has 
attempted to explain human prosocial behavior. Capraro and Rand (Judgment and Decision 
Making, 13, 99-111, 2018) recently provided experimental evidence that prosociality in 
anonymous, one-shot interactions (such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator Game 
experiments) is not driven by outcome-based social preferences—as classically assumed—but 
by a generalized morality preference for “doing the right thing”. Here we argue that the key 
experiments reported in Capraro and Rand (2018) comprise prominent methodological 
confounds and open questions that bear on influential psychological theory. Specifically, their 
design confounds: (i) preferences for efficiency with self-interest; and (ii) preferences for 
action with preferences for morality. Furthermore, their design fails to dissociate the preference 
to do “good” from the preference to avoid doing “bad”. We thus designed and conducted a 
preregistered, refined and extended test of the morality preference hypothesis (N=801). 
Consistent with this hypothesis, our findings indicate that prosociality in the anonymous, one-
shot Dictator Game is driven by preferences for doing the morally right thing. Inconsistent with 
influential psychological theory, however, our results suggest the preference to do “good” was 










                                                 
16 The work presented in this section was conducted in collaboration with Valerio Capraro and is published in 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology: 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103118302841  





People often pay costs to benefit others; they behave prosocially. Fundamental to human social 
life (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gintis et al, 2003; Nowak, 2006; Tomasello, 2014), prosocial 
behavior is often explained by appeal to reciprocity. If I pay a cost to help you today, you – or 
others who learn about my behavior – are more likely to help me tomorrow (Nowak & 
Sigmund, 2005; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Trivers, 1971). Defying explanations of this kind, 
however, prosocial behavior is frequently observed in contexts where opportunities for 
reciprocity are absent. For example, in anonymous, one-shot interactions, individuals often 
forego some amount of self-interest to the benefit of strangers (Camerer, 2003).  
 
Behavioral economists have classically sought to explain such behavior by assuming that 
individuals have preferences for minimizing inequity or maximizing efficiency (i.e., social 
welfare) (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Capraro, 2013; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Engelmann & 
Strobel, 2004; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). According to these influential frameworks, prosocial 
individuals derive utility – psychological benefit – from particular social outcomes; thus, 
realizing those outcomes offsets the cost of behaving prosocially.  
 
A recent alternative perspective is that individuals derive utility from performing actions they 
perceive to be morally right (Bicchieri, 2005; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Huck et al., 2012; 
Krupka & Weber, 2013). This perspective accords with evidence from social psychology that 
individuals derive utility from seeing themselves in a positive moral light (Aquino & Reed, 
2002; Dunning, 2007) and, in addition, that prosocial individuals in particular view 
opportunities for prosocial action in moral terms; for example, by considering what the morally 
“right” action is (Liebrand et al., 1986; Weber et al., 2004).  
 
Building on these converging lines of evidence, recent experimental work advanced the 
hypothesis that a generalized morality preference – rather than preferences for minimizing 
inequity or maximizing efficiency per se – drives prosocial behavior in anonymous, one-shot 
interactions (Capraro & Rand, 2018). In other words, that a simple preference for doing (what 
is perceived to be) the morally “right” thing underpins individuals’ prosociality in these 
contexts.  
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In their key experiments, Capraro and Rand (2018) used a “Trade-Off Game” (TOG) to 
empirically dissociate the hypothesized morality preference from outcome-based social 
preferences for equity and efficiency. In the TOG, participants made a unilateral choice about 
how to allocate money between themselves and two other (passive) people. While one choice 
minimized inequity – all participants earned the same amount – the other choice maximized 
efficiency – participants earned different amounts, but, together, the group earned more. This 
design effectively pitted preferences for equity and efficiency against one another; creating a 
decision context where the morally “right” choice was ambiguous. The researchers found that, 
framing either choice as the morally appropriate one dramatically affected participants’ 
choices, such that the majority chose the option framed as morally appropriate; be that the 
equitable or efficient choice.  
 
To support the inference that these moral considerations drive prosociality, however, required 
additional evidence. To that end, participants also completed, in addition to the TOG, a 
canonical prosocial choice task; either the Dictator Game (DG), or the Prisoner’s Dilemma  
(PD). In the latter tasks, participants made a unilateral choice about how much money to donate 
to a new (passive) person (DG), or a simultaneous bilateral choice whether to cooperate with a 
new person (PD), respectively.  
 
The key finding in Capraro and Rand (2018) was that participants who made the choice framed 
as morally appropriate in the TOG – be that the equitable choice or the efficient choice – were 
consistently more prosocial in the DG and PD; donating and cooperating (respectively) more 
than participants who chose otherwise in the TOG. Crucially, this result is inconsistent with 
stable outcome-based preferences for equity or efficiency as explanations for prosociality, 
which do not predict an association between moral framing in the TOG and prosociality in a 
different task, such as the DG/PD. The result is instead consistent with the morality preference 
hypothesis, which predicts that individuals sensitive to which choice is morally right in the 
TOG – as revealed by the moral framing of those choices – are also revealed to be more 
prosocial in the DG/PD; where, in contrast to the TOG, the morally right choice is unambiguous 
(Krueger & Acevedo, 2007; Krueger & DiDonato, 2010).  
 
The implication of Capraro and Rand’s (2018) findings is important: They suggest their data 
renders the classic approach to understanding prosocial choice through social preferences 
insufficient and, in particular, that an account based on a fluid preference for “doing the morally 
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right thing” is superior. However, their key evidence derives from an experimental design that 
contains several prominent methodological confounds, and leaves open important questions 





Consider the choice outcomes in the TOG. The equitable choice always provided the 
participants – the chooser, and two passive recipients – the same allocation; 13 Monetary Units 
(MU) each. The efficient choice, in contrast, always provided the chooser with 15 MU, and the 
passive recipients 23 MU and 13 MU, respectively. Thus, while the efficient choice clearly 
results in greater overall gains for the group – at the cost of equity, as intended – it also results 
in greater gains for the chooser themselves. In other words, the choice option meant to reveal 
a preference for efficiency is confounded with self-interest. A plausible consequence of this 
confound is an overestimate of the proportion of individuals with a preference for efficiency. 
An overestimation of this kind may have affected the key result – an association between TOG 
choice and prosociality in the DG/PD – in two ways.  
 
First, it may have inflated the association between TOG choice under the equitable-is-moral 
frame, and prosociality in the DG/PD. Specifically, this association may not have been driven 
by participants with a genuine morality preference – who choose the equitable option under 
this TOG frame, and the prosocial option in the DG/PD – but, rather, by self-interested 
participants – who choose the efficient option under this TOG frame, and the self-interested 
option in the DG/PD. Indeed, in the worst case, the behavior of self-interested participants 
could fully account for the observed association between TOG choice under the equitable-is-
moral frame, and prosociality in the DG/PD. 
 
Second, by the opposite logic, the overestimation of individuals with a preference for efficiency 
may have deflated the association between TOG choice under the efficient-is-moral frame, and 
prosociality in the DG/PD. This is because some participants making the efficient choice under 
that TOG frame did so not because of a general morality preference nudged by the framing, 
but, rather, for their own self-interest. Crucially, these participants would not have chosen 
prosocially in the DG/PD, thereby deflating the observed association between the two choices.  
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These issues directly affect the key evidence – an association between TOG choice and 
prosociality in the DG/PD – supporting the morality preference hypothesis. A remedy to these 




Not only do the efficient-is-moral and equitable-is-moral frames differ in the labels used to 
describe the two choice options, but, in addition, they differ in which is the active choice and 
which is the passive choice. Specifically, in the efficient-is-moral frame, participants start with 
an equitable allocation (13 MU each), while in the equitable-is-moral frame they start with an 
efficient allocation (15, 23, and 13 MU, respectively). In other words, the moral choice is 
always framed as an active choice to change these initial allocations. Choice frame is thus 
confounded with active/passive frame. 
 
A substantial body of work in social, moral, and decision-making psychology indicates that 
humans perceive inaction differently than action (Baron & Ritov, 2004; Spranca et al., 1991). 
For example, regret is greater for actions that lead to negative outcomes than for inactions that 
lead to the same negative outcomes (Feldman & Albarracín, 2017; Zeelenberg et al., 2002); 
individuals are biased towards maintaining the status quo in decision-making (Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988); and, in moral judgment, harms caused by action are considered worse than 
the same harms caused by inaction (Cushman et al., 2006). Finally, most relevant here, action 
framing influences engagement in prosocial behavior (Teper & Inzlicht, 2011), and there is 
considerable variation in who exhibits action-inaction asymmetries (Baron & Ritov, 2004). 
 
Given this evidence, it is probable that the confounding of choice frame with active/passive 
frame over- or under-estimated the proportion (and types) of individuals choosing the morally-
framed option in the TOG; with unknown consequences for the key association between TOG 
choice and prosociality in the DG/PD. Decoupling these frames is necessary to make clear 
inferences about the effect of choice frame in the TOG. 
 
Doing Good vs. Avoiding Bad 
 
An influential hypothesis in social psychology is that immoral, negative, or otherwise “bad” 
stimuli weigh more heavily than their “good” counterparts in human cognition and behavior 
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(Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Vaish et al., 2008; see Corns, 2018 for a 
recent critique).  
 
Consistent with this hypothesis, recent evidence suggests that “self-righteousness” – 
manifested in, for example, the average person rating themselves morally superior to the 
average person (Tappin & McKay, 2017) – are greater for immoral than moral stimuli (Klein 
& Epley, 2016, 2017). Relatedly, the correlation between individuals’ life satisfaction and their 
self-perception is reportedly stronger if the latter is computed as the distance between 
individuals’ “real” and “undesired” selves vs. between their “real” and “desired” selves 
(Ogilvie, 1987). In other words, those data suggest the type of person individuals want to avoid 
being weighs more heavily (in their life appraisal) than the type of person they would ideally 
like to be. A similar asymmetry manifests in the psychology of moral regulation. In particular, 
in the distinction between proscriptive morality – what we should do and be – and prescriptive 
morality – what we should avoid doing and being. Whereas the former is considered 
discretionary and a matter of personal preference, the latter is considered mandatory and strict 
(Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).  
 
To implement the choice framing in the TOG, the two choice options were jointly framed as 
moral and immoral, respectively. Individuals choosing the morally-framed option may thus 
have been motivated by a preference to do “good” (e.g., a desire to be moral), or motivated by 
a preference to avoid “bad” (e.g., an aversion to being immoral). These distinct preferences are 
confounded in the TOG design. Given the preceding evidence, it is plausible that individuals’ 
choices were motivated more by a preference to avoid “bad” than to do “good”. Furthermore, 
assuming this hypothesis, a further plausible hypothesis is that participants who were motivated 
by a preference to do “good” (vs. avoid “bad”) in the TOG were more likely to behave 
prosocially in the DG/PD. For example, because the preference to avoid bad may reflect a 
general desire to avoid punishment, whereas a preference to do good may reflect a desire to do 
good for its own sake. That is, the latter preference is more diagnostic of true prosocial 
motivation.  
 
The Current Study 
 
Here we address the methodological confounds and open theoretical questions in Capraro and 
Rand (2018), and, thus, provide a refined and extended test of the morality preference 
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hypothesis. To do so, we design and implement an improved Trade-Off Game (TOG), and test 
for an effect of choice frame on TOG choice (Hypothesis 1), and for an association between 
framing of the TOG and prosociality in a different task, the DG (Hypothesis 3). We also test 
two novel hypotheses bearing on existing psychological theory. First, that the effect of choice 
frame on TOG choice is greater under an avoid “bad” than do “good” moral frame (Hypothesis 
2) (cf. Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Vaish et al., 2008). Second, that the 
association between choosing the morally-framed option in the TOG, and prosociality in the 




The hypotheses, design, sampling and analysis plan were preregistered on the Open Science 




We sought to collect N=200 participants per treatment, giving a total N=800. We determined 
this sample size by multiplying the N-per-treatment in Capraro and Rand (2018) study 3 by 
1.5x; the study most conceptually similar to that which we reproduce here. Sensitivity power 
analyses (reported in SM) for our key hypothesis tests indicated we had sufficient power (>.80) 
to detect standardized effect sizes conventionally considered small (r =.10). A total of N=801 
participants completed the study. Participants were recruited online via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (AMT) (for the validity of AMT, see e.g., Arechar et al., 2018; Horton et al., 2011; 
Paolacci et al., 2014; Thomas & Clifford, 2017), and were located in the US at the time of 
taking part. All participants provided informed consent. This study was reviewed and approved 




Participants began by playing a Dictator Game (DG). In the DG, they were given $0.10 and 
they had to decide how much, if any, to give to another anonymous participant who received 
no starting money allocation. Participants could donate in increments of $0.01; from $0.00 to 
$0.10. The participant was informed that the other person had no active choice and would only 
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receive what they decide to give. We asked two comprehension questions to ensure that 
participants understood the payoff structure of the DG prior to their decision. Specifically, we 
asked which choice (1) maximized their own payoff, and which choice (2) equalized their 
payoff with that of the other person. Participants who failed either or both comprehension 
questions were prevented from completing the survey (this condition was made explicit in the 
consent form). Those who passed the comprehension questions were then asked to make their 
DG decision. 
 
Following the DG, participants played an improved Trade-Off Game (TOG). In this TOG, 
participants (“choosers”) had to decide between two choice options that affected their own 
payoff and the payoff of two other people; the latter being passive recipients who did not make 
any choices. One option was “equitable”, in the sense that it minimized payoff differences 
among the three participants; specifically, they each earned $0.13. The other option was 
“efficient”, in the sense that it maximized the sum of the payoffs of the three participants; 
specifically, the chooser earned $0.13, while the other two people earned $0.23 and $0.13, 
respectively. Importantly, in this improved TOG design, because the chooser earns $0.13 by 
making either choice, the confounding of self-interest with preferences for efficiency is 
eliminated. Furthermore, because participants are not told that one or the other state of money 
distribution ([13, 13, 13] or [13, 23, 13]) initially holds, both choice options are rendered equal 
in terms of active/passive frame. 
 
Before reading the TOG instructions, participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
versions of the TOG, each corresponding to a particular framing combination in a 2x2 between-
subjects design:  
 
• TOG frame: Give – Do Good 
• TOG frame: Give – Avoid Bad 
• TOG frame: Equalize – Do Good 
• TOG frame: Equalize – Avoid Bad 
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We experimentally manipulate whether the efficient (“Give”) or equitable (“Equalize”) choice 
is framed as morally appropriate (choice frame17: Give, Equalize). Furthermore, we also 
manipulate whether the moral framing emphasizes doing “good” or avoiding “bad” (moral 
frame: Do Good, Avoid Bad): 
 
• Under the Give – Do Good frame, the efficient option is labelled “be generous, Option 
1”, and the equitable option is “Option 2” 
• Under the Give – Avoid Bad frame, the efficient option is labelled “Option 2”, and the 
equitable option is “be ungenerous, Option 1” 
• Under the Equalize – Do Good frame, the efficient option is labelled “Option 2”, and 
the equitable option is “be fair, Option 1” 
• Under the Equalize – Avoid Bad frame, the efficient option is labelled “be unfair, 
Option 1”, and the equitable option is “Option 2” 
 
Importantly, notice that the experimental manipulation of moral frame decouples the 
preference to do “good” from the preference to avoid “bad”. After making their decision in the 
TOG, participants provided standard demographic information, at the end of which they were 
given the completion code needed to submit the survey on AMT. After the end of the survey, 
we downloaded the data file and computed the bonuses, which were paid on top of the base 
participation fee received by all participants ($0.50). No deception was used. We refer to the 
SM for verbatim experimental instructions (available here: https://osf.io/m7w2s/). We report 




Data analysis was conducted in R (v.3.4.0, R Core Team, 2017) using RStudio (v.1.1.423, 
RStudio Team, 2016). R packages used in analysis and figures: ggplot2 (v.2.2.1, Wickham, 
2009), plyr (v.1.8.4, Wickham, 2011), dplyr (v.0.7.4, Wickham et al., 2017), reshape (v.0.8.7, 
Wickham, 2007), gridExtra (v.2.3, Auguie & Antonov, 2017), effsize (v.0.7.1, Torchiano, 
                                                 
17 Following Capraro & Rand (2018), in our preregistered protocol and analysis script we labelled the 
efficient-is-moral frame the “Give” frame, and the equitable-is-moral frame the “Equalize” frame. For 
consistency, we follow that convention here. 
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2017), datatable (v.1.10.4-3, Dowle et al., 2017). The raw data and code to reproduce all results 




N=288 (26.45%) participants answered one or more of the comprehension questions 
incorrectly, or did not answer these questions, and were thus prevented from completing the 
study (following our preregistered protocol). Of the remaining N=801 participants who 
completed the study, there were N=15 (1.87%) duplicate responses according to participants’ 
IP address/unique Mechanical Turk ID. In line with our preregistered protocol, we excluded 
these duplicates, retaining the earliest responses only—defined by the date/time they began the 
study. Finally, after these exclusions, we identified N=2 (0.25%) participants that dropped out 
of the study prior to making their decision in the TOG, and are thus unable to be included in 
the analysis (leaving N=784 for analysis). 
 
Hypotheses 1 & 2 
 
Preregistered analyses. We first test whether participants were more likely to choose the 
efficient option in the TOG under the “give” choice frame than under the “equalize” choice 
frame (Hypothesis 1). We then test whether this framing effect was stronger under the “avoid 
bad” moral frame than under the “do good” moral frame (Hypothesis 2). To that end, we fit a 
binomial logistic regression model with two dummy-coded treatment variables as predictors: 
choice frame [0=equalize frame, 1=give frame] and moral frame [0=avoid bad, 1=do good], 
and choice in the TOG as the dependent variable [TOG choice: 0=equitable choice, 1=efficient 
choice]. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, choice frame predicted TOG choice in the expected 
direction, Odds Ratio (OR) = 3.55, 95% CI [2.34, 5.40], Z = 5.94 p <.001. A majority of 
participants chose the efficient option under the give choice frame (69.21%), whereas only a 
minority of participants chose this option under the equalize choice frame (39.90%).  
 
Inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, there is no statistically significant interaction between choice 
frame and moral frame, OR = 0.91 [0.50, 1.64], Z = -0.32, p =.752. In other words, the effect 
of choice frame appeared largely independent of whether the choice was framed as “doing 
good” or “avoiding bad”. Both H1 and H2 results remain similar after adjusting for age, gender 
[not female=0, female=1] and education [0=less than college, 1=college or above] in the model: 
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Main effect of choice frame OR = 3.74 [2.45, 5.72], Z = 6.11, p <.001; interaction between 
choice frame and moral frame OR = 0.89 [0.49, 1.61], Z = -0.39, p =.697. The proportion of 




Figure 1. Proportion of efficient and equitable choices as a function of treatment. Error bars 






THE INTERSECTION OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & BELIEF FORMATION 
 
116 
Preregistered analyses. Next, we test the hypothesis that participants who make the ‘moral’ 
choice in the TOG – that is, choose the efficient option under the “give” frame, or choose the 
equitable option under the “equalize” frame – donate more to their partner in the DG 
(Hypothesis 3). We fit a linear regression model with two dummy-coded variables as 
predictors: TOG choice frame [0=equalize frame, 1=give frame] and the choice the participant 
made in the TOG [0=equitable choice, 1=efficient choice], respectively. The DV is amount 
donated in the DG [from 0 to 10].  
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, there is an interaction in the predicted direction, b = 1.68, SE = 
0.40, t = 4.17, p <.001. Under the equalize frame, participants who made the equitable choice 
donated more in the DG (M = 3.40, SD = 2.60) than participants who made the efficient choice 
(M = 2.38, SD = 2.57), t (389) = 3.81, p <.001, hedges’ g = 0.39, 95% CI [0.19, 0.60]. This 
pattern was reversed under the give frame. There, participants who made the equitable choice 
donated less in the DG (M = 2.53, SD = 2.75) than participants who made the efficient choice 
(M = 3.19, SD = 2.80), t (391) = -2.19, p =.029, hedges’ g = -0.24 [-0.45, -0.02]. (Note: All t-
tests are post-hoc.) This interaction between choice frame and TOG choice remains similar 
after adjusting for age, gender, and education, b = 1.67, SE = 0.40, t = 4.14, p <.001. The 
interaction pattern is displayed in Figure 2. As seen in Figure 2 (panel A), DG donations follow 
an approximately bimodal distribution peaking over donations of 0 and 5. We thus conducted 
exploratory analyses to test the robustness of the preceding linear regression results (reported 




Preregistered analyses. In our final preregistered analysis, we test whether the difference in 
DG donations between participants who made the ‘moral’ vs. ‘non-moral’ choice in the TOG 
is larger under the “do good” frame than under the “avoid bad” frame (Hypothesis 4). In line 
with our preregistered protocol, to simplify this analysis, we collapse across two variables: 
TOG choice frame [equalize, give], and the TOG choice the participant made [efficient, 
equitable]. This provides a new binary variable denoting whether the participant made the 
moral choice in the TOG [0=no, 1=yes], where the moral choice is simply defined as either the 
efficient option under the “give” frame, or the equitable option under the “equalize” frame. We 
then fit a linear regression model with two variables as predictors: moral choice [0=no, 1=yes], 
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and moral frame [0=avoid bad, 1=do good]. As before, the DV is amount donated in the DG 
[0-10].  
 
Inconsistent with Hypothesis 4, there is no statistically significant interaction between moral 
choice and moral frame on DG donations, b = -0.32, SE = 0.40, t = -0.79, p =.429. In other 
words, while participants who made the moral choice in the TOG tended to donate more in the 
DG than participants who made the non-moral choice (i.e., Hypothesis 3), this effect appeared 
largely independent of whether the participants made their TOG choice under the moral frame 
of “doing good” or “avoiding bad”. Adjusting for age, gender, and education in the model did 









Figure 2. Violin plots (A) and boxplots (B) of DG donations as a function of choice frame, 
and the choice the participants made, in the TOG. A, points denote the mean values and error 






Converging evidence suggests that prosociality in anonymous, one-shot interactions is not 
solely motivated by outcome-based social preferences, but that it is also motivated by what 
individuals perceive to be the morally right action (Bicchieri, 2005; DellaVigna et al., 2012; 
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Eriksson et al, 2017; Kimbrough & Vostroktunov, 2016; Krupka & Weber, 2013); perhaps 
serving to maintain a positive moral self-image (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Dunning, 2007). 
Building on this work, recent experimental evidence advanced the hypothesis that a generalized 
morality preference drives prosocial behavior in anonymous, one-shot interactions like that in 
Dictator and Prisoner’s Dilemma games (Capraro & Rand, 2018). This hypothesis rejects the 
classic view in behavioral economics that prosociality in these situations is driven by social 
preferences for equity and efficiency.  
 
Here we identified prominent methodological confounds and open theoretical questions in the 
key experiments reported in Capraro and Rand (2018). In particular, their Trade-Off Game 
(TOG) design (i) confounds preferences for efficiency with self-interest, and (ii) preferences 
for action with preferences for morality. Moreover, the design fails to dissociate preferences to 
do “good” from preferences to avoid doing “bad”. It is highly likely these issues affected the 
observed association between choice in the TOG, and prosociality in the DG/PD; the key 
evidence for the morality preference hypothesis. Likewise, the failure to decouple the 
preference to do “good” from that to avoid doing “bad” leaves the mechanism of the proposed 
morality preference unclear, and misses a key prediction from influential psychological theory; 
that “bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Vaish et 
al., 2008). 
 
To address these issues, we designed and implemented an improved TOG/DG experiment – 
eliminating the confounds identified in the original experiments reported in Capraro and Rand 
(2018). In doing so, we replicated the key results in support of the morality preference 
hypothesis. We found that framing one or the other TOG choice as morally appropriate – by 
labelling the focal choice “fair” or “generous”, or the counterpart choice “unfair” or 
“ungenerous” – strongly affected individuals’ choices. Specifically, approximately 70% of 
individuals chose the efficient option when that choice was framed as morally appropriate, 
dropping to 40% when the equitable choice was framed as morally appropriate; a swing of 
30%, and a reverse in the majority decision. More importantly, we found that individuals who 
chose the morally appropriate option in the TOG – be that the efficient option or the equitable 
option – were more prosocial in the preceding DG; donating more money to a stranger. This 
result was robust to various analytic specifications, and provides evidence that prosociality (in 
the DG) is driven by a preference for doing what is perceived to be morally right.  
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Our results lend experimental support to various alternatives to outcome-based preference 
models (e.g., Alger & Weibull, 2013; Brekke et al., 2003; Kimbrough & Vostroktunov, 2016; 
Krupka & Weber, 2013; Lazear et al., 2012; Levitt & List, 2017). In particular, these models 
assume that individuals have moral preferences that guide their prosocial decision-making in 
unilateral interactions; an assumption consistent with the current findings. A parallel class of 
models has sought to explain prosocial decision-making using an intention-based framework, 
according to which people are sensitive to others’ intentions (Falk et al., 2008; McCabe et al., 
2003; Rabin, 1993). These models have been useful in explaining prosociality observed in 
interactions with more than one active player. However, they are of limited use in the case of 
unilateral interactions – which are the focus of the current study – where beliefs about the 
intentions of others do not apply. Reputation-based models (e.g., Heck & Krueger, 2017; 
Jordan et al., 2016; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005) also appear of limited use for our results because 
choices were anonymous and one-shot. 
 
Our findings are consistent with work in social psychology that suggests individuals are 
motivated to maintain a positive moral self-image (Dunning, 2007). Indeed, an open question 
at the intersection of this research is whether individuals who assign greater value to a moral 
self-image (Aquino & Reed, 2002) show stronger choice framing effects in the TOG, and/or a 
stronger association between TOG choice and prosociality in the DG/PD. That said, we note 
that it is unlikely individuals are solely motivated by what they perceive to be the right thing, 
especially across different choice contexts. In line with Capraro and Rand (2018), we do expect 
that these results extend to the PD. There is some recent evidence, however, that behavior in 
other economic games is driven by outcome-based preferences, and not by a general morality 
preference (Capraro, 2018). An interesting avenue for future work is thus to further explore the 
boundary conditions of the morality preference account. One avenue might be situations in 
which people have to trade-off conflicting moral principles, like in the case of “altruistic” lying; 
that is, lying to benefit others (Biziou-van-Pol et al., 2015; Erat & Gneezy, 2012). An open 
empirical question is whether and how preferences for morality – as revealed by choice in the 
TOG – predict moral trade-offs of this kind. 
 
We found that a moral frame emphasizing “good” affected TOG choice as strongly as a moral 
frame emphasizing “bad”. For example, the proportion of individuals switching from the 
efficient choice to the equitable choice was essentially identical (approx. 30%) whether the 
latter choice was labelled “fair” or the former choice “unfair”. We thus found little evidence 
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that “bad” (framing) was stronger than “good” (framing) in prosocial choice (cf. Baumeister et 
al., 2001).  
 
An explanation for this discrepancy is found in recent work that has criticized the dominance 
of “bad” over “good” (termed the negativity bias) on theoretical and empirical grounds (Corns, 
2018). A particular criticism concerns the credible alternative explanations for much of the 
evidence base. For example, asymmetries in perception that are taken to support the stronger 
effect of negatively-valenced stimuli may instead be explained by differences in the 
informativeness of negative vs. positive stimuli (Corns, 2018). In research on impression 
formation, as a case in point, the greater weight assigned to immoral (vs. moral) traits may be 
explained by the fact that immoral traits tend to be more informative of others’ character 
(Kellermann, 1984). In the case of self-perception, in contrast, it is likely this informativeness 
bias does not hold; for example, because individuals can introspect on their full “moral 
history”, unlike when they are judging other people. Absent a difference in informativeness, 
immoral and moral traits may yield similar impact on judgment and behavior.  
 
This provides a plausible explanation for our results, and is consistent with a recent critique of 
the negativity bias hypothesis (Corns, 2018). This explanation also clarifies why the observed 
association between choosing the morally-framed option in the TOG, and prosociality in the 
DG, was similar under the “good” vs. “bad” moral frame (i.e., rejection of H4). Specifically, 
because the frames were equally motivating, individuals choosing the morally-framed option 
in either frame were equally liable to donate more in the DG. It is important to highlight that 
our “bad” frame label was symmetric vis-à-vis our “good” frame label (e.g., “unfair” vs. “fair”, 
respectively). Had we used frames with stronger, but asymmetric labels – such as “steal” in 
place of “unfair” – we may have elicited an asymmetric moral frame effect in line with the 
negativity bias hypothesis. As noted above, however, in that case it may have been unclear 
whether the moral frame asymmetry was due to the valence of the frames per se (i.e., bad vs. 
good), or other differences such as asymmetric strength or salience of the labels (cf. Corns, 
2018). 
 
Finally, our results add to a growing body of research on framing effects in prosocial choice. 
Prior work finds that situational labels sometimes impact prosocial decision-making (e.g., 
Capraro & Vanzo, 2018; Kay & Ross, 2003; Krupka & Weber, 2013; Larrick & Blount, 1997; 
Liberman et al., 2004), but not always (Dreber et al., 2013; Goerg et al., 2017). This suggests 
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the effect of labels may depend on the specific interaction or game type. Our findings replicate 
recent work showing that labels are highly effective in the Trade-Off Game (Capraro, 2018; 
Capraro & Rand, 2018).  
 
In summary, recent experimental work advanced the hypothesis that prosociality in 
anonymous, one-shot interactions is not driven by outcome-based social preferences for equity 
or efficiency per se, but by a generalized morality preference for “doing the right thing” 
(Capraro & Rand, 2018). We identified prominent methodological confounds and open 
theoretical questions in this work, and, consequently, conducted a refined and extended test of 
the morality preference hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, our findings indicate that 
prosociality in the anonymous, one-shot Dictator Game is driven by preferences for doing the 
morally right thing. Furthermore, consistent with a recent critique of the negativity bias 
hypothesis, our results suggest the preference to do “good” was as potent as the preference to 


























Sensitivity Power Analyses 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were tested via binomial logistic regression. H1 test is for a main effect (in 
the presence of another main effect and an interaction), while H2 test is for an interaction (in 
the presence of two main effects). In our sensitivity analysis, we assume that the two non-focal 
effects in each of the H1 and H2 tests jointly account for an R2 of .10. We note that increasing 
the R2 to .50 (i.e., implausibly high) does not dramatically change the sensitivity of our H1 and 
H2 tests (we are still able to detect r <.20). Moving on, we further assume 80% power, an alpha 
threshold of .05, a sample of N=784 (i.e., our post-data exclusion N) and a binomial distribution 
for the independent variables – because these were dummy-coded [0, 1]. Given these 
parameters, we were able to detect an Odds Ratio of 1.64. This is equivalent to an r coefficient 
of .13; conventionally considered small. The GPower (Faul et al., 2017) input/output of this 
sensitivity analysis is displayed in Figure S1. 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 were tested via linear regression. Both H3 and H4 tests were for an 
interaction (in the presence of two main effects). In our sensitivity analysis, we thus specify 
three predictor variables in a linear multiple regression model. Assuming 80% power, alpha of 
.05, and an N=784, we were able to detect an f2 of .01; equivalent to an r coefficient of .10, 














Figure S2. GPower output of sensitivity analysis for H3 and H4. 
 
 






As shown in Figure 2 in the main text, DG donations are clearly not normally distributed; 
rather, they follow an approximately bimodal distribution peaking over donations of 0 and 5. 
We thus conducted several exploratory analyses to test the robustness of the linear regression 




Following the bimodal distribution of the DG donations, we computed a binary variable 
identifying participants who donated less than 5 and participants who donated 5 or above 
[coded 0 and 1, respectively]. We fitted an exploratory binomial logistic regression model with 
this new variable as the DV, and TOG frame and TOG choice as the predictor variables. There 
was an interaction between TOG frame and TOG choice, OR = 3.09 [1.70, 5.61], Z = 3.71, p 
<.001. A larger proportion of participants donated 5 or above if they made the equitable choice 
(59.57%) vs. the efficient choice (42.31%) under the equalize frame. This pattern was reversed 
under the give frame. There, a smaller proportion of participants donated 5 or above if they 
made the equitable choice (42.98%) vs. the efficient choice (53.68%).  
 
We also conducted an exploratory Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) rank sum test with a 4-level factor 
specifying each combination of TOG choice frame [give, equalize] and TOG choice [efficient, 
equitable] as a separate group. The DV was DG donation [0-10]. This test showed that the 
groups differed in DG donations, X2 (3) = 18.16, p <.001. Follow-up K-W tests showed that, 
under the equalize frame, participants who made the equitable choice in the TOG donated more 
in the DG (Median = 5, IQR = 5) than participants who made the efficient choice in the TOG 
(Median = 1, IQR = 5), X2 (1) = 13.10, p <.001. In contrast, under the give frame, the reverse 
was true (equitable choice Median = 1, IQR = 5; efficient choice Median = 5, IQR = 5), X2 (1) 
= 5.07, p =.024 (Figure 2, panel B). Both the logistic regression and nonparametric test results 




THE INTERSECTION OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & BELIEF FORMATION 
 
126 
As before, given the approximately bimodal distribution of DG donations (Figure 2, main text), 
we fitted an exploratory binomial logistic regression as a robustness check on the linear 
regression model. We specified the binary DG variable computed previously as the DV 
[0=donated less than 5, 1=donated 5 or above], and moral choice and moral frame as the 
predictor variables. Consistent with the results of the preregistered linear regression model, 
there was little evidence of an interaction between moral choice and moral frame, OR = 0.86 






For this task, you will be paired with another person taking this survey.  
 
The amount of money you can earn depends only on your choice. You are given 10c and the 
other person is given nothing. You have to decide how much, if any, to donate to the other 
person. The other person has no choice and will accept your donation. 
 
The other person is REAL and will really get your donation. After the survey has ended, your 
choice will be matched to them to determine each of your bonus earnings. 
 
Here are some questions to make sure that you understand the rules.  
 
Remember that you have to answer all of these questions correctly in order to get the completion 
code. If you fail any of them, the survey will automatically end and you will not get any 
payment.  
 
What donation by you means that you and the other person earn the same amount? 
(Available answers: 0c/1c/…/10c) 
 
How much should YOU donate to maximize YOUR earnings? 
(Available answers: 0c/1c/…/10c) 
 
(Here there was a skip logic which redirected to the end of the survey all subjects who fail either 
or both the comprehension questions) 




Congratulations, you successfully answered all the questions. It is now time to make your 
decision.  
 
What is your donation? 
(Available answers: 0c/1c/…/10c) 
 
 
Trade-Off game (Give – Do Good frame) 
 
This is the second part of the HIT. Here, you will complete another task. 
  
You are Person A. You are completing this task with two other people taking the survey, Person 
B and Person C. They are different from the person you were paired with in the previous task.  
 
You get to make a choice. Person B and Person C do not make any choices.  
  
You can either be generous by choosing Option 1, or you can choose Option 2.  
  
If you decide to be generous by choosing Option 1, then you earn 13 cents, Person B 
earns 23 cents, and Person C earns 13 cents as a bonus.  
  
If you choose Option 2, then you earn 13 cents, Person B earns 13 cents, and Person C 
earns 13 cents as a bonus. 
 
This is the only interaction you have with Person B and Person C. They will not have the 
opportunity to influence your earnings in later parts of the HIT.  
  
As with the previous task, the other people are REAL and will really get your donation. After the 
survey has ended, your choice will be matched to them to determine each of your bonus earnings. 
 
What do you want to do? 
(Available answers: Be generous, Option 1/Option 2)   
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Trade-Off game (Give – Avoid Bad frame) 
 
This is the second part of the HIT. Here, you will complete another task. 
  
You are Person A. You are completing this task with two other people taking the survey, Person 
B and Person C. They are different from the person you were paired with in the previous task.  
 
You get to make a choice. Person B and Person C do not make any choices.  
 
You can either be ungenerous by choosing Option 1, or you can choose Option 2.  
  
If you decide to be ungenerous by choosing Option 1, then you earn 13 cents, Person B 
earns 13 cents, and Person C earns 13 cents as a bonus.  
  
If you choose Option 2, then you earn 13 cents, Person B earns 23 cents, and Person C 
earns 13 cents as a bonus. 
 
This is the only interaction you have with Person B and Person C. They will not have the 
opportunity to influence your earnings in later parts of the HIT.  
 
As with the previous task, the other people are REAL and will really get your donation. After the 
survey has ended, your choice will be matched to them to determine each of your bonus earnings. 
 
What do you want to do?   
(Available answers: Be ungenerous, Option 1/Option 2) 
 
 
Trade-Off game (Equalize – Do Good frame) 
 
This is the second part of the HIT. Here, you will complete another task. 
  
You are Person A. You are completing this task with two other people taking the survey, Person 
B and Person C. They are different from the person you were paired with in the previous task.  
  
You get to make a choice. Person B and Person C do not make any choices.  




You can either be fair by choosing Option 1, or you can choose Option 2.  
  
If you decide to be fair by choosing Option 1, then you earn 13 cents, Person B earns 13 cents, 
and Person C earns 13 cents as a bonus.  
  
If you choose Option 2, then you earn 13 cents, Person B earns 23 cents, and Person C 
earns 13 cents as a bonus. 
 
This is the only interaction you have with Person B and Person C. They will not have the 
opportunity to influence your earnings in later parts of the HIT.  
 
As with the previous task, the other people are REAL and will really get your donation. After the 
survey has ended, your choice will be matched to them to determine each of your bonus earnings. 
 
What do you want to do?   
(Available answers: Be fair, Option 1/Option 2) 
 
 
Trade-Off game (Equalize – Avoid Bad frame) 
 
This is the second part of the HIT. Here, you will complete another task. 
  
You are Person A. You are completing this task with two other people taking the survey, Person 
B and Person C. They are different from the person you were paired with in the previous task.  
  
You get to make a choice. Person B and Person C do not make any choices.  
 
You can either be unfair by choosing Option 1, or you can choose Option 2.  
  
If you decide to be unfair by choosing Option 1, then you earn 13 cents, Person B earns 23 cents, 
and Person C earns 13 cents as a bonus.  
  
If you choose Option 2, then you earn 13 cents, Person B earns 13 cents, and Person C 
earns 13 cents as a bonus. 




This is the only interaction you have with Person B and Person C. They will not have the 
opportunity to influence your earnings in later parts of the HIT.  
 
As with the previous task, the other people are REAL and will really get your donation. After the 
survey has ended, your choice will be matched to them to determine each of your bonus earnings. 
   
What do you want to do?   
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In Part II, I investigate several factors that are purported to influence belief formation in the 
morally-charged context of contemporary US politics. In particular, I study (i) whether belief 
updating is biased by the beliefs people already hold or by their desired political outcomes (or 
both), and (ii) the extent to which cognitive sophistication facilitates biased information 
processing, such that people who are more sophisticated are more likely to form factual beliefs 
that are favourable to their political identities. 
 
Specifically, in Part 2.1 I report a study designed to pit two putative “biases” in belief updating 
against one another. The first bias, which I refer to here as confirmation bias, predicts that 
people incorporate belief-confirming evidence to a greater extent than belief-disconfirming 
evidence when updating their beliefs (all else being equal). In contrast, the second—which I 
refer to here as desirability bias—predicts that people incorporate desirable evidence to a 
greater extent than undesirable evidence when updating their beliefs (all else being equal). 
These biases are often conflated in past work and thus it is unclear which accounts for variance 
(and how much) in belief updating. To tease the biases apart, I conducted a study capitalizing 
on the context of the 2016 US presidential election. Individuals were asked who they desired 
to win and who they believed would win the election. I recruited an equal number of people 
whose desire and belief were congruent (e.g., a desire for Trump and the belief he would win) 
and whose desire and belief were incongruent (e.g., a desire for Trump but the belief Clinton 
would win). I then randomly assigned information about who was more likely to win—
decoupling desires and prior beliefs in the aggregate sample of the study—and re-measured 
people’s beliefs. I found evidence to suggest that people updated their beliefs by a greater 
magnitude if the information was desirable (vs. undesirable). In contrast, I found little evidence 
for the corresponding asymmetry in updating for information that confirmed (vs. disconfirmed) 
prior beliefs. 
 
In Part 2.2, I report five studies that investigated the hypothesis that cognitive sophistication 
facilitates identity-protective bias in political belief formation. The logic of this hypothesis is 
that people with distinctive cognitive resources are expected to bring those resources to bear 
THE INTERSECTION OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & BELIEF FORMATION 
 
132 
on information that threatens their political identities; specifically, to resist and disregard it. I 
test this hypothesis in the context of two processes involved in belief formation: (a) belief 
updating—that is, how beliefs change after receipt of evidence—and (b) reasoning/evidence 
evaluation—that is, beliefs about the validity or quality of the evidence itself. I infer cognitive 
sophistication from performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), a behavioural 
measure of the propensity to think analytically. Regarding (a), I find that—contrary to the target 
hypothesis—people who score higher on the CRT deviate less from the posterior beliefs of a 
Bayesian agent; implying less bias in belief updating. Regarding (b), I find evidence to suggest 
that people who score higher on the CRT condition more strongly on their prior beliefs—rather 
than on their political identities per se—when evaluating new information. I discuss these 
findings with respect to existing models of identity-protective belief formation, and I conclude 
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2.1. The Heart Trumps the Head: Desirability Bias in Political Belief Revision18 
 
Abstract 
Understanding how individuals revise their political beliefs has important implications for 
society. In a preregistered study (N=900) we experimentally separated the predictions of two 
leading theories of human belief revision—desirability bias and confirmation bias—in the 
context of the 2016 US presidential election. Participants indicated who they desired to win, 
and who they believed would win, the election. Following confrontation with evidence that 
was either consistent or inconsistent with their desires or beliefs, they again indicated who they 
believed would win. We observed a robust desirability bias—individuals updated their beliefs 
more if the evidence was consistent (versus inconsistent) with their desired outcome. This bias 
was independent of whether the evidence was consistent or inconsistent with their prior beliefs. 
In contrast, we find limited evidence of an independent confirmation bias in belief updating. 
These results have implications for the relevant psychological theories and for political belief 















                                                 
18 The work presented in this section was conducted in collaboration with Leslie van der Leer and Ryan 
McKay (supervisor) and is published in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General: 
http://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2017-23363-001.pdf  





People are routinely exposed to a bewildering array of information relevant to their political 
beliefs.  Whether and how they incorporate this information has profound consequences for 
society. The belief that vaccines have harmful side effects (Moritz, 2011), or that climate 
change is a hoax (Lewandowsky et al., 2013), can reduce people’s intentions to vaccinate 
(Gangarosa et al., 1998; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a; Horne et al., 2015), or to minimize their 
carbon footprint (Douglas & Sutton, 2015; Jolley & Douglas, 2014b). Even simple 
infographics displayed during live televised election debates can meaningfully shape beliefs 
about debate outcome, potentially influencing the voting intentions of millions of viewers 
(Davis et al., 2011). A clear understanding of how people incorporate information into their 
political beliefs is thus of considerable practical importance. 
 
Two prominent theories offer similar yet distinct predictions regarding when and how people 
incorporate new information into their beliefs. One theory contends that individuals assign 
greater weight to information that is desirable versus undesirable—i.e., a desirability bias. This 
bias is reported to underlie an asymmetry whereby people update their prior beliefs to 
incorporate new and desirable information more than new but undesirable information (Sharot 
& Garrett, 2016). The other theory, confirmation bias, contends that people preferentially 
search for, evaluate and incorporate new information that confirms their prior beliefs 
(Nickerson, 1998). This bias is reported to underlie an asymmetry whereby people update their 
prior beliefs to incorporate new and confirming information more than new but disconfirming 
information—even if they receive a balanced set of both types of information (Lord et al., 1979; 
Taber & Lodge, 2006; Taber et al., 2009).  
 
Unfortunately, the predictions of desirability bias and confirmation bias are often conflated. In 
the domain of self-belief, the tendency for people to believe desirable things about themselves 
and their futures (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Weinstein, 1980) means that new information is 
typically either confirming and desirable, or disconfirming and undesirable (Eil & Rao, 2011). 
In the domain of political belief, rigorous separation of desirable and confirming information 
is similarly difficult. Of the few experiments that are appropriately designed to disentangle 
them, group identity is taken as a proxy for the desirability of information—that is, whether 
the information is consistent (i.e., desirable) or inconsistent (undesirable) with the position of 
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an individual’s cultural group—and belief updating is not the target outcome measure (e.g., see 
Kahan, 2016a; 2016b).  
 
Here we experimentally separated desirability bias and confirmation bias in political belief 
updating.  To do so, we capitalized on the political context prior to the 2016 US presidential 
election. To illustrate the advantage of this context, consider that many supporters of candidate 
Donald Trump may have believed Hillary Clinton would win the election—owing to her 
establishment support (Green & Kapur, 2016) or, more conspiratorially, a rigged ballot 
(Graham, 2016). In such circumstances, new information may have been simultaneously 
confirming but undesirable—for instance, polls indicating a Clinton win—or disconfirming 
but desirable—polls indicating a Trump win: causing desirability bias and confirmation bias to 
yield divergent predictions for belief updating.  
 
We exploited the profusion of close polling results19 to credibly suggest to individuals that 
either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton would become the next president, and measured how 
individuals with congruent (i.e., same candidate) desire-belief profiles, and incongruent 
(different candidate) desire-belief profiles updated their beliefs following receipt of this 
information. We thus independently manipulated whether information was consistent or 
inconsistent with (a) who individuals desired to win the election, or (b) who they believed 






We collected data from 900 participants online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (59% female; 
Mage = 37.89 SD = 12.91). Participants were US residents as determined by IP address (IP 
addresses located outside of the US were blocked prior to the start of the experiment). We 
required 779 participants to attain greater than 80% power (α = .05) to detect a small effect of 
partial eta squared (ηp²) = .01 in our primary analyses of covariance. We added approximately 
15% to this number to guard against power loss due to planned data exclusions. Following 
                                                 
19 At the time of study (data collection commenced 26th September 2016); see 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/us/general_election_trump_vs_clinton-5491.html  
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these data exclusions, we retained 811 participants for analyses. The study hypotheses, design, 
data collection, and analysis plan were pre-registered (see https://aspredicted.org/idxgj.pdf). 
 
Procedure & Design 
 
At the beginning of the survey, participants completed a brief screening questionnaire designed 
to determine who they (a) desired to win, and (b) believed would win the 2016 US presidential 
election. Responses to (a) were provided in a nominal choice format: Participants selected 
“Donald Trump”, “Hillary Clinton”, or “neither”. Responses to (b) were provided on a bipolar 
sliding scale from 0-100 with “Hillary Clinton” (0) at one end, and “Donald Trump” (100) at 
the other (the numerical values were hidden from participants). Participants were instructed 
that the more confident they were that a candidate would win, the closer they should slide the 
pointer to that candidate’s name. Those who responded with scores greater than 50 were 
categorized as believing Trump would win, and scores less than 50 as believing Clinton would 
win. Participants selecting “neither” for (a), or exactly 50 for (b), were directed to an end-of-
survey message and were unable to continue. This yielded two quasi-experimental groups; 
those whose desire-believe candidates were congruent, and those whose desire-believe 
candidates were incongruent. We balanced these condition assignments to obtain 
approximately 450 in each quasi-experimental condition (final condition samples after data 
exclusions: congruent desire-belief: n=406 [desireTrump / believeTrump: n=127, desireClinton / 
believeClinton: n=279]; incongruent desire-belief: n=405 [desireClinton / believeTrump: n=91, 
desireTrump / believeClinton: n=314])20.  
 
Participants in both conditions then completed a filler task (the 16-item Balanced Inventory of 
Desirable Responding; Hart et al., 2015) before being randomly presented with evidence either 
consistent, or inconsistent, with who they believed would win the election. Specifically, 
participants read a short passage about nationwide polling results, which emphasized either 
that Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump was likely to win the upcoming election. Participants 
were also presented with a bar graph figure illustrating such an outcome (study materials are 
available in the Materials Supplement). Evidence presentation was balanced within each 
specific candidate that participants initially believed would win the election. For example, of 
                                                 
20 The substantial variance in condition sizes per candidate reflects the fact that approximately three-quarters 
of our sample initially believed Clinton would win (see Figure 1 in the results section)—explaining the smaller 
number of individuals in the “believeTrump” condition(s). 
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those participants who initially believed Trump would win, half received the polling 
manipulation suggesting Clinton would win, and half received the polling manipulation 
suggesting Trump would win (likewise for those who initially believed Clinton would win). 
Thus, collapsing over specific candidates, this yielded four between-subjects conditions in a 2 
x 2 design: Evidence consistent or inconsistent with who the participant initially believed 
would win (Confirmation: Confirmatory or Disconfirmatory) and consistent or inconsistent 
with who they desired to win (Desirability: Desirable or Undesirable). Following the evidence 
presentation participants responded to several filler questions about polling data—e.g., “To 
what extent have you been following the polling data for the upcoming US presidential 
election?”—before again indicating who they believed would win the election, on the same 




We calculated how much participants updated their confidence in who they believed would 
win the election in the following steps. First, we converted both the participants’ initial 
confidence (T1), and their subsequent confidence (T2), onto a comparable scale indicating the 
absolute confidence they had in the candidate they initially believed was most likely to win. 
Thus, for those who initially believed Trump would win we subtracted 50 from T1 and T2 
scores, whereas for those who initially believed Clinton would win we subtracted T1 and T2 
scores from 50. Next, we computed the absolute difference between these newly converted T1 
and T2 scores for each participant. Finally, we multiplied this difference by either 1 (if the 
participant updated towards the presented evidence) or -1 (if the participant updated away from 
the presented evidence); meaning that higher numbers represented greater belief updating 






Participants were excluded from all analyses for fulfilling one or more of the pre-registered 
criteria: Failing an attention check embedded in the filler task (n=22, 2.44% of sample), 
answering “yes” to a question asking them if they responded dishonestly or mistakenly during 
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the survey (n=48, 5.33%), or recording a belief update score of greater than the mean ± 3SD in 
their respective condition (n=26, 2.89%). We excluded 1 (0.11%) further participant for taking 
the survey more than once (identified via their unique Amazon Mechanical Turk ID). 




Figure 1 displays the proportion of participants reporting who they (a) desired to win and (b) 
initially believed would win the election (for these results split by gender, age group and 





Figure 1. Percentage of participants reporting which candidate they (a) desired to win and (b) 









We conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to investigate the effect of Desirability 
and Confirmation factors on belief updating, adjusting for absolute T1 confidence scores21 
(Figure 2 displays the adjusted mean update in each condition22). There was a main effect of 
Desirability: F (1, 806) = 32.81, p <.001, ηp² = .04 90% CI [0.02, 0.06], such that participants 
updated more towards the evidence when it was consistent (versus inconsistent) with the 
candidate they desired to win. There was also a main effect of Confirmation: F (1, 806) = 76.63, 
p <.001, ηp² = .09 [0.06, 0.12], but in this case participants updated more towards the evidence 
when it was inconsistent (versus consistent) with the candidate they initially believed would 
win. In other words, we observed a disconfirmation bias. Finally, we observed a small 
interaction between Desirability and Confirmation: F (1, 806) = 7.15, p = .008, ηp² = .01 [0.00, 
0.02]. To decompose this interaction, we conducted planned ANCOVAs comparing updating 





                                                 
21 This prevents regression to the mean spuriously affecting belief updating. 
22 The raw means and distributions of update scores are reported in the Analysis Supplement.  
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Figure 2. Mean update by condition. Error bars and parentheses denote standard error of the 
mean. Note: Means are adjusted for absolute T1 confidence and based on the 2x2 ANCOVA 
model. One unit of update corresponds to a 1% adjustment on the bipolar scale used to measure 
belief.  N=811. 
 
 
For those participants receiving disconfirming information, updating was greater if that 
information was desirable (versus undesirable): F (1, 407) = 36.58, p <.001, ηp² = .08 90% CI 
[0.04, 0.13]. This pattern was the same for those receiving confirming information, albeit less 
pronounced: F (1, 398) = 20.62, p <.001, ηp² = .05 [0.02, 0.09]. Next, we examined those 
participants who received undesirable information—updating was greater for disconfirming 
(versus confirming) information: F (1, 406) = 23.76, p <.001, ηp² = .06 [0.02, 0.09]. This 
disconfirmation pattern was the same, yet more pronounced, for those receiving desirable 
information: F (1, 399) = 47.72, p <.001, ηp² = .11 [0.06, 0.16]. Finally, directly comparing the 
unique effect of desirable information (disconfirming-desirable condition) against the unique 
effect of confirming information (confirming-undesirable condition) revealed that updating 
was greater for the former: F (1, 402) = 75.26, p <.001, ηp² = .16 [0.11, 0.21].  
 
In the following sections, we report a series of exploratory analyses to examine (a) the 




Prior exposure. It is likely that participants had different amounts of prior exposure to the 
election polls. Examination of the distribution of one of our filler questions— “To what extent 
have you been following the polling data for the upcoming US presidential election?”—
suggested this was the case (see Figure S4 in the Analysis Supplement). It is possible this 
affected our manipulation and subsequent results. We thus repeated our preregistered 
ANCOVA with the addition of this variable as a covariate. However, the pattern of results 
remained the same. 
 
Initial confidence. Participants’ initial (T1) confidence scores were negatively skewed—in 
particular, a substantial number reported complete (or strong) confidence in their initial belief 
regarding which candidate would win (see Figure 3). This constrains belief updating for those 
THE INTERSECTION OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & BELIEF FORMATION 
 
141 
receiving confirming information because they are unable to update towards the new 
information (i.e., increase their confidence). In contrast, those receiving disconfirming 
information can update towards the new information (i.e., decrease their confidence). This may 





Figure 3. Distribution of absolute T1 confidence in belief about which candidate would win 




To explore this possibility, we selected a subset of participants (N = 370)—excluding those 
with high initial confidence (absolute T1 confidence scores > 25, Nexcluded = 441)—and 
recomputed the mean update in each condition (Figure 4 displays the results). The pattern of 
means in this truncated sample indicated a diminished disconfirmation bias, but an enduring 
                                                 
23 We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for emphasizing this point. 
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desirability bias. To confirm this statistically we conducted separate Kruskal-Wallis tests on 
the distribution of belief updating in the Confirmation and Desirability conditions, 
respectively24. As suspected, there was now only a trivial difference in updating for participants 
who received disconfirmatory (Median = 2.01, IQR = 11.69) versus confirmatory (Median = 
1.78, IQR = 6.58) information: χ² (1, N = 370) = 2.01, p =.156. In contrast, participants 
receiving desirable information updated more (Median = 3.08, IQR = 11.61) than those 






Figure 4. Mean update by condition following sample truncation. Error bars and parentheses 
denote standard error of the mean. Note: Means are unadjusted. One unit of update 
corresponds to a 1% adjustment on the bipolar scale used to measure belief.  N=370. 
 
 
                                                 
24 Parametric analyses were inappropriate as the cell N’s across conditions were unequal following sample 
truncation. 




To supplement this analysis, we also specifically examined updating among those with weak 
confidence in their initial belief. This is worthwhile because participants with particularly low 
confidence may have been (a) less constrained by the upper limit of the confidence scale, or 
(b) simply more receptive to confirming information, compared to their higher confidence 
counterparts. Thus, we selected those participants with low confidence (absolute T1 confidence 
scores ≤ 12.5, Nexcluded = 622) and again recomputed the mean update in each condition. 
Because the resultant N was small (Nlow-confidence = 189) and unevenly distributed across 
conditions, we simulated belief updating scores using the parameters from the low confidence 
sample. Specifically, for each of the four conditions, we drew 500 scores from a random normal 
distribution centered on the respective condition mean, and the pooled SD (i.e., computed 
across the four conditions) (the simulation script and data are available in the Simulation 
Supplement).  
 
This simulated sample conferred greater than 99% power to detect small effects (ηp² = 0.01,  
= 0.05). Conducting an ANOVA on this data revealed a main effect of Desirability, F (1, 1996) 
= 53.73, p <.001, ηp² = .03 90% CI [0.02, 0.04], similar in size and equivalent in direction to 
that observed in the preceding empirical analyses. The main effect of Confirmation was trivial 
in size, F (1, 1996) = 2.06, p =.151, ηp² = .001 [0.000, 0.005], as was the interaction between 
the two factors, F (1, 1996) = 1.54, p =.215, ηp² = .001 [0.000, 0.004].  
 
Ideological Asymmetry Hypothesis 
 
There is ongoing debate over whether motivated cognition is more pronounced among 
individuals on the political right than the political left (Jost et al., 2003; Kahan, 2016b). We 
thus explored whether supporters of Donald Trump demonstrated greater desirability bias than 
supporters of Hillary Clinton. We conducted an ANCOVA (adjusting for absolute T1 
confidence as before) with two factors: Desirability, and a dummy coded variable denoting 
which candidate the participant desired to win (“Supporter”). There was a small Desirability 
by Supporter interaction, F (1, 806) = 8.58, p =.004, ηp² = .01 90% CI [0.00, 0.03]. Separate 
ANCOVA models revealed a stronger desirability bias among supporters of Donald Trump, F 
(1, 438) = 34.07, p <.001, ηp² = .07 [0.04, 0.11], than supporters of Hillary Clinton, F (1, 367) 
= 2.54, p =.112, ηp² = .01 [0.00, 0.03].  




Further exploration, however, revealed this asymmetry was due to the previously identified 
ceiling effect in initial (T1) confidence. First, a large number of participants supported Clinton 
and also believed she would win (n=279)—whereas fewer than half this number supported 
Trump while also believing he would win (n=127). Second, these participants (i.e., those with 
congruent desire and prior belief) had strong negative skew in their initial confidence, with 
many believing that their desired candidate was certain to win (see Figure S5 in the Analysis 
Supplement). Taking these facts together implies that supporters of Clinton were more 
numerous among those who received desirable information but were constrained (by virtue of 
their extreme initial confidence) in updating their belief towards this information.  
 
This was confirmed by examining participants who (i) had a congruent desire-belief profile, 
(ii) received desirable information, and (iii) reported extreme initial confidence (absolute T1 
confidence > 45). Of these participants (n=69), 67% supported Clinton (n=46) and 33% 
supported Trump (n=23). This discrepancy may have disproportionately suppressed 
desirability bias among Clinton supporters. Indeed, truncating the sample to exclude those with 
extreme initial confidence (absolute T1 confidence > 45, Nexcluded = 192, Nincluded = 619), and 
repeating the ANCOVA analysis, diminished the size of the Desirability by Supporter 
interaction, F (1, 614) = 1.08, p =.298, ηp² = .002 90% CI [0.000, 0.012]. Supporters of Donald 
Trump and supporters of Hillary Clinton demonstrated similar desirability bias in this sample: 
F (1, 348) = 27.19, p <.001, ηp² = .07 [0.03, 0.12] and F (1, 265) = 10.55, p =.001, ηp² = .04 




Understanding how people revise their political beliefs has important implications for society. 
In the context of the 2016 US presidential election, we observed a robust desirability bias: 
individuals incorporated information more if it was consistent (versus inconsistent) with their 
desired outcome. This bias was independent of whether the information was consistent or 
inconsistent with individuals’ prior beliefs. In contrast, we found limited evidence of an 
independent confirmation bias in belief updating. These results have implications for the 
underlying psychological theories and for political belief revision in practice. 
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A substantial body of work spanning neuroscience, economics, and clinical psychology reports 
an asymmetry in the updating of self-beliefs whereby desirable information is incorporated 
more than undesirable information. This asymmetry has been observed when individuals 
receive information about their personality traits (Korn et al., 2016; Korn et al., 2012), abilities 
and attractiveness (Eil & Rao, 2011; Mobius et al., 2011), or risk of experiencing future 
negative life events (Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2011; but see Shah et al., 2016; 
Garrett & Sharot, 2017). A similar yet distinct asymmetry has been reported in the updating of 
political beliefs whereby individuals become more confident in their prior beliefs despite 
receiving a balanced set of confirming and disconfirming information. When two individuals 
with conflicting prior beliefs are thus exposed to the same stream of information, polarization 
of political beliefs is an oft-observed outcome (e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Taber & Lodge, 2006; 
Taber et al., 2009).  
 
The present study advances this work twofold. First, we find a robust asymmetry in political 
belief updating that is consistent with desirability bias, independent of individuals’ prior 
beliefs. In contrast, we find little independent effect of prior beliefs on belief updating. This 
suggests that the belief polarization reported in previous studies may be due to individuals’ 
conflicting desires, not their prior beliefs per se. Second, whereas past investigations of 
political belief updating have mainly focused on political attitudes (e.g., support for or against 
a policy), here we examined belief updating about political reality—specifically, individuals’ 
belief about which presidential candidate was going to be elected. Though one might expect 
biased belief updating in the former case—after all, attitudes are guided by preferences and 
desires—it is somewhat more surprising to find that individuals’ desires biased their belief 
updating over a question of fact (Kahan, 2016a). 
 
A recent study reported that individuals updated their beliefs about the facts of global warming 
asymmetrically, but that the specific pattern depended upon whether they were weak or strong 
believers in anthropogenic climate change (Sunstein et al., 2016). Particularly, when 
confronted with new information regarding global temperature increase, strong believers 
updated their beliefs more upon receipt of ostensibly undesirable information (i.e., a faster 
temperature increase than expected), whereas weak believers updated their beliefs more upon 
receipt of ostensibly desirable information (a slower increase than expected). Though this 
pattern appears consistent with an independent confirmation bias, such an outcome may 
emerge when individuals are personally invested in “being right”—indeed, for many climate 
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change activists a belief that the world is warming constitutes a core part of their identity (Stern 
et al., 1999). For such people, objectively undesirable (but confirming) information about the 
rate of global warming may be subjectively desirable: vindicating their commitment to 
combatting climate change (Sunstein et al., 2016) and affirming their cultural group identity 
(Kahan et al., 2012).  
 
It is unlikely that our design inadvertently conflated confirmation with desirability in this way. 
Ahead of an election, it is difficult to imagine an individual being personally invested in the 
belief that their desired candidate would not get into office. Indeed, in the domain of self-belief 
updating, rigorous separation of confirming and desirable information yields identical results 
to those reported in the present study—namely, a robust desirability bias but limited evidence 
of confirmation bias (Eil & Rao, 2011). We note the important distinction, however, between 
(a lack of) confirmation bias observed in belief updating as measured here, and confirmation 
bias observed in measures of information search and evaluation (e.g., Ditto & Lopez, 1992). 
We did not directly examine the latter, which may yet manifest independent of information 
desirability. Additional exploration of our own data lent support to this distinction (see 
“informational value of polls” available in the Analysis Supplement).  
 
Finally, our results offer a mechanistic explanation for why impassioned political 
disagreements in the US, such as those over gun control or immigration, appear increasingly 
polarized and intractable (Pew Research Center, 2016). Insofar as individuals have strong 
preferences concerning these issues (Koleva et al., 2012), our findings suggest they selectively 
incorporate new evidence into what they believe to be true regarding the relevant facts—
provided it is consistent with what they desire to be true. Polarization over factual beliefs is 
inimical to the effective functioning of democratic society (Kahan et al., 2012); it is thus a 
priority to continue exploring which interventions ameliorate the motivated integration of 

















Participants completed the following questions as part of the screening procedure (in a fixed 
order): 
 
1. Please enter your age (in years): 









e. Other (please enter): 






f. Other (please enter): 
5. Which political candidate do you want to win the upcoming US presidential election? 
a. Donald Trump 
b. Hillary Clinton 
c. Neither 
6. Which political candidate do you think will win the upcoming US Presidential 
election?  




Please provide your response using the sliding scale below (note: dragging the slider 
closer towards the name of the candidate indicates how confident you are). 
 






After the screening questionnaire, those who were eligible to continue with the survey 
completed the 16-item balanced inventory of desirable responding (BIDR, Hart et al., 2015). 
Completed on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). The question order was 
fixed. 
 
1. I have not always been honest with myself. 
2. I always know why I like things. 
3. It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
4. I never regret my decisions. 
5. I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough. 
6. I am a completely rational person. 
7. I am very confident of my judgments. 
8. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
9. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
10. I never cover up my mistakes. 
11. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
12. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
13. I have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back. 
14. Please select response number three. [Attention check] 
15. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
16. I never take things that don’t belong to me. 
17. I don’t gossip about other people’s business. 
 






Following the 16-item BIDR, participants (according to condition) read the following passage: 
 
Over the past several months there have been many polls conducted to try and predict 
the outcome of the upcoming US Presidential election: specifically, whether it will be 
Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump who assumes the mantle of commander-in-chief.  
 
These polls are conducted at both the local (i.e., state-wide) and nationwide level. As 
Election Day draws closer, several of the large nationwide polls become increasingly 
indicative of who will go on to win the election and become the next President of the 
United States. Examples of such nationwide polls are the USC/Los Angeles Times and 
NBC/Survey Monkey tracking polls, the Google Consumer Surveys poll, and the 
Ipsos/Reuters Core Political Data survey. 
 
As you may be aware, data from several of these nationwide polls have recently 
suggested that, on Election Day, Hillary Clinton [Donald Trump] is likely to obtain the 
largest proportion of votes, and thus be elected as President of the United States. The 
results of nationwide polling data are not definitive, but results this close to Election 
Day have proven accurate in correctly identifying the election of Presidential 
candidates in the past. 
 
 
Participants in the Clinton-win condition saw the following graphic: 













Polling Data (Filler) Questions 
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Following the manipulation, participants responded to the following three filler questions 
(fixed order): 
 
1. In general, do you think polling data is informative? [Scored from 1 (Not at all) to 7 
(Very much so)] 
2. Do you think there should be more or less polling data made available to the public 
prior to US presidential elections? [Scored from 1 (Definitely less) to 7 (Definitely 
more)] 
3. To what extent have you been following the polling data for the upcoming US 
presidential election? [Scored from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much so)] 
 
 
Time 2 Belief 
 
Participants then once again indicated who they believed would win the election (on the same 
bipolar scale used previously): 
 
Finally, given these nationwide polling data and your own opinion, please indicate 
which political candidate you think will win the upcoming US Presidential election. 
  
Please provide your response using the sliding scale below (note: dragging the slider 
closer towards the name of the candidate indicates how confident you are). 
 






On the last page of the survey participants were asked: 
 
Accurate data are very important for our research so please answer the following question 
honestly.  




Your answer to this question is completely anonymous, and we can assure you that there will 
be no negative consequences whatsoever for answering "yes".  
  
You will get your HIT code on the next screen regardless of how you respond, and your 
response will have no influence on what Mechanical Turk HITs you can choose to do in the 
future. 
  
During this survey, did you answer dishonestly or mistakenly at any point? 
 
 
1. Yes   2. No 
 
 
Lastly, we would like to hear any feedback you have about the survey. Please leave any 














Figures S1-S3 (below) show whom participants (a) desired to win and (b) initially believed 
would win the 2016 US presidential election, by gender (Figure S1), age group (Figure S2) and 
ethnicity (Figure S3).  
 







Figure S1. Percentage of males and females reporting which candidate they (a) desired to win 
and (b) initially believed would win the 2016 US presidential election. Please note: N=810. 
One participant did not identify as male or female; they reported desiring Trump but believing 















Figure S2. Percentage of participants in each age group (in years) reporting which candidate 
they (a) desired to win and (b) initially believed would win the 2016 US presidential election. 
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Figure S3. Percentage of Non-White and White participants reporting which candidate they 
(a) desired to win and (b) initially believed would win the 2016 US presidential election. Note: 
Non-White n=152; White n=659. Due to the low number of Non-White participants we pooled 





Prior exposure. Figure S4 (below) shows the distribution of scores on the filler question “To 
what extent have you been following the polling data for the upcoming US presidential 





Figure S4. Distribution of scores indicative of prior exposure to US election polls. Note: 
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Ideological Asymmetry Hypothesis 
 
Figure S5 (below) shows the distribution of initial (T1) confidence in the candidate participants 





Figure S5. Distribution of absolute T1 confidence according to which candidate participants 





Additional Exploratory Analyses 
 
Informational Value of Polls 
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We examined the effect of Confirmation and Desirability on participant responses to one of 
our filler questions— “In general, do you think polling data is informative?” [Scored from 1 
(Not at all) to 7 (Very much so)]. Conducting a two factor ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
Desirability, F (1, 807) = 28.86, p <.001, ηp² = .04 90% CI [0.02, 0.06], such that participants 
thought polling data was more informative when it was consistent (M = 4.95, SD = 1.40) versus 
inconsistent (M = 4.41, SD = 1.56) with whom they desired to win the election. We also 
observed a main effect of Confirmation, F (1, 807) = 65.86, p <.001, ηp² = .08 [0.05, 0.11], 
such that participants thought polling data was more informative when it was consistent (M = 
5.08, SD = 1.42) versus inconsistent (M = 4.27, SD = 1.48) with whom they initially believed 
would win the election. There was only a trivial interaction between the factors, F (1, 807) = 
0.01, p =.933, ηp² < .001. 
 
We also investigated to what extent supporters of Donald Trump and supporters of Hillary 
Clinton differed in their judgments of the informational value of polling data overall. An 
independent samples t-test revealed a trivial difference between supporters of Trump (M = 
4.61, SD = 1.58) and supporters of Clinton (M = 4.75, SD = 1.42): t (809) = 1.31, p =.192, d = 
0.09 95% CI [-0.05, 0.23].  
 
Participants Who Changed Their Belief 
 
Of the full sample (n=811), 62 (7.64%) changed their (qualitative) belief about which candidate 
was going to win the election. This was determined by examining the sign of absolute T2 
confidence: if participants crossed the midpoint of the bipolar scale when giving their belief 
for a second time (i.e., indicating they now believed that a different candidate was most likely 
to win the election) the sign would be negative. As to be expected, participants who changed 
their belief had lower confidence in their initial belief (MT1 confidence = 15.66, SDT1 confidence = 
12.42) than those who did not change their belief (MT1 confidence = 29.15, SDT1 confidence = 15.81). 
Participants who changed their belief also had much larger belief updating scores (Mupdating = 
25.10, SDupdating = 23.02) than those who did not (Mupdating = 1.92, SDupdating = 8.61). 
 
Of those who changed their mind, half were supporters of Donald Trump (n=32, 7.26% of all 
Trump supporters), and half were supporters of Hillary Clinton (n=30, 8.11% of all Clinton 
supporters). Of those who initially believed Clinton was most likely to win (n=593), 32 (5.40%) 
subsequently believed Trump was most likely to win; whereas, of those who initially believed 
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Trump (n=218), 30 (13.76%) changed their belief to Clinton. Finally, receiving the polling 
manipulation which suggested that Trump was going to win (n=414) prompted 40 (9.66%) 
individuals to change their belief about which candidate was most likely to win; whereas only 
22 (5.54%) of those who received the Clinton manipulation (n=397) did the same. This was 
probably a function of the fact that approximately three-quarters of the sample initially believed 
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2.2. Rethinking the Link between Cognitive Sophistication and Identity-
Protective Bias in Political Belief Formation25 
 
Abstract 
Popular accounts of political belief formation argue that citizens’ cognition is biased toward 
the formation of factual beliefs that are favorable to their political identities. An alarming 
hypothesis derived from these accounts is that cognitive sophistication facilitates identity-
biased processing of political information. In this paper, we re-examine this hypothesis, 
presenting five studies (total N>5000) that investigated the role of analytic thinking (as 
measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test, CRT) in political belief formation. Our key results 
are twofold. In Studies 1 and 2, we investigated belief updating, and found no evidence that 
analytic thinking is associated with biased updating. On the contrary, individuals who scored 
higher on the CRT tended to deviate less from the posterior beliefs of a Bayesian agent, whether 
new information was concordant or discordant with their political identity. In Studies 2 through 
5, we investigated reasoning about the validity of politically concordant or discordant 
information. Our results suggested that highly analytic individuals deferred more to their prior 
beliefs when reasoning, rather than to their political identities per se. An important implication 
of these results is to highlight the possibility that, rather than being deployed to disregard or 
resist identity-threatening evidence, cognitive sophistication may instead be deployed to assess 
and integrate new evidence in light of what the person currently believes to be true. This 
perspective has implications for theory, provides a reinterpretation of past findings, and may 
offer greater cause for optimism regarding the role of cognitive sophistication in political belief 








                                                 
25 The work presented in this section was conducted in collaboration with Gordon Pennycook and David 
Rand. 





The ideal of an informed electorate is central to democratic governance. Relevant to promoting 
this ideal is an understanding of how citizens acquire their beliefs about political issues; and, 
in particular, their beliefs about politically-relevant facts—what is true “out there” in the 
world—distinct from values, attitudes or opinions. Although this is a longstanding research 
topic, it has taken on new impetus in recent years as the potential influence of misinformation 
and disinformation on democratic functioning has piqued scientific, public, and governmental 
interest (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Digital, Culture, Media, and Sports Committee, 2018; 
Lazer et al., 2018; Nyhan, 2016), and public consensus over politically-relevant science 
continues to elude even the more advanced democratic nations (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017; 
Kahan, 2015). 
 
According to an influential theoretical perspective, one barrier to public convergence on true 
beliefs in politics is citizens’ identity commitments. That is, who they are, and the groups—
most commonly, political parties—with which they identify. More specifically, the proposal is 
that citizens’ cognition is biased toward the formation of factual beliefs favorable to their 
political identities. As this bias arises from the application of cognition, an alarming hypothesis 
that has been advanced is that the most cognitively sophisticated partisans will exhibit the most 
identity-bias when processing political information. This hypothesis presents a considerable 
challenge to the ideal of an informed electorate, and casts an ominous shadow over the prospect 
of achieving convergence on true beliefs in politics. Chiefly, because it implies that the distinct 
proficiencies of cognitively sophisticated partisans will be deployed to disregard and resist 
evidence that threatens their political identities. 
 
In the current paper, we test this hypothesis and offer an alternative hypothesis to explain past 
evidence. Specifically, we report on a multi-study investigation of how political belief 
formation relates to the interaction between analytic thinking and political identity. Our main 
results are twofold. First, benchmarked against a normative Bayesian agent, we find evidence 
that more analytic individuals are overall less biased in their belief updating after receipt of 
new political information, whether or not it aligns with their political identity. Second, we find 
evidence that highly analytic individuals may defer more to their prior beliefs – rather than to 
their political identities per se (i.e., independent of their prior beliefs) – when reasoning about 
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the validity of this information. An important implication of these results is to highlight the 
possibility that, rather than being deployed to disregard or resist identity-threatening evidence 
per se, cognitive sophistication may instead be deployed to assess and integrate new evidence 
in light of what the person currently believes to be true. We argue that these results offer a 
somewhat more optimistic perspective on the role of cognitive sophistication in political belief 
formation. However, we also highlight that, from a practical perspective, reliance on prior 
beliefs may be similarly problematic for the prospect of achieving convergence on true beliefs 
in politics.  
 
1.1. Identity-Protective Cognition in Political Belief Formation 
 
According to several overlapping theoretical accounts, the cognitive processes involved in 
political belief formation are biased by people’s group identities (Bermúdez, 2018; Kahan, 
2016a; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). While these identities may be diverse in scope, they are 
often construed along (US) political lines: “Democrat” and “Republican”, “liberal” and 
“conservative” (Kahan, 2016a; Pereira & Van Bavel, 2018; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018).  
 
The central proposition common to these accounts is that a person’s political identity biases 
their cognition towards formation of factual beliefs that are concordant with that identity, and 
away from factual beliefs that are discordant with the identity26. For brevity, we will call this 
biasing influence “identity-protective cognition” (IPC) (cf. Kahan, 2017).  
 
A further similarity between these accounts is their appeal to the logic of utility maximization 
in belief formation to explain IPC (Bénabou & Tirole, 2016; Loewenstein & Molnar, 2018; 
Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). To illustrate this logic, consider that people often depend upon 
their identity-defining personal and social commitments for psychological and material 
wellbeing, commitments that may be put at risk by adoption of politically-discordant beliefs 
(e.g., Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Huber & Malhotra, 2017). The accuracy of those beliefs—
particularly beliefs about political issues which lack a perceptible impact on day-to-day life—
is of limited value by comparison (Kahan, 2016a). Thus, the logic underpinning IPC is that 
                                                 
26 As indicated in the opening paragraphs, the focus of the current paper is factual beliefs—that is, people’s 
beliefs about what is true “out there” in the world—rather than values, attitudes or opinions. We use “belief” 
throughout the paper to refer to factual beliefs. 
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cognition is sensitive to—and adjusts for—this value asymmetry; manifesting as bias in favor 
of political identity in belief formation.  
 
A final and related similarity between these theoretical accounts is their construal of bias as 
deviation from accuracy. That is, the bias caused by IPC is considered detrimental to 
epistemically normative processes of belief formation; because of the prioritization of the 
identity concordance of political beliefs over their truth value (Bermúdez, 2018; Kahan, 2016a; 
Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018).  
 
Despite these similarities, there are some differences between the theoretical accounts 
described. Most notably, they diverge in the specific cognitive processes through which IPC is 
assumed to exert bias on belief formation. For example, whereas Kahan’s (2016a) account 
assumes the biasing influence of IPC operates when individuals reason about the diagnosticity 
of new evidence, Van Bavel and Pereira’s (2018) account assumes a broader biasing influence 
of IPC; including on reasoning, memory, perception, and other cognitive processes. While 
these differences between the accounts are explicit, less explicit is why IPC should be limited 
to some cognitive processes but not others. After all, both accounts invoke the same logic—
utility maximization in belief formation—to explain the biasing influence of IPC.  
 
To illustrate the potential implications of IPC more concretely, Figure 1 displays a triad of 
distinct cognitive-behavioral processes involved in belief formation; processes through which 
IPC could conceivably exert bias on the formation of beliefs in the political domain.  
 
The top of the triad—sampling—refers to the process of sampling information from the 
environment. Following the logic of IPC (utility maximization), individuals may be expected 
to deploy information sampling strategies such that they are more likely to sample information 
that is concordant (vs. discordant) with their political identity. For example, selecting into 
politically like-minded media outlets (Bolin & Hamilton, 2018; Newman et al., 2018; 
Rodriguez et al., 2017), and choosing to hear from politically like-minded others (Marks et al., 
2018).  
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Figure 1. Three distinct cognitive-behavioral processes involved in political belief formation 
through which IPC conceivably exerts bias. Sampling refers to information sampling from the 
environment. Reasoning refers to reasoning (deliberating) about the validity of information. 
Updating refers to integrating new information with existing beliefs to arrive at a revised 





The lower left of the triad—reasoning—refers to the process of reasoning or deliberating about 
the validity of information. Following the logic of IPC, individuals may be expected to reason 
about information in such a way that politically-concordant information is judged to be more 
valid or accurate than politically-discordant information. For example, “liberal Democrats” and 
“conservative Republicans” (in the US) will judge the same information as less or more valid, 
conditional on its implications for their political identity (Kahan, 2013). Identity-protective 
reasoning is the process most commonly studied in the context of IPC and political belief 
formation. A meta-analytic review of such evidence was recently conducted by Ditto and 
colleagues (2018a; for a critique see Baron & Jost, 2018; for a reply see Ditto et al., 2018b). 
 
The lower right of the triad—updating—refers to the process of integrating new information 
with existing beliefs; providing a revised (updated) set of beliefs. Following the logic of IPC, 
individuals may be expected to integrate new information with existing beliefs in a biased 
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fashion; updating to a greater extent after receipt of politically-concordant than politically-
discordant information (Sunstein et al., 2017).  
 
1.2. Cognitive Sophistication and Identity-Protective Belief Formation 
 
An alarming hypothesis derived from the logic of IPC is that cognitive sophistication will 
facilitate identity-protective processing in political belief formation (Kahan, 2013, Kahan et 
al., 2017). By extension, cognitive sophistication may be expected to increase bias in this 
domain; polarizing, rather than unifying, the beliefs of people who identify with opposing 
political groups. This hypothesis, which we will call the “IPC facilitation hypothesis”, casts an 
ominous shadow over the prospect of achieving convergence on true beliefs in politics; chiefly, 
because it implies that the distinct proficiencies of cognitively sophisticated partisans will be 
deployed to disregard or resist new evidence that threatens their political identities.  
 
The IPC facilitation hypothesis is consistent with numerous sets of observational data reported 
in the last decade. Surveys of US adults repeatedly find that educational attainment is 
associated with greater belief polarization among individuals of opposing political identities, 
on issues as diverse as climate change (Bolin & Hamilton, 2018; Drummond & Fischhoff, 
2017; Buttel & Flinn, 1978; Ehret et al., 2017; Hamilton et al., 2015; Hamilton et al., 2018; 
Hamilton & Keim, 2009; Hamilton & Stampone, 2013; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Shao et al., 
2014), the safety of vaccination (Hamilton et al., 2015; Joslyn & Sylvester, 2017), concern 
about the environment (Ehret et al., 2017; Hamilton, 2008; Hamilton & Safford, 2015; 
Hamilton et al., 2010), the trustworthiness of the scientific community (Gauchat, 2012), and 
various others (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017; Hamilton & Saito, 2015; Joslyn & Haider-
Markel, 2014; Scheitle, 2018). While educational attainment is a rather crude measure of 
cognitive sophistication, more targeted measures reveal a similar pattern: High scores on tests 
of science literacy, numeracy, topic knowledge, and open-minded and reflective thinking are 
likewise associated with greater belief polarization across various political issues (Bolsen et 
al., 2015; Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017; Hamilton, 2011; Hamilton et al., 2012; Hart et al., 
2015; Kahan et al., 2012; Kahan & Corbin, 2016; Kahan & Stanovich, 2016; Malka et al., 
2009; Sarathchandra et al., 2018). 
 
Although these observational data are consistent with the IPC facilitation hypothesis, their 
purely correlational nature does not provide particularly compelling evidence of IPC. Neither 
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do they provide insight into the specific processes—for example, sampling, reasoning or 
updating—through which IPC might exert bias on political belief formation to produce such 
polarization (Figure 1). To our knowledge, there has been no investigation of whether cognitive 
sophistication correlates with more biased belief updating, and there is only mixed evidence 
regarding a link with selective information sampling (e.g., Bolin & Hamilton, 2018; Cragun, 
2018; Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2017).  
 
Stronger evidence for the IPC facilitation hypothesis instead comes from several experimental 
studies linking cognitive sophistication with identity-protective reasoning in political belief 
formation. In a representative study, Kahan (2013) found that individuals who scored highest 
on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) – a behavioral measure of the propensity to engage in 
reflective/analytic thinking (Frederick, 2005; Pennycook et al., 2016) – were most polarized in 
their evaluation of information that was manipulated to be concordant vs. discordant with their 
political identities (see also Kahan et al., 2017)27. These data thus draw a clearer link between 
cognitive sophistication and identity-protective processing than provided by the 
aforementioned observational studies28; and, at the same time, they offer a mechanism to 
explain those observational findings. Specifically, that cognitive sophistication—indexed by 
educational attainment, CRT performance, and so on—confers individuals the aptitude to more 
effectively reason about information such that it “fits” with their political identity (Kahan, 
2017).  
 
1.3. Rethinking Cognitive Sophistication and Identity-Protective Processing 
 
Here we re-examine the IPC facilitation hypothesis by further investigating how political belief 
formation relates to the interaction between cognitive sophistication and political identity. We 
focus on the processes of (a) reasoning about political information, and (b) belief updating 
after receipt of political information. Regarding (a), we propose and test an alternative 
hypothesis for why cognitively sophisticated individuals putatively defer more to their political 
identities when reasoning about information in the political domain. Regarding (b), we provide 
                                                 
27 A similar pattern is reported by Bakker et al. (2018). However, in those experiments, the outcome measure 
was policy support, not beliefs about “facts” out in the world—as is the focus of the current paper. 
28 But, still, not a causal link: Political identity and cognitive sophistication are not randomly assigned in these 
experiments. This prohibits the inference that political identity (or cognitive sophistication) causes biased 
reasoning, because of the potential confounding influence of unobserved variables (e.g., Gerber & Green, pp. 
301-303). Indeed, we posit one such confounding variable—prior beliefs—in the following section. 
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the first test (to our knowledge) of whether cognitively sophisticated individuals are more 
biased in favor of their political identities when updating their beliefs. In the latter case, we 
also test the alternative hypothesis that cognitively sophisticated individuals are less biased in 
their belief updating. 
 
Our alternative hypotheses are motivated by multiple and distinct lines of recent evidence. 
Regarding (a), evidence suggests that cognitively sophisticated individuals defer more to their 
prior beliefs when reasoning about information—in both political and apolitical domains. 
Because prior beliefs about political issues are often correlated with political identity—perhaps 
in part due to selective exposure to news media29 (Bolin & Hamilton, 2018; Rodriguez et al., 
2017)—stronger deference to political identity among the cognitively sophisticated may 
instead reflect a more general and direct deference to prior beliefs. Regarding (b), recent 
evidence suggests that cognitively sophisticated people have more accurate beliefs about the 
truth and falsity of political news headlines—independent of the identity concordance of those 
headlines—a pattern that suggests overall less biased belief formation among this group. Below 
we briefly elaborate on this evidence. 
 
First, a substantial body of research using the “belief bias” paradigm suggests that individuals 
are influenced by their prior beliefs when reasoning about the deductive validity of arguments 
(Evans et al., 1983; Klauer et al., 2000; Markovits & Nantel, 1989). In the typical paradigm, 
individuals are tasked with endorsing (or not) a conclusion that follows from two assumed-to-
be-true premises, where the conclusion either does (valid) or does not (invalid) logically 
follow, and either contradicts or aligns with individuals’ prior beliefs (e.g., that whales can 
walk). Recent work with this paradigm indicates that, while individuals with greater cognitive 
ability in general—as well as those who score higher on the CRT in particular—perform better 
overall, they are also more influenced by their prior beliefs (Trippas et al., 2015; Trippas et al., 
2018).  
 
To illustrate, consider a recent study by Trippas and colleagues (2015). Among low CRT 
scorers, the difference in endorsement rates between valid and invalid conclusions was similar 
irrespective of whether the conclusions contradicted or aligned with subjects’ prior beliefs. 
Specifically, low CRT scorers endorsed valid over invalid conclusions at roughly the same rate 
                                                 
29 But possibly also due to other factors unrelated to political identity. 
THE INTERSECTION OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & BELIEF FORMATION 
 
167 
across prior belief manipulations. Among high CRT scorers, in contrast, the difference in 
valid/invalid endorsement rates was greater for conclusions that contradicted prior beliefs. In 
other words, whether a given conclusion contradicted or aligned with subjects’ prior beliefs 
affected task performance in this way only for those who scored high on the CRT. Importantly, 
the content of the task was unrelated to identity or politics, implying that cognitively 
sophisticated individuals are more sensitive to how information squares with their prior beliefs 
per se; a phenomenon that may also manifest in reasoning about information in the political 
domain.  
 
Second, several recent studies indicate that people who score higher on the CRT are better able 
to recognize political disinformation (specifically, “fake news”)—rating it as less accurate—
than those who score lower on the CRT (Bronstein et al., 2018; Pennycook & Rand, 2018a, 
2018b). Notably, Pennycook and Rand (2018a) found that this association was independent of 
the identity-concordance of the disinformation; that is, better CRT performance was associated 
with more accurate beliefs about both politically-discordant and politically-concordant fake 
news. This pattern provides some evidence that cognitive sophistication is associated with 
less—not more—biased belief formation (in the context of fake news headlines, at least; but 
see Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015a for a review of similar results in other domains). 
 
Third, and finally, when judging the accuracy of real and fake news headlines, people who 
scored higher on the CRT were more sensitive to the plausibility of the headlines than to their 
concordance with political identity. In particular, high CRT scorers were more skeptical of 
headlines that were rated (out of sample) as implausible, compared to those that were more 
ambiguous. At the same time, however, they were less skeptical of headlines that were rated 
as plausible (Pennycook & Rand, 2018a). This pattern of results suggests that cognitively 
sophisticated individuals may be more sensitive to how information in the political domain 
squares with their prior knowledge—to infer plausibility (Mercier, 2017)—and their accuracy 
ratings defer accordingly30.  
 
                                                 
30 Of course, cognitively sophisticated individuals may also have a richer or more accurate web of prior 
beliefs which they bring to bear on assessment of plausibility—rather than being more sensitive to their prior 
beliefs per se. Thus, while the results of Pennycook and Rand (2018a) suggest some differential influence of 
prior beliefs among the more (vs. less) cognitively sophisticated, because cognitive sophistication and prior 
beliefs are not randomly assigned this association is susceptible to unobserved confounding (a point to which 
we return in the discussion).  
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1.4. Current Investigation 
 
In four studies (Study 1-4) and an augmented reanalysis of previously published data collected 
during the 2016 US presidential election (Study 5), we investigated how political belief 
formation relates to the interaction between cognitive sophistication—as indexed by CRT 
performance—and political identity. Across these studies, we distinguish between two 
processes in belief formation: belief updating – the integration of new evidence with prior 
beliefs (Studies 1 and 2) – and reasoning – explicit evaluations of the validity or accuracy of 
new evidence (Studies 2-5).  
 
In particular, in Studies 1 and 2 we adapted a recent learning paradigm to investigate whether 
individuals who score higher (vs. lower) on the CRT are more biased in favor of their political 
identities when updating their beliefs. Recall that, according to the IPC perspective, the bias 
caused by IPC implies deviation from accuracy. In their review of psychological research on 
bias, Hahn and Harris (2014) argue that charges of bias are rarely backed up by rigorous and 
systematic evaluation of subjects’ behavior against an accuracy criterion. Where use of an 
accuracy criterion is difficult, Hahn and Harris (2014) recommend that putative bias is 
evaluated against other normative or optimality criteria; for example, in the case of belief 
updating, Bayesian rationality.  For this reason, in Study 1 and 2 we assess bias in individuals’ 
belief updating against the normative benchmark of a Bayesian agent.  
 
In Study 2, we also examined differences in reasoning about evidence among higher vs. lower 
CRT scorers.  Study 3 and 4 did the same using a different paradigm: We conducted two 
replications of Kahan’s (2013) influential experiment that examined differences in reasoning 
among higher vs. lower CRT scorers. Critically, however, we also measured and modelled 
prior beliefs alongside political identity. Finally, in the reanalysis of data collected during the 
2016 US presidential election (Study 5), we retroactively matched subjects’ patterns of 
reasoning in the data to their CRT performance measured in separate, unrelated research. 
Furthermore, as a function of the design of Study 5, political identity and prior beliefs were 
only weakly correlated; allowing us to test the interaction between CRT performance and prior 
beliefs on reasoning about evidence somewhat independent of political identity. 
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Across these five studies—which comprised a range of designs, stimuli, analytic approaches, 
and dependent variables—we found consistent evidence to suggest that individuals who scored 
higher on the CRT (i) deferred more to their prior beliefs when reasoning about information in 
the political domain, and (ii) were less biased in their belief updating after receipt of such 
information. In contrast, we found no evidence that these individuals (i) deferred more to their 
political identities per se (i.e., independent of their prior beliefs) when reasoning about such 
information, or (ii) were more biased in favor of their political identities when updating their 
beliefs. 
 
1.5. Preregistration Protocols and Study Data 
 
We preregistered the hypotheses, sample sizes, designs, and primary analysis plans for Studies 
1-4 (Study 1: https://osf.io/e39kq/; Study 2: https://osf.io/9yj57/; Study 3: https://osf.io/j7hrb/; 
Study 4: https://osf.io/2byaq/). All non-preregistered analyses are designated their own 
sections—entitled exploratory analyses—or, when reported alongside the preregistered 
analyses, are clearly labelled post-hoc. All analyses were conducted in R (v.3.4.0, R Core 
Team, 2017), using R Studio (v.1.1.423, RStudio Team, 2016). The complete list of R packages 
(with versions) used in data analysis is reported in this footnote31. The data and analysis code 
to reproduce the results and figures in Studies 1-4 are available via the project hub on the OSF: 
https://osf.io/yt3kd/. Unfortunately, data from Study 5 is not publicly available due to the 




In Study 1, we adapted a recent learning paradigm (Hill, 2017) to compare subjects’ belief 
updating in the political domain to that of a normative Bayesian agent. We tested two 
hypotheses. The first is that individuals who score higher on the CRT deviate less from 
Bayesian updating overall; combining their prior beliefs with new political information in a 
                                                 
31 Complete list of R packages used in data analysis: Data.table (v.1.10.4-3, Dowle & Srinivasan, 2017); 
reshape (v.0.8.7, Wickham, 2007); plyr (v.1.8.4, Wickham, 2011); dplyr (v.0.7.6, Wickham et al., 2018); lme4 
(v.1.1-15, Bates et al., 2015); ggplot2 (v.3.0.0, Wickham, 2016); gridExtra (v.2.3, Auguie, 2017); effects (v.4.0-
0, Fox, 2003); ppcor (v.1.1, Kim, 2015); psych (v.1.8.4, Revelle, 2018); sjPlot (v.2.5.0, Lüdecke, 2018); MASS 
(v.7.3-47, Venables & Ripley, 2002); lmerTest (v.3.0-0, Kuznetsova et al., 2017). We are grateful to the authors 
of these packages. 
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less biased (more Bayesian) manner (H1). The second, consistent with the logic of the IPC 
facilitation hypothesis, is that individuals who score higher on the CRT deviate from Bayesian 
updating in a pattern consistent with identity-protective processing (H2). Specifically, their 
deviation from Bayesian updating is conditional on the political concordance of new 





In this and subsequent studies, for brevity, we report methodological detail sufficient to orient 
readers but refer to the supplementary materials (SM) for minutiae (also available on the OSF: 




We sought to collect N = 500 subjects, on the assumption of a small association between CRT 
performance and deviation from Bayesian updating (a priori power analysis reported in the 
preregistered protocol). A total of N = 501 subjects completed the study. In Studies 1-3, and 
Study 5, subjects were from the US, recruited online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 
Subjects in Study 4 were recruited from Lucid, a marketplace for online survey research whose 
samples are more representative of the US general population than MTurk (Coppock & 
McClellan, 2017).  
 
While MTurk is an intensely studied convenience sample—presenting valid concerns about 
the non-naiveté of subjects and generalizability of results—recent work suggests that cognitive 
psychological phenomena are generally reproducible on MTurk, despite non-naiveté (Bialek 
& Pennycook, 2017; Stagnaro et al., 2018; Zwaan et al., 2017). Furthermore, MTurk is valid 
for research on political identity in particular—insofar as political partisans recruited via 
MTurk have similar psychological profiles to partisans in nationally representative samples 
(Clifford et al., 2015). Finally, past work administering the CRT to representative samples finds 
over a third of individuals score zero; limiting the discriminability of the test at low-end 
performance (Kahan, 2013; also see Bialek & Pennycook, 2017). CRT scores in our MTurk 
samples, by contrast, are considerably less skewed (in Study 1, 2 and 3, see SM for the 
distributions); and, consequently, better discriminate among low-end performers. While 
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MTurk thus possesses certain limitations as a sampling population, existing evidence suggests 
that it can provide for valid inferences in the case of the current investigation. 
 
2.1.2. Belief Update Task 
 
The task consisted of two phases. In phase one (P1), subjects made sequential likelihood 
judgments about the truth of various political statements; their prior beliefs. Subjects were 
informed before P1 began that the statements were either true or false. Likelihood judgments 
were provided in percentages on a sliding scale from 0 (“certainly false”) to 100 (“certainly 
true”), in whole integers. There were 16 political statements, corresponding to 16 trials in P1. 
Of these 16 statements, 8 favored the Democratic Party if they were true (pro-Democratic); 4 
of which were (in fact) true, and 4 of which were false. The remaining 8 statements favored 
the Republican Party if true (pro-Republican); again, 4 were in fact true, while 4 were false. 
The political statements were selected via a three-step pre-testing procedure (reported in full 




Table 1. Four Example Political Statements Used in Studies 1 and 2. 
 Pro-Democratic Pro-Republican 
True 
During former President Barack Obama’s 
final 4 years in office, wages of the average 
American worker went up. 
Under President Donald 
Trump’s administration, 
unemployment has fallen to a 17-
year low. 
False 
Within two years of "Obamacare" being 
signed into law, health care premiums were 
going up more slowly than at any time in the 
previous 50 years. 
Only 10 cents on every dollar 
from the Clinton Foundation goes 




Immediately after rating a given political statement in P1, subjects received a signal about 
whether that statement was in fact true (i.e., “TRUE”) or false (i.e., “FALSE”). Signals were 
correct with probability 2/3. Signals thus provided noisy but, on average, accurate evidence 
about the truth (or falsity) of the political statements. Importantly, subjects were informed of 
the probability of receiving an accurate signal and answered comprehension questions prior to 
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P1 to ensure their understanding. Verbatim task instructions are available on the OSF: 
https://osf.io/yt3kd/. Subjects were reminded of the probability of receiving an accurate signal 
after each signal they received in P1. 
 
After rating and receiving signals for each of the 16 statements in P1, subjects moved onto 
phase two (P2). In P2, subjects saw each political statement presented in P1 again (sequentially, 
over 16 trials), and made another likelihood judgment about the truth of each statement; their 
posterior beliefs. Subjects were not reminded of their P1 likelihood judgment or the signal they 
received. Upon completion of P2, the task was over. The presentation order of political 
statement stimuli in P1 and P2 was randomized. Prior to starting P1, all subjects completed a 
practice P1 and P2 trial with an apolitical statement: “Henry VII was King of England between 









2.1.3. Comparison with Bayesian Agent 




To compare the posterior beliefs of our subjects—obtained in P2—to those of a (simple) 
normative Bayesian agent, we first consulted the prior beliefs provided by subjects in P1 and 
the signal they received for each statement during the belief update task. With this information, 







where 𝑃(𝑇|𝑆) is the posterior probability the statement is true, given the signal received on 
that trial (i.e., the “Bayesian posterior belief”); 𝑃(𝑇) is the prior probability that the statement 
is true (i.e., the subject’s prior belief); and, 𝑃(𝑆|𝑇) is the probability of receiving the signal 
assuming the statement is true (i.e., equal to 2/3 for TRUE signals, and 1/3 for FALSE signals). 
The terms 𝑃(¬𝑇) and 𝑃(𝑆|¬𝑇) refer to the prior probability that the statement is false (1 −
𝑃(𝑇)), and to the probability of receiving the signal assuming the statement is false (1 −
𝑃(𝑆|𝑇))32, respectively. Using this equation, we computed Bayesian posterior beliefs for each 
statement rated by each subject.  Note that prior and posterior beliefs are on the 0-1 scale for 
these computations, but are converted back to 0-100 scale for analysis.  
 
We computed two dependent variables (DVs) to quantify subjects’ deviation from Bayesian 
posterior beliefs: (i) the difference between subjects’ posterior beliefs and Bayesian posterior 
beliefs (difference index), and (ii) the ratio of subjects’ posterior beliefs to Bayesian posterior 
beliefs (ratio index). To illustrate the DVs, assume that a subject receives a signal of “TRUE” 
regarding statement X. They subsequently report a posterior belief of 72% that statement X is 
true. The Bayesian posterior belief on this trial, however, is calculated to be 65%. Thus, the 
raw difference between the subject and Bayesian posterior belief is 72 – 65 = 7 (difference 
index). The ratio of the two posterior beliefs is 72/65  1.11 (ratio index). For all analyses, we 
log-transform the ratio index due to positive skew (this transformation was preregistered). 
These two indices react in different ways to the bounded nature (0-100%) of the likelihood 
judgment scale; thus, analyzing both provides for more valid inferences (Shah et al., 2016). 
The two DVs are computed such that, relative to Bayesian updating, values smaller than zero 
                                                 
32 We note that is it not a mathematical necessity that P(S|-T) is equal to 1 – P(S|T), but this is a reasonable 
assumption in the this context given the symmetric wording of “accuracy” in the instructions provided to subjects. 
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imply under-updating, and values greater than zero imply over-updating. Values of exactly 
zero imply the (normatively correct) updating of a Bayesian agent.  
 
2.1.4. Post-Task Measures 
 
Following the belief update task, subjects completed a memory test (for exploratory purposes). 
Specifically, they were shown each political statement again and were asked to indicate 
whether they saw a TRUE or FALSE signal for that statement. Subjects then completed a 7-
item CRT; comprised of a reworded version of the original 3-item Frederick (2005) CRT (from 
Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012), and the 4-item non-numeric CRT from Thomson and 
Oppenheimer (2016). The CRT is a behavioral task that measures the propensity to engage in 
reflective/analytic thinking, and to override intuitive but incorrect responses (Frederick, 2005; 
Pennycook et al., 2016). Test-retest reliability estimates for the original 3-item measure range 
from .75 to .81 (Stagnaro et al., 2018), and CRT performance shares a substantial positive 
correlation with cognitive ability and aptitude over a range of rational thinking measures 
(Toplak et al., 2011) and predicts a number of everyday beliefs and behaviors (Pennycook, 
Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015a). Correct responses were summed to create a 0-7 score for each 
subject (M = 3.85, SD = 2.15,  = .79, 95% CI [.77, .82], average inter-item r = .35) (items and 
distributions of sum scores are reported in the SM). Finally, subjects completed a self-report 
scale measuring their responsiveness to evidence (for exploratory purposes), and provided 
demographic information including which US political party they preferred; Democratic or 
Republican (forced choice). 
 
2.1.5. Political Concordance of Evidence 
 
For analyses, we computed a variable indexing whether the signal (i.e., “evidence”) subjects 
received on each trial was concordant or discordant with their political identity. This variable 
was a joint function of subjects’ political party preference (Democratic or Republican), the 
partisanship of the political statement stimulus (i.e., the statement favors Democrats if it is true 
vs. favors Republicans if it is true), and the signal received (signal: “TRUE” or “FALSE”). The 
classifications are displayed in Table 2. 
 
 










political statement Signal received 
Political 
concordance 
Democratic Democrat-favor True Concordant 
Democratic Democrat-favor False Discordant 
Democratic Republican-favor True Discordant 
Democratic Republican-favor False Concordant 
Republican Democrat-favor True Discordant 
Republican Democrat-favor False Concordant 
Republican Republican-favor True Concordant 






2.2.1. Data Exclusions 
 
For all hypothesis tests, we exclude subjects with duplicate IP addresses (N = 9, 1.80%); 
retaining the earliest responses only. We also exclude trials on which subjects’ prior belief was 
provided as 0 or 100, and the signal they received was FALSE or TRUE, respectively; because 
updating is not possible on these trials (N trials = 254, 3.23%). Lastly, missing trial data (prior 
and posterior beliefs) are excluded from both H1 and H2 tests (N = 0), as are subjects who did 
not report a US political party preference (preregistered test of H2 only, N = 2, 0.41%). These 
exclusion criteria were preregistered prior to data collection. 
 
2.2.2. H1: High CRT Scorers Deviate Less from Bayesian Updating 
 
After data exclusions, we retained N = 492 for the preregistered test of H1. To test H1—that 
individuals who score higher on the CRT deviate less from Bayesian updating overall—we 
computed absolute values of both DVs (|difference index|, |ratio index|). The absolute values 
thus represent deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs collapsing over the particular direction 
of that deviation (since direction is the focus of H2). We then computed the mean absolute 
deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs over the 16 trials for each subject. 




2.2.2.1. Preregistered Tests 
 
Due to anticipated skew in the absolute DVs, we preregistered nonparametric Kendall’s tau (τ) 
correlations between the DVs and CRT sum scores. Consistent with H1, CRT performance was 
negatively correlated with absolute deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs, though the 
association was larger for the difference index: τ = -.20, Z = -6.27, p <.001, than for the ratio 
index: τ = -.06, Z = -1.72, p =.086. The raw data are displayed in Figure 3 (A).  
 
The magnitude of the negative correlations was similar across politically concordant and 
politically discordant evidence: Politically discordant: τ = -.18, Z = -5.66, p <.001 (difference 
index), τ = -.04, Z = -1.24, p =.215 (ratio index), politically concordant: τ = -.17, Z = -5.42, p 
<.001 (difference index), τ = -.06, Z = -1.99, p =.046 (ratio index). (Note: These correlation 
tests—split by the political concordance of the evidence—were conducted post-hoc).  
 
Broadly consistent with H1, subjects who scored higher on the CRT deviated less from 
Bayesian posterior beliefs overall, combining their prior beliefs with new politically-relevant 
evidence in a more normative (less biased) manner. 
 
2.2.2.2. Exploratory Tests 
 
As a check on the robustness of H1 results, we conducted a range of exploratory analyses. 
These analyses are reported in full in the SM, and, on the aggregate, show that the preregistered 
result is robust to a variety of analytic specifications and potential confounds. Here we report 
one particularly noteworthy such analysis regarding memory errors.  
 
The memory test following the belief update task indicated that subjects scoring higher on the 
CRT had better memory for the signals they received (i.e., they made fewer errors in recall, see 
SM for analysis). It is possible this difference—rather than differences in updating per se—
accounted for the relationship between CRT performance and deviation from Bayesian 
posterior beliefs. To examine this possibility, we conducted nonparametric partial correlations 
between (a) CRT scores and (b) mean absolute deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs, 
adjusting for (c) subjects’ proportion of memory errors (see SM for further details). The results 
closely reproduced the preregistered H1 results: τ = -.20, Z = -6.58, p <.001 (difference index), 
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τ = -.07, Z = -2.42, p =.015 (ratio index). In fact, the coefficient on the ratio index slightly 
increased, implying that differences in memory were slightly suppressing the relationship 
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Figure 3. Deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs as a function of CRT performance and 
the political concordance of evidence in Study 1. A, mean absolute deviation from Bayesian 
posterior beliefs (represented at y = 0). Each point corresponds to the mean absolute deviation 
of one subject. Data points have slight jitter for visibility. B, predicted magnitude and direction 
deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs (represented at y = 0). Predicted values are obtained 





2.2.3. H2: High CRT Scorers Deviate from Bayesian Updating Conditional on their Political 
Identities 
 
After data exclusions, we retained N = 490 for the preregistered test of H2. H2 is that 
individuals who score higher on the CRT deviate from Bayesian posterior beliefs conditional 
on the political identity concordance of the evidence (to a greater extent than individuals who 
score lower on the CRT). Furthermore, H2 concerns the direction of deviation from Bayesian 
posterior beliefs; that is, whether individuals who score high on the CRT (i) deviate from 
Bayesian posterior beliefs conditional on the political concordance of the evidence (to a greater 
extent than low CRT scorers), and, specifically, (ii) deviate in the direction that is more 
favorable to their political identities.  
 
To assess both magnitude and direction of deviation conditional on political concordance, we 
use the two DVs as initially computed; that is, before their absolute transformations for the test 
of H1. Relative to the Bayesian benchmark, therefore, values greater than zero imply over-
updating; values smaller than zero imply under-updating; and values of exactly zero imply the 
normatively correct updating of a Bayesian agent. The critical test of H2 is on the interaction 
between CRT performance and the political concordance of the evidence in predicting these 
values. 
 
2.2.3.1. Preregistered Tests 
 
We fitted two linear mixed effects models at the trial-level; one for each DV (difference index, 
ratio index). Linear mixed effects models possess several advantages over classic ANOVA (see 
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e.g., Barr et al., 2013; Brauer & Curtin, 2017; Judd et al., 2012). Most notably, they can model 
non-independent data while maintaining the nominal (5%) type I error rate, and allow 
researchers to generalize beyond the stimuli used in their particular experiment. Our model 
fitting procedure is detailed in the SM. In the text below, we report Likelihood Ratio Tests 
(LRT) statistically evaluating the contribution of the key fixed-effect interaction term: CRT 
performance x political concordance (of the evidence). We first attempt to fit a “maximal” 
random effects structure33 before conducting the LRT, because this was our preregistered 
critical test. Where the maximal model does not converge, we simplify the model by iteratively 
dropping random effects terms and re-estimating the model at each iteration. This protocol was 
preregistered. In Table 3, we report the parameter estimates from the final models described in 
text below. 
 
The maximal model fitted on the difference index DV failed to converge. To achieve 
convergence, we re-estimated the model after dropping the random slope of [CRT x political 
concordance] on stimuli. The critical LRT on the fixed-effect interaction term in this model 
was (just) statistically significant, 2 (1) = 3.94, p =.047. That is, the interaction between CRT 
performance and the political concordance of evidence improved model fit. Predicted values 
from this model are displayed in Figure 3 (left panel B). We thus proceeded to estimate the 
simple slopes of CRT performance over trials where the evidence was (a) politically 
concordant, and (b) politically discordant, by fitting separate models for each. Higher CRT 
performance was associated with relatively greater over-updating on trials where the evidence 
was politically concordant, b = 1.03 (SE = 0.67), but this missed the significance threshold, 2 
(1) = 2.34, p =.126. This pattern was reversed on trials where the evidence was politically 
discordant. There, higher CRT performance was associated with relatively greater under-
updating, b = -0.74 (SE = 0.92), but again this slope was not statistically significant itself, 2 
(1) = 0.65, p =.421. 
 
In the ratio index maximal model, the critical LRT was statistically significant, 2 (1) = 6.04, 
p =.014. That is, the interaction between CRT performance and the political concordance of 
evidence improved model fit. Predicted values from the maximal model are displayed in Figure 
3 (right panel B). Once again, we proceeded to estimate the simple slopes of CRT performance 
                                                 
33 This means estimating a full random effects structure; providing a conservative test of the contribution of 
the fixed effects (for more discussion we refer to Barr et al., 2013). 
THE INTERSECTION OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & BELIEF FORMATION 
 
180 
by fitting separate models for each. Higher CRT performance was again associated with 
relatively greater over-updating on trials where the evidence was politically concordant, b = 
0.05 (SE = 0.03), but this missed the significance threshold, 2 (1) = 3.01, p =.083. This pattern 
was reversed on trials where the evidence was politically discordant. There, higher CRT 
performance was associated with relatively greater under-updating, b = -0.04 (SE = 0.04), but 




Table 3. Linear Mixed Effects Model Output in Study 1. 
    Difference index   Ratio index 
    B std. Error p   B std. Error p 
Fixed Effects 
(Intercept)   2.29 1.34 .087   0.14 0.05 .009 
CRT   -0.76 0.89 .391   -0.05 0.04 .234 
Political concordance   -3.51 0.93 <.001   -0.06 0.05 .202 
CRT x Political concordance   1.74 0.88 .047   0.10 0.04 .011 
Observations   7586   7586 
NSubject  490  490 
NStimuli  16  16 
R2 / Ω02   .004 / .217   .002 / .239 
Deviance   73038.56   24978.64 
Note. For brevity, only the fixed effect estimates are displayed. Random effects estimates are reported 
in the SM. The ratio index model is estimated via ML because REML did not converge (the difference 
index model is estimated via REML). P-values in the table are estimated via Wald test. CRT = Cognitive 
Reflection Test (z-score). 
 
 
                                                 
34 In the preregistered protocol for the test of H2, we slightly mis-specified the intended maximal random 
effects structure of the models. Thus, the foregoing LRT results and interaction estimates in Table 3 are from the 
models with a correctly specified random effects structure (see SM for details). For full transparency, we also 
report here the LRT results and fixed-effect interaction estimates from the incorrect maximal models, difference 
index: 2 (1) = 5.70, p =.017, b = 2.33 (SE = 0.95), ratio index: 2 (1) = 6.54, p =.011, b = 0.10 (SE = 0.04). As 
can be seen from these LRT results, the outcomes are substantively similar. 




Despite the presence of an interaction in both models—consistent with H2—the pattern of 
results in fact provide relatively little support for the IPC facilitation hypothesis; as can be seen 
in the predicted values in Figure 3 (B), and the simple slopes analyses conducted above. 
Specifically, while subjects who scored higher on the CRT appeared more “biased” towards 
their political identities than their low scoring counterparts—updating more on politically 
concordant evidence but less on politically discordant evidence—in three of four cases the 
simple slopes of CRT converged towards the posterior beliefs of a Bayesian agent. That is, 
instead of high CRT subjects exhibiting identity-protective deviation from Bayesian posterior 
beliefs, we observed that low CRT subjects exhibited the opposite of identity-protective bias; 
relative to the Bayesian prediction, they tended to over-update on politically discordant 
evidence, and under-update on politically concordant evidence. The updating of high CRT 
subjects, in contrast, was closer to that of a normative Bayesian agent. In this light, the 
statistically significant interaction is not particularly consistent with H2; in fact, it seems more 
consistent H1. More generally, this result highlights the value in assessing putative bias in 
political belief formation against a normative (e.g., Bayesian) benchmark (Gerber & Green, 
1999; Hahn & Harris, 2014). 
 
2.2.3.2. Exploratory Tests 
 
To increase the sensitivity of the H2 test, we also fitted models where political identity was 
represented continuously (not dichotomized into a preference for Democratic or Republican 
Party). The details of this exploratory analysis are reported in the SM. The results closely 




In Study 1, we found that subjects who scored higher on the CRT deviated less from Bayesian 
updating overall; combining their prior beliefs with new politically-relevant information in a 
less biased (more normative) manner (H1). In testing H2, we found some evidence consistent 
with the IPC facilitation hypothesis—wherein more cognitively sophisticated subjects (indexed 
by CRT performance) appeared relatively more “biased” in favor of their political identities 
when updating their beliefs. However, when assessed against the Bayesian benchmark, this 
pattern of updating was revealed to be more, not less, normatively appropriate.  
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We note, however, that the pattern of subjects’ belief updating vis-à-vis the Bayesian agent 
may depend in part upon how they interpreted the task instructions. Specifically, recall that we 
told them that the signals were accurate on average two out of three times. We assumed that 
subjects interpreted this instruction as P(STRUE|T) = .67; that is, the likelihood of receiving a 
signal saying “TRUE” assuming the statement is true is equal to 2/3 (and, analogously, we 
assumed they interpreted P(SFALSE|F) = .67). However, it is possible they interpreted this 
instruction instead as P(T|STRUE) = .67; that is, the posterior probability that the statement is 
true upon receipt of a signal saying “TRUE”. These conditional probabilities are not equivalent.  
 
To test our assumption that subjects interpreted the task instructions as P(STRUE|T) = .67 not as 
P(T|STRUE) = .67, we can examine subjects’ posterior beliefs after receiving “TRUE” and 
“FALSE” signals. Specifically, if subjects were interpreting the task instructions about signal 
accuracy as P(T|STRUE) = .67 (violating our assumption), their posterior beliefs should “stack” 
on 67% or 33% following receipt of a “TRUE” or “FALSE” signal, respectively. If there is no 
such stacking on these values in the posterior beliefs, we can be more confident that subjects 
did not misinterpret the task instructions as we describe above. In Figure S3 in the SM, we plot 
the distributions of posterior beliefs as a function of political statement stimuli and signal 
received (“TRUE” or “FALSE”). There is little evidence that the posterior beliefs stack on the 




A particular limitation of Study 1 was that we imposed on subjects the diagnosticity of the 
evidence they received; the “likelihood ratio”, in Bayesian terms. Specifically, we informed 
subjects of the probability that signals were accurate (i.e., 2/3), and we assumed all subjects 
applied this knowledge uniformly in their updating behavior. This assumption is perhaps 
unrealistic. Indeed, the prediction of Kahan’s (2016a) IPC account is that individuals’ 
reasoning about the likelihood ratio—the diagnosticity of evidence—is conditional on their 
political identities. Belief updating and reasoning about the likelihood ratio are thus 
confounded in Study 1, possibly biasing against H2.  
 
To resolve this issue, in Study 2 subjects provided repeated subjective judgments regarding the 
diagnosticity of signals in the task, and we used this in conjunction with their prior beliefs to 
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compute Bayesian posterior beliefs; isolating the process of belief updating—distinct from 
reasoning about the likelihood ratio. The hypotheses were the same as in Study 1 (H1 & H2). 
In addition, we obtained self-reported accuracy ratings on each individual signal to test the IPC 
facilitation hypothesis that high CRT scorers reason about the validity of evidence conditional 






We sought to double the sample size from Study 1 and collect N = 1000 subjects. A total of N 
= 1004 subjects completed the study. Subjects who completed Study 1 were unable to take part 
in Study 2. 
 
3.1.2. Belief Update Task 
 
The task was identical to Study 1, except for the following adjustments. First, subjects were 
not told the probability of receiving an accurate signal; instead, they were simply informed that 
signals were accurate with some fixed probability, and that signals were, on average, accurate 
(i.e., that this probability was > 0.5). Second, upon receipt of each signal in P1, subjects 
reported on a scale from 1 to 5 whether they believed that particular signal was accurate (1 = 
definitely NOT; 2 = probably NOT; 3 = not sure; 4 = probably YES; 5 = definitely YES). We 
refer to these as signal accuracy ratings. Following this rating, subjects were asked to consider 
all the signals they had seen thus far in the task, and to provide a judgment about the overall 
likelihood of receiving an accurate signal in the task as a whole. We refer to these as likelihood 
judgments. These judgments allowed us to infer subjects’ subjective likelihood ratios—that is, 
their perception of the diagnosticity of the evidence—at repeated stages throughout the task. 
The likelihood judgments were provided on a sliding scale in whole integers, anchored from 
51% – “signals are almost random/uninformative” – through 75% – “signals are mostly 
accurate/quite informative” – to 99% – “signals are almost perfectly accurate/very 
informative”. Subjects answered comprehension questions and completed a P1 and P2 practice 
trial prior to starting P1. P2 was the same as in Study 1. Verbatim task instructions are available 
on the OSF: https://osf.io/yt3kd/.  
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3.1.3. Comparison with Bayesian Agent 
 
Bayesian posterior beliefs were computed as in Study 1. The only difference was that, in Study 
2, 𝑃(𝑆|𝑇) and 𝑃(𝑆|¬𝑇) were defined by subjects themselves, via their subjective likelihood 
judgments provided immediately after each statement-signal pairing in P1. In particular, to 
calculate the Bayesian posterior belief for political statement 𝑖, we consulted the signal received 
for that statement (“TRUE” or “FALSE”), and the subjective likelihood judgment (scaled to 0-
1), 𝐿, provided by subjects immediately after that statement-signal pairing. Formally, for TRUE 
signals, 
 
𝑃(𝑇𝑖|𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸) =  
𝑃(𝑇𝑖)𝐿𝑖
𝑃(𝑇𝑖)𝐿𝑖 + 𝑃(¬𝑇𝑖)(1 − 𝐿𝑖)
 
 
For FALSE signals, 
 
𝑃(𝑇𝑖|𝑆𝐹𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐸) =  
𝑃(𝑇𝑖)(1 − 𝐿𝑖)
𝑃(𝑇𝑖)(1 − 𝐿𝑖) + 𝑃(¬𝑇𝑖)𝐿𝑖
 
 
We deliberately chose to consult subjects’ subjective likelihood, 𝐿, provided after the focal 
statement-signal pairing (rather than before) to allow for the fact that subjects’ subjective 
likelihood ratio may instantaneously change upon receipt of the focal signal; affecting their 
belief updating on the focal statement (Cheng & Hsiaw, 2017). Concretely, suppose 𝐿 after 
trial A is 99%; that is, the subject believes signals are highly diagnostic. If they subsequently 
receive a signal on trial B that contradicts their strong belief about the truth of statement B, it 
is possible they become instantaneously more uncertain about the diagnosticity of the signals 
(i.e., 𝐿 decreases); affecting their updating on statement B. After computing the Bayesian 
posterior beliefs using the above method, the two DVs were calculated as in Study 1 (difference 
index, ratio index). 
 
3.1.4. Post-Task Measures 
 
Following the belief update task, subjects completed the 7-item CRT as in Study 1 (M = 3.67, 
SD = 2.07,  = .76, 95% CI [.74, .79], average inter-item r = .31), and provided demographic 
information. There was no memory test or other exploratory measures in Study 2. 






3.2.1. Data Exclusions 
 
As in Study 1, for all hypothesis tests, we exclude subjects with duplicate IP addresses (N = 
12, 1.20%); retaining the earliest responses only. For H1 and H2 tests, we also exclude trials 
on which subjects’ prior belief was provided as 0 or 100, and the signal they received was 
FALSE or TRUE, respectively (N trials = 346, 2.18%). Trials with missing data for prior 
beliefs, posterior beliefs, or likelihood judgments are excluded from H1 and H2 tests (N = 0). 
Trials with missing data for signal accuracy ratings are excluded from the test of H3 (N = 0). 
Finally, subjects who do not report a US political party preference are excluded from H2 and 
H3 tests (N = 0). As in Study 1, these exclusion criteria were preregistered. 
 
3.2.2. H1: High CRT Scorers Deviate Less from Bayesian Updating 
 
After data exclusions, we retained N = 992 for the preregistered test of H1. The analysis plan 
was the same as in Study 1. 
 
3.2.2.1. Preregistered Tests 
 
CRT performance was again negatively correlated with absolute deviation from Bayesian 
posterior beliefs, though the association was larger for the difference index: τ = -.18, Z = -8.04, 
p <.001, than the ratio index: τ = -.07, Z = -3.14, p =.002. The raw data are displayed in Figure 
4 (A).  
 
As in Study 1, the magnitude of the negative correlation was similar across politically 
concordant and politically discordant evidence: Politically discordant: τ = -.14, Z = -6.25, p 
<.001 (difference index), τ = -.06, Z = -2.59, p =.010 (ratio index), politically concordant: τ = 
-.17, Z = -7.66, p <.001 (difference index), τ = -.08, Z = -3.40, p <.001 (ratio index). As in 
Study 1, the latter analyses—split by political concordance—were conducted post-hoc.  
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The results thus replicate Study 1 (H1): Subjects who scored higher on the CRT deviated less 
from Bayesian posterior beliefs overall, combining their prior beliefs with new politically-









Figure 4. Deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs as a function of CRT performance and 
the political concordance of evidence in Study 2. A, mean absolute deviation from Bayesian 
posterior beliefs (represented at y = 0). Each point corresponds to the mean absolute deviation 
of one subject. Data points have slight jitter for visibility. B, predicted magnitude and direction 
deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs (represented at y = 0). Predicted values are obtained 





3.2.2.2. Exploratory Tests 
 
We repeated all the exploratory analyses conducted in Study 1 (H1) as a robustness check on 
the above results (reported in the SM). As before, these analyses suggest that the preregistered 
H1 result is robust to a variety of analytic specifications and potential confounds. 
 
3.2.3. H2: High CRT Scorers Deviate from Bayesian Updating Conditional on their Political 
Identities 
 
After data exclusions, we retained N = 992 for the preregistered test of H2. The analysis plan 
was the same as in Study 1. Recall that, in this analysis, DV values greater than zero imply 
over-updating; values smaller than zero imply under-updating; and values of exactly zero imply 
the normatively correct updating of a Bayesian agent. The critical test of H2 is on the 
interaction between CRT performance and the political concordance of the evidence in 
predicting these values. 
 
3.2.3.1. Preregistered Tests 
 
In the difference index model, the critical LRT missed the significance threshold (albeit only 
just), 2 (1) = 3.76, p =.053. That is, the interaction between CRT performance and the political 
concordance of evidence did not improve model fit at p <.05. Predicted values from the 
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difference index maximal model are displayed in Figure 4 (left panel B). Parameter estimates 
from this model are reported in Table 4. 
 
Due to convergence issues, the ratio index model was not fitted with a maximal random effects 
structure, and we estimated degrees of freedom and p-value for the interaction term via the 
Satterthwaite approximation, using the lmerTest package in R (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). These 
analysis contingencies were preregistered. The critical test just missed the significance 
threshold, t922 = 1.93, p =.054. That is, the interaction between CRT performance and the 
political concordance of evidence did not improve model fit at p <.05. Predicted values from 




Table 4. Linear Mixed Effects Model Output in Study 2 (Hypothesis 2). 
    Difference index   Ratio index 
    B 
std. 
Error 





(Intercept)   -11.99 0.83 <.001   -0.33 0.03 <.001 
CRT   0.47 0.44 .291   -0.01 0.01 .498 
Political concordance   0.04 0.52 .939   -0.04 0.02 .030 
CRT x Political 
concordance 
  1.02 0.52 .048   0.03 0.02 .053 
Observations   15526   15526 
NSubject  992  992 
NStimuli  16  16 
R2 / Ω02   .002 / .170   .001 / .099 
Deviance   140739.37   43212.82 
Note. For brevity, only the fixed effect estimates are displayed. Random effects estimates are reported 
in the SM. The ratio index model is estimated via ML because REML did not converge (the difference 
index model is estimated via REML). P-values in the table are estimated via Wald test (note that the 
Wald test p-value for the interaction in the difference index model is .048, but the preregistered LRT p-
value—reported in text—was .053). CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test (z-score). 






While the LRTs bearing on H2 (for both DVs) failed to meet the preregistered threshold for 
statistical significance in Study 2, the results do not appear to be an emphatic rejection of H2 
because the tests only just missed this threshold; and the predicted values of both models are 
qualitatively consistent with a cross-over interaction pattern (Figure 4B). As in Study 1, 
however, the simple slopes of CRT performance tended towards Bayesian posterior beliefs in 
three of four cases. Thus, also as in Study 1, the pattern appears broadly inconsistent with the 
notion that high CRT performance is associated with more biased belief updating conditional 
on political identity. 
 
3.2.3.2. Exploratory Tests 
 
As in Study 1, to increase the sensitivity of the H2 test we also fitted models where political 
identity was represented continuously (not dichotomized into a preference for Democratic or 
Republican Party). The details of this exploratory analysis are reported in the SM. The results 
were consistent with the pattern of results reported above. 
 
3.2.4. H3: High CRT Scorers Evaluate Evidence Conditional on their Political Identities 
 
After data exclusions, we retained N = 992 for the preregistered test of H3. In testing H3, we 
turn our focus from belief updating to reasoning about the accuracy of the evidence (i.e., 
“evidence evaluation”). In particular, H3 is that high CRT scorers’ ratings of signal accuracy 
are conditional on their political identity to a greater extent than low CRT scorers’. In other 
words, subjects who score higher on the CRT are more polarized in their evaluation of evidence 
that is concordant vs. discordant with their political identity (cf. Kahan, 2013). 
 
3.2.4.1. Preregistered Tests 
 
We fitted a maximal linear mixed effects model on the trial-level data, with CRT performance 
and the political concordance of evidence—and their interaction—as IVs. The DV was signal 
accuracy ratings, provided by subjects for each signal they received in P1 of the belief update 
task. Recall that these ratings represent judgments about whether each signal is accurate (from 
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1 = definitely NOT, to 5 = definitely YES). The critical LRT on the interaction missed the 
statistical significance threshold, 2 (1) = 3.56, p =.059. That is, the interaction between CRT 
scores and the political concordance of evidence did not improve model fit at p <.05. Model 
parameter estimates are reported in Table 5. The interaction estimate is positive, however, 
meaning that the result is directionally consistent with H3—but just missed the preregistered 





Table 5. Linear Mixed Effects Model Output in Study 2 (Hypothesis 3). 
    Signal accuracy ratings 
    B std. Error p 
Fixed Effects 
(Intercept)   3.08 0.03 <.001 
CRT   -0.03 0.02 .134 
Political concordance   0.61 0.05 <.001 
CRT x Political concordance   0.06 0.03 .054 
Observations   15872 
NSubject  992 
NStimuli  16 
R2 / Ω02   .067 / .227 
Deviance   48296.82 
Note. For brevity, only the fixed effect estimates are displayed. Random effects estimates are reported 
in the SM. The model is estimated via ML because REML did not converge. P-values in the table are 




3.2.4.2. Exploratory Tests 
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To increase the sensitivity of the H3 test we fitted a model where political identity was instead 
represented continuously (see SM for details). Specifically, in this model we fitted a three-way 
interaction between (i) CRT performance, (ii) political party identity (scored 1 = Strong 
Democrat, to 7 = Strong Republican, midpoint-centered and standardized for analysis), and 
(iii) whether the signal favored Democrats or Republicans. The latter variable is computed by 
combination of the partisanship of the political statement (Democrat-favor or Republican-
favor), and the signal type (TRUE or FALSE) (e.g., see Table 2).  
 
In contrast to the preregistered LRT result in H3, this interaction did significantly improve 
model fit at p <.05: 2 (1) = 4.76, p =.029, b = 0.07 (SE = 0.03). The predicted values from this 
model are displayed in Figure 5 (A). They show a pattern consistent with H3 and the IPC 
facilitation hypothesis as it relates to reasoning about evidence: Namely, subjects who scored 
higher on the CRT were more polarized in their evaluation of evidence that was concordant vs. 
discordant with their political identity. Notwithstanding type I error inflation due to multiple 
testing, this suggests the preregistered test of H3—which treated political identity as a 
dichotomous variable—was somewhat obscuring the association between CRT performance, 
political identity, and evidence evaluation (expected under the IPC facilitation hypothesis). 
 
However, we explored whether this pattern was better accounted for by high CRT scorers 
deferring more to their prior beliefs, rather than their political identities per se. To do so, we 
first coded whether each signal was concordant or discordant with subjects’ prior belief about 
the truth of the political statement in question, as well as the strength of that prior belief (see 
SM for further details). We then jointly modelled the three-way interaction between (i) CRT 
performance and these two new prior belief variables, and (ii) CRT performance, political party 
identity, and whether the signal (evidence) favored Democrats or Republicans (as in the 
previous model). 
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Figure 5. Predicted signal (evidence) accuracy ratings in Study 2. A, C, Strong Democrat, 
Strong Republican, and Independent correspond to values of -1.5, +1.5, and 0 on the midpoint-
centered and standardized party identity variable, respectively. B, Weak, Moderate, and Strong 
priors correspond to values of 15, 30, and 45 on the prior belief strength variable, respectively 
(range: 1-50). Predicted values are obtained from the linear mixed effects models reported in 




In this model, the three-way interaction with prior beliefs improved model fit, 2 (1) = 14.07, 
p <.001, b = 0.004 (SE = 0.001). This interaction is displayed in the predicted values in Figure 
5 (B). The pattern illustrates that subjects scoring higher on the CRT tended to defer more 
strongly to their prior beliefs when rating the signals (“evidence”). In contrast to the model 
without prior beliefs, in this model the three-way interaction with political identity no longer 
improved model fit, 2 (1) = 0.05, p =.819, b = 0.003 (SE = 0.015). The predicted values are 
displayed in Figure 5 (C). They illustrate that the association between CRT performance, 
political identity and evidence evaluation—expected under the IPC facilitation hypothesis—is 




There are three key results from Study 2. First, as in Study 1, we found that subjects who scored 
higher on the CRT deviated less from Bayesian posterior beliefs overall; combining their prior 
beliefs with new politically-relevant information in a less biased (more normative) manner 
(H1). This result is more compelling for the fact that subjects reported their subjective 
likelihoods on the evidence; isolating belief updating from reasoning about the evidence in our 
analysis. This suggests that differences in reasoning about the diagnosticity of the evidence—
between subjects scoring high and low on the CRT—do not account for the association between 
CRT performance and deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs that we observed. 
 
However, a noteworthy limitation in the design of Study 2 (and Study 1) was the lack of a 
control group when measuring belief updating. Recall that, in these studies, subjects reported 
their beliefs in a first phase (P1), subsequently received evidence (signals), and then reported 
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their beliefs again in a second phase (P2). When taking repeated measurements of a quantity 
with natural variability and/or susceptibility to measurement error—in this case, beliefs about 
the truth of various political statements—inclusion of a control group is necessary to ensure 
regression to the mean does not bias estimates of belief updating (Yu & Chen, 2015).   
 
Regression to the mean (RTM) describes the phenomenon where more extreme measurements 
at time 1 tend to regress towards the mean when measured again at time 2. Thus, in the case of 
Study 1 and Study 2, more extreme prior beliefs (i.e., closer to the likelihood scale ends of 0% 
and 100%) may have been associated with greater RTM measured in the posterior beliefs. If 
the extremity of prior beliefs differed systematically over CRT performance, differences in 
RTM—rather than differences in belief updating behavior per se—could have accounted for 
the association between CRT performance and deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs. In 
the SM, however, we show that subjects who scored higher on the CRT did not have more 
extreme prior beliefs (on average) than subjects who scored lower on the CRT. Furthermore, 
we find that the association between CRT performance and deviation from Bayesian posterior 
beliefs remains after statistically adjusting for the extremity of prior beliefs (see SM). Thus, 
while inclusion of a control group—subjects who receive no (or unrelated) evidence—is the 
gold standard for separating RTM from estimates of belief updating, our supplemental analyses 
provide some evidence that RTM does not account for the association between CRT 
performance and belief updating that we observe in Studies 1 and 2. 
 
The second key result is that, as in Study 1, there was little evidence that subjects who scored 
higher on the CRT deviated from Bayesian posterior beliefs conditional on the political 
concordance of the new information (H2). Indeed, once again, three of four simple slopes of 
CRT performance tended towards the posterior beliefs of a Bayesian agent (Figure 4, B); more 
consistent with H1 than H2. The most striking result from Study 2 is that, after modelling 
individuals’ subjective likelihoods, updating is estimated to be substantially less than that 
prescribed by the Bayesian agent. This is consistent with past work on human belief updating, 
where “conservatism” in updating is regularly observed (Hahn & Harris, 2014), and suggests 
that subjects did not uniformly apply the given likelihood ratio (of 2, i.e., 2/3  1/3) in Study 
1.  
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As in Study 1 we examined whether subjects interpreted the task instruction about signal 
accuracy as P(T|STRUE) = .67, violating our assumption that they interpreted it as P(STRUE|T) = 
.67. Accordingly, in Figure S4 in the SM we plot the distributions of posterior beliefs as a 
function of political statement stimuli and signal received (“TRUE” or “FALSE”). As in Study 
1, there is little evidence that the posterior beliefs stack on the values of 67% or 33%, 
respectively. This suggests that subjects did not interpret the task instructions about signal 
accuracy as P(T|STRUE) = .67 (or, analogously, as P(T|SFALSE) = .33). 
 
The third key result is that the association between CRT performance, political identity, and 
evidence evaluation (H3)—expected under the IPC facilitation hypothesis—all but disappeared 
after modelling prior beliefs. In particular, in an exploratory sensitivity analysis, we found 
evidence to suggest that our preregistered use of a binary political identity measure for testing 
H3 was insensitive to the association between CRT performance, political identity, and 
evidence evaluation (Figure 5A). In a second exploratory analysis, however, we found 
evidence to suggest this association was subsumed by an association between CRT 
performance, prior beliefs, and evidence evaluation (Figure 5B and 5C).  
 
These results indicate that the association between CRT performance and political identity in 
predicting reasoning about evidence may be confounded by prior beliefs. This is intuitive given 
that prior beliefs (about political issues) are often correlated with political identity; for example, 
because of selective exposure to information (Bolin & Hamilton, 2018; Rodriguez et al., 2017). 
Our data support this conjecture: The mean correlation between (i) the prior belief that a 
statement was true and (ii) political party affiliation, over the 8 pro-Democratic political 
statements was -.35 (SD = 0.07, range = [-.45, -.26]). In other words, Republican subjects 
believed pro-Democratic statements were more likely to be false than did Democrats. For the 
8 pro-Republican statements, the reverse was true (Mcorrelation = .33, SD = 0.06, range = [.26, 
.42]. Explicit modelling of this shared variance suggested that the interaction between CRT 
performance and prior beliefs was decisive in predicting reasoning about the validity of the 
evidence. However, these results were exploratory and must be replicated in confirmatory 
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In Study 3, therefore, we conducted a conceptual replication of the experiment reported by 
Kahan (2013); the results of which are cited as evidence that cognitive sophistication facilitates 
identity-protective reasoning in political belief formation. Importantly, unlike in Kahan’s 
(2013) experiment, we measured and modelled relevant prior beliefs, alongside political 
identity. 
  
In the original experiment (Kahan, 2013), subjects completed the CRT before being randomly 
assigned to treatments where they were asked to evaluate the validity of the CRT itself. Across 
treatments, information about the CRT was manipulated. Specifically, in both experimental 
treatments, the CRT was said to measure “open-minded and reflective thinking”, but, in one 
treatment, it was stated that climate change skeptics tended to score higher in the test. In the 
other experimental treatment, in contrast, it was stated that climate change believers tended to 
score higher in the test. Kahan (2013) found that subjects’ evaluation of the validity of the CRT 
in measuring “open-minded and reflective thinking” was conditional on their political identities 
and treatment assignment: “Liberal Democrats” rated the test as more valid in the treatment 
where believers were said to score higher (vs. the treatment were skeptics were said to score 
higher), and vice versa for “conservative Republicans”. Crucially, the data indicated that this 
conditioning on political identity when reasoning was greatest among those who scored highest 
on the CRT; consistent with the IPC facilitation hypothesis.  
 
Based on the alternative hypothesis outlined in the introduction—and suggested by the 
exploratory results of Study 2—we tested whether Kahan’s (2013) results are confounded by 
an association between CRT performance and conditioning on prior beliefs when reasoning 
about the evidence. That is, whether cognitively sophisticated subjects defer more strongly to 
their prior beliefs—rather than their political identities per se—when reasoning about the 






We sought to collect the approximate N-per-treatment used in Kahan (2013, N = 583); our 
target sample size was thus N = 1200 (i.e., N-per-treatment = 600). A total of N = 1215 subjects 
completed the study. 




4.1.2. Design & Procedure 
 
To measure and model prior beliefs alongside political identity, we simplified Kahan’s (2013) 
original design. Specifically, in the original design, we identified (at least) three prior beliefs 
that may conceivably have affected variance in ratings of the CRT’s validity as a measure of 
open-mindedness: Subjects’ beliefs about (i) the relative open-mindedness of climate-skeptics 
vs. climate-believers, (ii) how open-minded they themselves are, and (iii) how they just 
performed on the CRT.  
 
To reduce the number of relevant beliefs (and thus streamline their measurement and 
modelling) in our design, subjects rated the validity of a different but related test – which we 
labeled the “Open-Mindedness Test” – comprised of three self-report questions taken from the 
Actively Open-minded Thinking scale (Baron, 2008; Haran et al., 2013). Importantly, subjects 
did not complete this test themselves. This modification served to remove the influence of prior 
belief (iii), and reduce the influence of prior belief (ii), described above. To measure prior 
belief (i) – subjects’ belief about the relative open-mindedness of climate-skeptics vs. climate-
believers – we asked them who they considered to be more open-minded: Someone who 
believes climate change is happening vs. someone who is skeptical climate change is happening 
(scored from 1 to 7, anchored 1 = believer is definitely more open-minded, 4 = neither is more 
open-minded than the other, 7 = skeptic is definitely more open-minded). This question was 
embedded within a list of nine additional (distractor) questions related to other targets’ open-
mindedness; for example, the relative open-mindedness of females vs. males. The verbatim 
task instructions are available on the OSF: https://osf.io/yt3kd/. 
 
When rating the validity of the “Open-Mindedness Test”, subjects were randomly assigned to 
one of two treatments. In both treatments, subjects were told that psychologists were still 
evaluating the validity of the test, but that a higher score is taken to indicate greater open-
mindedness. In one treatment – believers are open-minded – subjects were asked whether they 
agreed that this test supplied good evidence of how open-minded someone is, on the 
assumption that future research finds that individuals who believe climate change is happening 
tend to score higher than individuals who are skeptical climate change is happening. In the 
other treatment – skeptics are open-minded – subjects provided the same judgment, but on the 
reverse assumption: That future research finds that climate change skeptics tend to score higher 
THE INTERSECTION OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & BELIEF FORMATION 
 
198 
than those who believe climate change is happening. These ratings were provided on a 1-7 
scale, as in Kahan (2013) (anchored: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat 
disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 = agree, 7 = strongly agree). 
 
To recap, our modified design comprised three key components: (i) ratings of the validity of 
the “Open-Mindedness Test” (experimental component), (ii) ratings of how open-minded 
climate-skeptics vs. climate-believers are (prior beliefs), and (iii) completion of the 7-item CRT 
(M = 3.43, SD = 2.09,  = .77, 95% CI [.75, .79], average inter-item r = .32). The order of (i) 
and (ii) was counterbalanced across subjects, and (iii) was always completed in between (i) 
and (ii). At the end of the study, subjects provided demographic information, including their 
political party affiliation (from 1-7, anchored 1 = Strong Democrat, 7 = Strong Republican) 





4.2.1. Data Exclusions 
 
For all hypothesis tests, we excluded N = 14 (1.15%) subjects who were duplicate respondents 
(determined by their unique MTurk ID/IP address); retaining the earliest responses only. This 
exclusion criterion was preregistered. In addition to the preregistered exclusion criterion, N = 
1 (0.08%) subject did not report their political party affiliation or political ideology, and was 
thus unable to be included in the tests of H1 and H3.  
 
4.2.2. H1: High CRT Scorers Evaluate Evidence Conditional on their Political Identities 
 
After data exclusions, we retained N = 1200 for the preregistered test of H1. H1 is a conceptual 
replication of Kahan (2013), and states that subjects who score higher on the CRT are more 
polarized in their evaluation of the “open-mindedness test”, conditional on their political 
identities and treatment assignment.  
 
4.2.2.1. Preregistered Test 
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We fitted a linear regression model with three variables: (i) CRT performance (z-score), (ii) 
treatment assignment [0 = believer-is-open-minded, 1 = skeptic-is-open-minded], and (iii) 
political identity. The DV was agreement that the test supplies good evidence of how open-
minded someone is (higher scores = greater agreement). To compute the political identity 
variable, we summed the standardized and midpoint-centered party affiliation and political 
ideology variables (following Kahan, 2013). The political identity variable thus ranged from -
3.75 (very liberal/strong Democrat) through 0 (moderate/Independent) to +3.75 (very 
conservative/strong Republican). The three-way interaction between (i), (ii), and (iii) is the test 
of theoretical interest.  
 
As per the model parameter estimates reported in Table 6, the three-way interaction was not 
statistically significant. The predicted values from this model (2) are displayed in Figure 6 (A). 
They indicate that subjects with high and low scores on the CRT deferred to their political 
identities to the same extent when evaluating the test, conditional on treatment assignment. 
This result is inconsistent with H1 and the results reported by Kahan (2013).  
 
4.2.2.2. Exploratory Test 
 
We also fitted an ordered logistic regression model with the same variables as a check on the 
robustness of the preregistered H1 result. In this model, similarly, the key three-way interaction 























Table 6. Linear Regression Model Output in Study 3 (Hypothesis 1). 
    (1) (2) 
    B std. Error p   B std. Error p 
(Intercept)   4.53 0.07 <.001   4.53 0.07 <.001 
Treatment   -0.53 0.09 <.001   -0.53 0.09 <.001 
Political identity   -0.19 0.03 <.001   -0.19 0.03 <.001 
CRT   -0.18 0.07 .007   -0.18 0.07 .007 
Treatment x Pol ID   0.37 0.05 <.001   0.37 0.05 <.001 
Treatment x CRT   0.01 0.09 .951   0.01 0.09 .881 
Pol ID x CRT   -0.01 0.02 .792   -0.01 0.03 .673 
Treatment x Pol ID x CRT        0.02 0.05 .740 
Observations   1200   1200 
R2 / adj. R2   .109 / .105   .109 / .104 
Deviance   2859.86   2859.60 
Note. The DV is agreement that the test supplies good evidence of how open-minded someone is (higher 
values = greater agreement). CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test (z-score). 
 




Figure 6. Predicted test validity judgments in Study 3. A, Liberal Democrat, Conservative 
Republican, and Moderate Independent correspond to values of -2, +2, and 0 on the political 
identity variable, respectively (range: -3.75, +3.75). B, Prior belief: Believers, Skeptics, and 
Neither more open-minded correspond to values of -1, +1, and 0 on the midpoint-centered and 
standardized prior belief variable, respectively. Predicted values are obtained from the models 
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4.2.3. H2: High CRT Scorers Evaluate Evidence Conditional on their Prior Beliefs 
 
After data exclusions, we retained N = 1201 for the preregistered test of H2. H2 states that 
subjects who score higher on the CRT are more polarized in their evaluation of the “open-
mindedness test” conditional on their prior beliefs and treatment assignment (political identity 
is not modelled in the test of H2, see H3).  
 
4.2.3.1. Preregistered Test 
 
We fitted a linear regression model with three variables: (i) CRT performance (z-score), (ii) 
treatment assignment [0 = believer-is-open-minded, 1 = skeptic-is-open-minded], and (iii) 
prior belief in the relative open-mindedness of climate-believers vs. climate-skeptics 
(standardized and midpoint-centered, original scale: 1 = believer is definitely more open-
minded, 7 = skeptic is definitely more open-minded). The DV was the same as in the test of 
H1.  
 
As per the model parameters reported in Table 7, the three-way interaction was statistically 
significant. The predicted values from this model (2) are displayed in Figure 6 (B). They 
indicate that subjects who scored higher on the CRT deferred to their prior beliefs to a greater 
extent when evaluating the test (conditional on treatment assignment); driven by individuals 
who believed that climate skeptics are more open-minded (central panel B). This result is 
broadly consistent with H2 and the exploratory results of Study 2 regarding prior beliefs. 
 
4.2.3.2. Exploratory Test 
 
As in H1, we fitted an ordered logistic regression model with the same variables as a check on 
the robustness of the preregistered H2 result. In this model, the key three-way interaction 
improved model fit (at p <.05): 2 (1) = 4.28, p =.039, b = 0.22 (SE = 0.10). 






Table 7. Linear Regression Model Output in Study 3 (Hypothesis 2). 
    (1)   (2) 
    B std. Error p   B std. Error p 
(Intercept)   4.27 0.07 <.001   4.25 0.07 <.001 
Treatment   -0.15 0.10 .135   -0.12 0.10 .229 
Prior belief   -0.57 0.06 <.001   -0.59 0.06 <.001 
CRT   -0.21 0.07 .002   -0.26 0.07 <.001 
Treatment x Prior   1.03 0.09 <.001   1.06 0.09 <.001 
Treatment x CRT   0.01 0.09 .881   0.12 0.10 .240 
Prior x CRT   -0.06 0.04 .145   -0.16 0.06 .009 
Treatment x Prior x CRT        0.19 0.08 .025 
Observations   1201   1201 
R2 / adj. R2   .163 / .159   .166 / .162 
Deviance   2687.11   2675.78 
Note. The DV is agreement that the test supplies good evidence of how open-minded someone is (higher 




4.2.4. H3: High CRT Scorers Do Not Evaluate Evidence Conditional on their Political 
Identities More than Low CRT Scorers after Modelling Prior Beliefs 
 
After data exclusions, we retained N = 1200 for the preregistered test of H3. H3 states that the 
association between CRT performance, political identity, and evidence evaluation is better 
accounted for by an association between CRT performance, prior beliefs, and evidence 
evaluation. Since H1 was rejected, the test of H3 is somewhat moot. Nevertheless, there is 
value in testing whether the association with prior beliefs holds after modelling the shared 
variance between political identity and prior beliefs; especially given that these two variables 
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are moderately correlated (replicating the correlations in Study 2), r (1198) = .42, 95% CI [.37, 
.47], p <.001.  
 
4.2.4.1. Preregistered Test 
 
We jointly modelled the association between (i) CRT performance (z-score), prior beliefs, and 
treatment assignment, and (ii) CRT performance (z-score), political identity, and treatment 
assignment. The DV was the same as in the test of H1 and H2. The results of the linear 
regression model showed that the interaction with prior beliefs remained of similar size, 
positive, and statistically significant [b = 0.20, SE = 0.09, p =.035]. The interaction with 
political identity also remained similarly sized and statistically non-significant [b = -0.03, SE 
= 0.05, p =.621] (full model parameter estimates are reported in the SM). This result is 
consistent with H3 and the exploratory results of Study 2 regarding prior beliefs. 
 
4.2.4.2. Exploratory Test 
 
In an ordered logistic regression model, the three-way interaction with prior beliefs just missed 
the p <.05 significance threshold, 2 (1) = 3.70, p =.054, b = 0.23 (SE = 0.12). In addition, as 
in the preregistered analyses, the interaction with political identity did not improve model fit, 




The key result from Study 3 is that subjects who scored higher on the CRT deferred more 
strongly to their prior beliefs when reasoning about evidence concordant vs. discordant with 
those beliefs (H2, H3); a result driven primarily by subjects who believed climate change 
skeptics are more open-minded and who received evidence to the contrary (Figure 6, central 
panel B). In contrast, we found no evidence that subjects who scored higher on the CRT 
deferred more strongly to their political identities when reasoning about the evidence (i.e., 
rejection of H1, Figure 6A). In other words, we did not replicate the result reported by Kahan 
(2013) and expected under the IPC facilitation hypothesis.  
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While our design was slightly modified from the original experiment (Kahan, 2013) to simplify 
the measurement and modelling of prior beliefs, the IPC facilitation hypothesis makes a clear 
prediction about the pattern of results expected in Study 3. That is, individuals scoring higher 
on the CRT would “use their distinctive analytic proficiencies to form identity-congruent 
assessments of [the] evidence” (p.3, Kahan, 2017, emphasis in original). According to LeBel 
and colleagues’ (2017) replication taxonomy, our study would be classified somewhere 
between a “very close” and “close” replication (p. 256). Moreover, we had a slightly larger 
sample size than the original experiment, and, in addition, the distribution of CRT scores in 
our data (reported in SM) were less skewed than in the original, where over a third of subjects 
scored zero. This provided favorable conditions for the expected result to emerge. Finally, we 
did observe the hypothesized interaction between CRT performance and prior beliefs (H2, H3), 
which suggests that prior beliefs may have confounded the result reported by Kahan (2013). 
 
However, another dimension on which our study differed from that reported in Kahan (2013) 
was the sampling population. In particular, we recruited a convenience sample via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). It is well documented that MTurk samples skew more 
liberal/Democrat than the general US population (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016), and have 
substantial prior experience with the CRT (Chandler et al., 2014). We consider it unlikely that 
experience with the CRT accounts for the difference in our results, for reasons described above 
regarding the theoretically favorable distribution of scores in our sample, as well as work 
indicating that the predictive validity of the CRT is robust to multiple exposures (Bialek & 
Pennycook, 2017; Meyer et al., 2018; Stagnaro et al., 2018). However, it is possible that the 
skew in our political identity variable prevented us from detecting the pattern of results 




In Study 4, we therefore conducted a further replication of the experiment reported in Kahan 
(2013). In this study, we drew our sample from a population more demographically 
representative of the general US population and (likely to be) less experienced with the CRT 
than the MTurk population.  
 
5.1. Methods 






We recruited the Study 4 sample from Lucid (https://luc.id/), a marketplace for online survey 
research that uses quota sampling to match respondents to census demographics. Importantly, 
compared to MTurk, samples of US adults recruited via Lucid are (a) closer to national 
benchmarks in reported political party identification, and (b) much closer in reported political 
ideology (Coppock & McClellan, 2017). Samples recruited via Lucid are also better matched 
to national benchmarks than MTurk on demographics such as age, gender, education, and 
ethnicity, as well as on personality traits (Coppock & McClellan, 2017). 
 
We sought to collect N = 2000, increasing the target N-per-treatment from N = 600 (in Study 
3) to N = 1000 in the current study. A total of N = 2060 subjects completed the study. The 
sample was slightly left-of-center on a 7-point party identification scale (M = 3.87, SD = 1.80, 
scored from 1 = Strong Democrat to 7 = Strong Republican), and slightly right-of-center on a 
5-point ideology scale (M = 3.04, SD = 1.04, scored from 1 = Very liberal to 5 = Very 
conservative) (distributions reported in the SM). This pattern—lean Democrat, lean 
conservative—is qualitatively similar to the pattern observed in the 2008 and 2012 American 
National Election Survey, and is distinct from the pattern observed in MTurk samples, which 
skew Democrat and liberal (for a direct comparison, see Table 2 in Coppock & McClellan, 
2017). Furthermore, replicating the representative US sample in Kahan (2013), the correlation 
between CRT performance and political identity (combined party and ideology variables) in 
our Study 4 sample was not significantly different from zero, r (2050) = .005, 95% CI [-.04, 
.05], p =.831. 
 
5.1.2. Design & Procedure 
 
The design and procedure were identical to Study 3, except for the following two adjustments. 
First, we made two changes to the list of distractor questions that asked about other targets’ 
open-mindedness (i.e., targets other than climate skeptics vs. believers). Specifically, we 
replaced the gun control and abortion targets with supporters/opponents of (a) genetically 
modified food and (b) driverless cars, respectively. We did this to avoid priming the political 
identity of respondents in areas unrelated to our focus (climate change).  
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Second, we slightly changed the wording of the experimental treatment delivered to subjects. 
Specifically, we more closely followed the treatment wording administered by Kahan (2013). 
Recall that, in Study 3, we asked subjects to rate the validity of the “open-mindedness test”, 
assuming future research finds that climate change skeptics [believers] tend to score higher in 
the test. In Study 4, we removed this conditional statement. Specifically, we asked subjects to 
rate the validity of the test after simply informing them that “among a group of subjects in one 
recent study, the researchers found that people who reject [accept] evidence of climate change 
tend to score higher on the test than people who accept [reject] evidence of climate change.” 
This more closely reflects the wording administered by Kahan (2013). The verbatim task 
instructions are available on the OSF: https://osf.io/yt3kd/.  
 
All other aspects of the design and procedure were identical to Study 3. We note that, as in 
Kahan (2013), CRT scores were skewed towards the lower end of the scale in the Study 4 
sample (7-item CRT: M = 1.99, SD = 1.74,  = .68, 95% CI [.66, .70], average inter-item r = 




5.2.1. Data Exclusions 
 
For all hypothesis tests, we excluded N = 7 (0.34%) subjects who were duplicate respondents 
(determined by IP address); retaining the earliest responses only. This exclusion criterion was 
preregistered. In addition to the preregistered exclusion criterion, N = 1 (0.05%) subject did 
not report their political party affiliation, and was thus unable to be included in the tests of H1 
and H3.  
 
5.2.2. H1: High CRT Scorers Evaluate Evidence Conditional on their Political Identities 
 
After data exclusions, we retained N = 2052 for the preregistered test of H1. As in Study 3, H1 
is a conceptual replication of Kahan (2013), and states that subjects who score higher on the 
CRT are more polarized in their evaluation of the “open-mindedness test”, conditional on their 
political identities and treatment assignment.  
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5.2.2.1. Preregistered Test 
 
As in Study 3, we fitted a linear regression model with three variables: (i) CRT performance 
(z-score), (ii) treatment assignment [0 = believer-is-open-minded, 1 = skeptic-is-open-minded], 
and (iii) political identity. The DV was agreement that the test supplies good evidence of how 
open-minded someone is. The political identity variable was calculated as in Study 3 (higher 
values = more conservative/Republican). 
 
As per the model parameter estimates reported in Table 8, in contrast to Study 3 this time the 
key three-way interaction was statistically significant. The predicted values from this model 
(2) are displayed in Figure 7 (A). They show that subjects who scored higher on the CRT 
deferred to their political identities to a greater extent when evaluating the test (conditional on 
treatment assignment); driven by subjects who identified as liberal/Democrat (Figure 7, left 
panel A). This result is broadly consistent with the IPC facilitation hypothesis and the results 
reported in Kahan (2013). 
 
5.2.2.2. Exploratory Test 
 
We fitted an ordered logistic regression model with the same variables as a check on the 
robustness of the preregistered H1 result. In this model, similarly, the key three-way interaction 













THE INTERSECTION OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & BELIEF FORMATION 
 
209 
Table 8. Linear Regression Model Output in Study 4 (Hypothesis 1). 
    (1)   (2) 
    B std. Error p   B std. Error p 
(Intercept)   4.70 0.05 <.001   4.70 0.05 <.001 
Treatment   -0.29 0.07 <.001   -0.30 0.07 <.001 
Political identity   -0.13 0.03 <.001   -0.13 0.03 <.001 
CRT   -0.07 0.05 .116   -0.08 0.05 .095 
Treatment x Pol ID   0.23 0.04 <.001   0.23 0.04 <.001 
Treatment x CRT   -0.20 0.07 .003   -0.19 0.07 .007 
Pol ID x CRT   0.02 0.02 .329   -0.03 0.03 .189 
Treatment x Pol ID x CRT        0.10 0.04 .004 
Observations   2052   2052 
R2 / adj. R2   .044 / .041   .047 / .044 
Deviance   4858.41   4839.00 
Note. The DV is agreement that the test supplies good evidence of how open-minded someone is (higher 
values = greater agreement). CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test (z-score). 
 





Figure 7. Predicted test validity judgments in Study 4. A, Liberal Democrat, Conservative 
Republican, and Moderate Independent correspond to values of -2, +2, and 0 on the political 
identity variable, respectively (range: -3.58, +3.58). B, Prior belief: Believers, Skeptics, and 
Neither more open-minded correspond to values of -1, +1, and 0 on the midpoint-centered and 
standardized prior belief variable, respectively. Predicted values are obtained from the models 
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5.2.3. H2: High CRT Scorers Evaluate Evidence Conditional on their Prior Beliefs 
 
After data exclusions, we retained N = 2053 for the preregistered test of H2. As in Study 3, H2 
is that individuals who score higher on the CRT are more polarized in their evaluation of the 
“open-mindedness test” conditional on their prior beliefs and treatment assignment. 
 
5.2.3.1. Preregistered Test 
 
We fitted a linear regression model with three variables: (i) CRT performance (z-score), (ii) 
treatment assignment [0 = believer-is-open-minded, 1 = skeptic-is-open-minded], and (iii) 
prior belief in the relative open-mindedness of climate-believers vs. climate-skeptics (higher 
values = skeptic relatively more open-minded). The DV was the same as in the test of H1.  
 
As per the model parameter estimates reported in Table 9, the three-way interaction was 
statistically significant. The predicted values from this model (2) are displayed in Figure 7 (B). 
They show that subjects who scored higher on the CRT deferred to their prior beliefs to a 
greater extent when evaluating the test (conditional on treatment assignment); though, in 
contrast to Study 3, this effect was primarily driven by subjects who considered climate change 
believers to be more open-minded (Figure 7, left panel B). This result is consistent with H2 
and replicates the general pattern observed in Study 3 regarding prior beliefs. 
 
5.2.3.2. Exploratory Test 
 
As in H1, we fitted an ordered logistic regression model with the same variables as a check on 
the robustness of the preregistered H2 result. In this model, the key three-way interaction 
improved model fit: 2 (1) = 9.80, p =.002, b = 0.26 (SE = 0.08). 
 
 




Table 9. Linear Regression Model Output in Study 4 (Hypothesis 2). 
    (1)   (2) 
    B std. Error p   B std. Error p 
(Intercept)   4.58 0.05 <.001   4.56 0.05 <.001 
Treatment   -0.11 0.07 .144   -0.09 0.07 .220 
Prior belief   -0.32 0.05 <.001   -0.33 0.05 <.001 
CRT   -0.07 0.05 .165   -0.12 0.05 .021 
Treatment x Prior   0.49 0.07 <.001   0.52 0.07 <.001 
Treatment x CRT   -0.19 0.07 .005   -0.10 0.07 .174 
Prior x CRT   0.05 0.04 .199   -0.08 0.05 .141 
Treatment x Prior x CRT        0.23 0.07 .001 
Observations   2053   2053 
R2 / adj. R2   .052 / .050   .057 / .054 
Deviance   4814.429   4789.695 
Note. The DV is agreement that the test supplies good evidence of how open-minded someone is (higher 




5.2.4. H3: High CRT Scorers Do Not Evaluate Evidence Conditional on their Political 
Identities More than Low CRT Scorers after Modelling Prior Beliefs 
 
After data exclusions, we retained N = 2052 for the preregistered test of H3. As in Study 3, H3 
states that the association between CRT performance, political identity, and evidence 
evaluation is accounted for by an association between CRT performance, prior beliefs, and 
evidence evaluation. For comparison with Study 3, we note that the correlation between (i) 
prior belief in the relative open-mindedness of climate change skeptics vs. believers, and (ii) 
political identity is moderate, r (2050) = .28, 95% CI [.24, .32], p <.001. 
 
5.2.4.1. Preregistered Test 




As in Study 3, we jointly modelled the association between (i) CRT performance (z-score), 
prior beliefs, and treatment assignment, and (ii) CRT performance (z-score), political identity, 
and treatment assignment. The DV was the same as before.  
 
The results of the joint linear regression model showed that both interactions reduced in size. 
Consequently, the interaction with political identity no longer improved model fit (at p <.05) 
[b = 0.06, SE = 0.04, p =.111]. The interaction with prior beliefs remained below the 
preregistered threshold of statistical significance (albeit on the borderline) [b = 0.15, SE = 0.08, 
p =.049] (full model parameter estimates are reported in the SM). This result is thus (weakly) 
consistent with H3. 
 
5.2.4.2. Exploratory Test 
 
In an ordered logistic regression model, the three-way interaction with prior beliefs contributed 
to model fit (at p <.05), 2 (1) = 4.20, p =.040, b = 0.18 (SE = 0.09). The three-way interaction 
with political identity, as in the preregistered H3 test, did not, 2 (1) = 1.44, p =.230, b = 0.05 




There are three key findings from Study 4. The first is that—contrary to Study 3—we 
successfully replicated the result reported by Kahan (2013) and expected under the IPC 
facilitation hypothesis. Specifically, subjects who scored higher on the CRT deferred more 
strongly to their political identity when reasoning about evidence concordant vs. discordant 
with that identity (H1). This result was driven entirely by subjects who identified as 
liberal/Democrat (Figure 7, left panel A). While this difference in the corroboration of H1—
compared with the result of Study 3—is plausibly due to the change in sampling population, it 
might also be due to other (albeit minor) changes we made to the design/procedure in Study 4 
(see Methods).  
 
The second key result is that we replicated the general pattern observed in Study 2 and Study 
3 regarding prior beliefs: Subjects who scored higher on the CRT deferred more strongly to 
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their prior beliefs when reasoning about evidence concordant vs. discordant with those beliefs 
(H2); a result driven primarily by subjects who considered believers in climate change to be 
more open-minded (Figure 7, left panel B). While the specifics of this interaction differed from 
that in Study 3—where the effect localized to those who considered climate skeptics to be more 
open-minded (Figure 6, central panel B)—the general pattern is again consistent with H2. 
 
The third key result is that, after modelling both three-way interactions together—political 
identity and prior beliefs—their independent contributions to model fit were both reduced; 
though this reduction appeared more emphatic for political identity (H3). Overall, this result is 
consistent with the preregistered result of Study 3 (H3) and the exploratory results of Study 2 
regarding prior beliefs. That is, the interaction between CRT performance, political identity, 
and reasoning about evidence—expected under the IPC facilitation hypothesis—does not 




In Study 5, we conducted a final empirical test of the hypothesis that individuals who score 
higher on the CRT defer more to their prior beliefs when reasoning about information in the 
political domain. In particular, we re-analyzed previously published data collected during the 
2016 US presidential election (Tappin et al., 2017). In that study, supporters of then presidential 
candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton read about election polls where it was 
highlighted that either some polls predicted Trump was more likely to win the election, or 
some polls predicted Clinton was more likely to win the election. Before the polling 
information, subjects reported their prior beliefs about which candidate was more likely to win. 
After reading the polling information, subjects were asked whether they considered polls (in 
general) informative. As reported in the paper (Tappin et al., 2017, supplementary material), 
subjects’ responses to this question were conditional on whether the just-presented polling 
results were concordant or discordant with their prior belief about who would win (in the 
expected fashion).  
 
While the CRT was not administered in that particular study, many of the subjects had taken 
(or had yet to take) part in unrelated studies—conducted in the senior authors’ lab between 
2012 and 2017—which did administer the CRT (these studies are aggregated in Stagnaro et 
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al., 2018). As a result, we could retroactively match the CRT performance of subjects in those 
studies to the prior beliefs and polling evaluations provided by the same subjects in Tappin et 
al. (2017). This allowed us to again test the hypothesis that people who score higher on the 
CRT defer more strongly to their prior beliefs when reasoning about the validity/accuracy of 
evidence that is concordant vs. discordant with those beliefs.  
 
In addition, as a function of the design used in Tappin et al. (2017), subjects’ prior belief about 
which candidate was more likely to win the election was only weakly correlated with who they 
preferred to win. Assuming that candidate preference is a proxy for political identity allowed 
us to test the association between CRT performance and prior beliefs largely independent of 
political identity—in contrast to Study 2-4, where prior beliefs and political identity were 






A total of N = 900 subjects completed the study reported in Tappin et al. (2017). As in the 
original study, we excluded N = 1 (0.11%) subjects for duplicate responding; leaving N = 899 
to match with the CRT performance data. The CRT data was aggregated over 11 studies 
conducted using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) by the senior author’s lab between 2012 
and 2017 (for the studies, see Stagnaro et al., 2018). These data comprised a total of N = 23,743 
observed CRT sum scores. Of these 23,743 observations, using subjects’ unique MTurk IDs, 
we identified N = 443 unique observations that could be matched to the study responses in 
Tappin et al. (2017). N = 443 was therefore our sample size for analysis.  
 
6.1.2. Evidence Evaluation 
 
In the study reported in Tappin et al. (2017), subjects first indicated (i) their preferred 
presidential candidate (dichotomous: Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton), and (ii) their prior 
belief about which candidate was more likely to win the 2016 presidential election. Prior beliefs 
were provided on a bipolar sliding scale from 0 (labelled “Hillary Clinton”) to 100 (“Donald 
Trump”), sensitive to three decimal places. Subjects were instructed that dragging the slider 
closer to either name indicated they were more confident that that candidate would win the 
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election (subjects who responded with exactly 50—complete uncertainty—were unable to take 
part in the study). Subjects fell into one of two groups: Those whose prior belief was consistent 
with their candidate preference—for example, a preference for Trump to win, and the belief 
that he was more likely to win—and those for whom it was inconsistent (e.g., a preference for 
Trump to win, but the belief that Clinton was more likely to win). An equal number of each 
group was recruited—meaning that, in the aggregate sample of the study, prior belief and 
candidate preference were (approximately) uncorrelated.  
 
Subjects were then randomly assigned to read a short paragraph about election polls that 
emphasized that either some polls predicted Trump was more likely to win, or some polls 
predicted Clinton was more likely to win the election. Random assignment was blocked on 
whether subjects initially believed either Trump or Clinton was more likely to win. This 
ensured that (roughly) equal numbers of subjects received a polling treatment concordant vs. 
discordant with their prior belief (and preference). In addition, there was no deception: At the 
time of data collection, the candidates were within several percentage points of each other and 
some polls had one or the other candidate ahead (verbatim study instructions are available in 
Tappin et al., 2017, Supplemental Material). On the same survey page as the polling 
information, subjects were asked: “In general, do you think polling data is informative?” They 
provided their response on a 1-7 scale, anchored 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much so. This 
constitutes the measure of evidence evaluation for the analysis we conduct here. 
 
6.1.3. Prior Belief and Political Identity Variables 
 
In our sample of N = 443, we first determined whether the polling treatment subjects received 
was pro-Clinton or pro-Trump. A total of N = 211 (47.63%) subjects received the treatment 
that emphasized polls reporting that Clinton was more likely to win; for the remaining subjects, 
the treatment emphasized polls reporting that Trump was more likely to win (variable: poll 
treatment). Second, we determined whether subjects initially believed either that Clinton was 
more likely to win (indicated by < 50 on the prior belief scale, N = 329, 74.27%), or that Trump 
was more likely to win (> 50 on the prior belief scale, N = 114, 25.73%) (variable: prior belief). 
Third, we computed the strength of subjects’ prior belief as the distance from the scale midpoint 
(50) (variable: prior belief strength). These values thus ranged from 0.237 (minimum strength 
prior) to 50 (maximum strength prior) (M = 30.15, SD = 16.03). Finally, we determined which 
political candidate subjects preferred to win (as a proxy for their political identity) (variable: 
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preference): N = 201 (45.37%) preferred Clinton to win; the remaining subjects preferred 
Trump to win. The sample sizes for each combination of preferred candidate, prior belief, and 
treatment assignment are displayed in Table 10. 
 
Due to the design used in Tappin et al. (2017), receiving evidence—that is, a poll treatment—
concordant with prior belief was only weakly (and non-significantly) correlated with receiving 




Table 10. Group Sample Sizes in Study 5. 


















6.1.4. CRT Performance 
 
The CRT performance data came from studies which administered the original 3-item CRT 
(Frederick, 2005), not the combined 7-item CRT used here in Studies 1-4. Thus, in Study 5, 
CRT sum scores ranged from 0 to 3 (correct responses were summed as usual). For subjects 
with repeated CRT measurements in the Stagnaro et al. (2018) dataset, we computed their mean 
CRT sum score over the repeated measurements. The mean CRT sum score over the N = 443 
sample was 1.22 (SD = 1.13). The distribution of mean CRT sum scores over the sample is 




6.2.1. Prior Beliefs Analysis 
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We first fitted a linear regression model with four IVs: (i) poll treatment assignment, (ii) prior 
belief, (iii) prior belief strength, and (iv) CRT performance. The DV was the measure of 
evidence evaluation (higher values = greater endorsement of evidence). The critical test is on 
the four-way interaction between (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv).  
 
The four-way interaction was statistically significant and positive [b = 0.05, SE = 0.02, p =.007] 
(full model parameter estimates are reported in the SM, Table S8). The predicted values from 
this model are displayed in Figure 8. They indicate that, among subjects who believed Trump 
was more likely to win the election, those who scored higher on the CRT deferred more 
strongly to their prior beliefs in evidence evaluation (Figure 8B). Unexpectedly, however, also 
among these subjects, those who had weak prior beliefs and who scored higher on the CRT 
appeared to defer less to their prior beliefs; evaluating the evidence almost at parity across prior 
belief concordance (Figure 8B, left-most panel). In other words, in these data, Trump-believing 
subjects who scored higher on the CRT were more sensitive to how the evidence squared with 
their prior beliefs; rather than blindly deferring to their prior beliefs per se. In contrast, subjects 
who believed Clinton was more likely to win the election and who scored higher on the CRT 
were relatively less sensitive to their prior beliefs in evidence evaluation (Figure 8A). The four-
way interaction remained of similar size and statistically significant in an ordered logistic 
regression model: 2 (1) = 8.68, p =.003, b = 0.06 (SE = 0.02). 
 
A possible confound in this result concerns the asymmetric group sample sizes used in the 
analysis. In particular, among subjects who believed Trump was more likely to win, 
approximately two-thirds also preferred him to win (see Table 10). Since the critical four-way 
interaction with prior beliefs was mainly driven by Trump-believing subjects (Figure 8), this 
interaction may, in fact, reflect an interaction with candidate preference (rather than prior 
beliefs). To rule out this possibility, we balanced the group sample sizes used in the analysis. 
Specifically, we balanced the number of subjects who preferred Trump and believed Trump 
would win, with those who preferred Clinton but believed Trump would win. To do so, we 
drew N random subjects from the former group of subjects, where N was equal to the latter 
group of subjects (N = 38). Thus, both groups of subjects now contained N = 38. We then 
refitted the critical four-way interaction in a linear regression model (exactly as before).  
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We performed this random-sample-refitting procedure 10,000 times, and recorded the estimate, 
standard error, and p-value of the four-way interaction after each iteration. We also recorded 
the correlation between receiving evidence concordant with prior beliefs and receiving 
evidence concordant with candidate preference (as a check on the balancing procedure). After 
10,000 iterations, the median correlation coefficient was -.01; indicating that prior beliefs and 
candidate preference were now (approximately) fully decoupled, as intended. The median 
estimate of the critical four-way interaction was 0.05; the median standard error was 0.02; and 
the median p-value was .017. In other words, the results of this procedure reproduced the results 
of the foregoing analysis that contained asymmetric group sample sizes. 
 
6.2.2. Political Identity and Joint Analysis 
 
We then proceeded to model the three-way interaction between (i) poll treatment assignment, 
(ii) subjects’ candidate preference (as a proxy for their political identity) and (iii) CRT scores. 
The interaction was not statistically significant [b = -0.37, SE = 0.25, p =.133]. The full model 
parameter estimates are reported in Table S9 in the SM (model 1). The predicted values are 
displayed in Figure 9 (A). 
 
Because of the positive—albeit weak—correlation between subjects receiving evidence 
concordant with prior beliefs and receiving evidence concordant with candidate preference (r 
= .08, reported in Methods), we also fitted a joint model—that is, estimating both target 
interactions together.  In this joint model (parameter estimates reported in full in Table S9 in 
the SM, model 2), the three-way interaction between treatment, candidate preference, and CRT 
performance was statistically significant—but in the opposite direction to that expected under 
the IPC facilitation hypothesis [b = -0.71, SE = 0.26, p =.006]. That is, subjects who scored 
higher on the CRT deferred relatively less to their candidate preference in evidence evaluation 
after modelling prior beliefs. The predicted values from this model are displayed in Figure 9 
(B). In contrast to these results, in the joint model, the four-way interaction with prior beliefs 









Figure 8. Predicted judgments on the informativeness of polling data in Study 5. A, subjects 
who believed Clinton was more likely to win the election (than Trump). B, subjects who 
believed Trump was more likely to win the election (than Clinton). Weak, Moderate, and Strong 
priors correspond to values of 15, 30, and 45 on the prior belief strength variable, respectively 
(range: 0.237-50.000). Predicted values are obtained from the linear regression model (2) 
reported in Table S8 in the SM. Shaded regions are 95% CI. CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test. 
 
 






Figure 9. Predicted judgments on the informativeness of polling data in Study 5. A, 
preferences in the model without any prior belief variables. B, preferences in the model with 
all prior belief variables. Predicted values in panel A are obtained from linear regression 
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model (1), and in panel B from model (2), both reported in Table S9 in the SM. Shaded regions 






The main result from Study 5 is that we again found evidence that subjects who scored higher 
on the CRT deferred more to their prior beliefs when reasoning about the validity of evidence; 
driven primarily by subjects who believed Trump was more likely to win the election. This 
result is notable, for two reasons. First, as a function of the design used in Tappin et al. (2017), 
prior beliefs and candidate preference were only weakly correlated in the sample we analyzed. 
That we nevertheless observed an interaction between CRT performance and prior beliefs 
meshes well with other evidence that suggests this interaction exists independent of political 
identity (e.g., Trippas et al., 2015) (insofar as candidate preference is a proxy for political 
identity). Furthermore, the interaction between CRT performance and prior beliefs was evident 
even after adjusting for the residual (weak) correlation between prior beliefs and candidate 
preference (via the random-sample-refitting procedure, and joint modelling of the two target 
interactions). The second reason this result is notable is the circumstances of data collection: 
We retroactively matched CRT data collected over a 5-year period—under various study 
designs and research aims—to subject responses in a different study again, conducted during 
the 2016 US presidential election. The broad consistency of the result with that observed in the 
evidence evaluation results of Study 2, 3, and 4 is a testament to its robustness.  
 
That said, there were some differences from the results we previously observed. In particular, 
while (Trump-believing) subjects who scored higher on the CRT and had strong prior beliefs 
appeared to defer more to those beliefs when reasoning about the evidence, we also observed 
that—among subjects with weak prior beliefs—those who scored higher on the CRT seemed 
to defer somewhat less to their prior beliefs (a trend in evidence for both Trump-believing and 
Clinton-believing subjects; Figure 9A and 9B, left-most panels). In other words, the results of 
Study 5 suggested that CRT performance correlated with greater sensitivity to how evidence 
squared with prior beliefs; rather than blind deference to those beliefs. While unexpected, this 
pattern seems generally consistent with the exploratory results of Study 2 regarding prior 
beliefs and evidence evaluation (Figure 5B). There, the association between CRT performance 
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and deference to prior beliefs increased in size in conjunction with the strength of those beliefs 
(i.e., through weak-moderate-strong prior beliefs).  
 
A secondary result from Study 5 is that subjects who scored higher on the CRT appeared to 
defer less to their political identity in evidence evaluation; a pattern opposite to that expected 
under the IPC facilitation hypothesis. However, this result is based on a proxy for political 
identity—preference for US presidential candidate—which was measured dichotomously 




The influence of political identity on the formation of factual beliefs is advocated by several 
overlapping theoretical accounts (Bermúdez, 2018; Kahan, 2016a; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). 
The central proposition common to these accounts is that political identity biases cognition 
toward the formation of politically concordant factual beliefs, and away from politically 
discordant factual beliefs. We referred to this biasing influence as identity-protective cognition 
(IPC) (cf. Kahan, 2017). An alarming hypothesis derived from the logic of IPC is that cognitive 
sophistication facilitates identity-protective processing in political belief formation (Kahan, 
2013; Kahan et al., 2017). By extension, cognitive sophistication may counterintuitively 
increase bias in this domain; polarizing—rather than unifying—the beliefs of people who 
identify with opposing political groups. We referred to this as the “IPC facilitation hypothesis”, 
and noted its rather ominous implications for the prospect of achieving convergence on true 
beliefs in politics. Chiefly, that the distinct proficiencies of cognitively sophisticated partisans 
will be deployed to disregard and resist evidence that threatens their political identities. 
 
In the current paper, we investigated this hypothesis, focusing on two distinct processes 
involved in political belief formation: (1) belief updating—the integration of new information 
with prior beliefs—and (2) reasoning—evaluations about the validity or accuracy of new 
information. Our key results are twofold. First, with regard to belief updating, when 
benchmarked against a normative Bayesian agent we found that cognitively sophisticated 
subjects appeared to be less—not more—biased in their belief updating after receipt of political 
information. Second, with regard to reasoning, we found evidence to suggest that more 
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cognitively sophisticated subjects deferred more to their prior beliefs—rather than to their 
political identities per se—when reasoning about the validity of political information.   
 
In particular, we investigated belief updating in Studies 1 and 2, and found that subjects who 
scored higher on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) – a behavioral measure of 
reflective/analytic thinking – deviated less from the posterior beliefs of a Bayesian agent 
overall. That is, more analytic subjects combined their prior beliefs with new politically-
relevant information in a more normative (i.e., less biased) manner. In contrast, we observed 
scant evidence that higher CRT scores were associated with more biased belief updating 
conditional on political identity, as would be consistent with the IPC facilitation hypothesis. 
Indeed, in most cases, subjects who scored higher on the CRT tended towards the posterior 
beliefs of the Bayesian agent—irrespective of the political identity concordance of the evidence 
they received. 
 
We then investigated reasoning about information in Studies 2 through 5, and found that 
subjects who scored higher on the CRT were more sensitive to their prior beliefs when 
reasoning about the validity of evidence that was concordant vs. discordant with those beliefs. 
Often, this manifested in these subjects deferring more to their prior beliefs in evidence 
evaluation, but not always. For example, in Studies 2 and 5, the strength of subjects’ prior 
beliefs seemed to moderate the extent to which CRT performance was associated with 
deference to those beliefs. Concretely, when prior beliefs were weak, there was some evidence 
that high CRT scorers deferred to their prior beliefs to the same extent (e.g., Study 2, Figure 5, 
left panel B) or less (Study 5, Figure 8A and 8B, left-most panels) than low CRT scorers. When 
prior beliefs were strong, in contrast, we found that high CRT scorers generally deferred more 
strongly to these beliefs when reasoning about the information (and never less than low CRT 
scorers). We note, however, that not all subjects exhibited this pattern: across studies a common 
observation was that either one group of prior believers or the opposite group displayed the 
hypothesized interaction between CRT performance and prior beliefs—but rarely both. 
 
The data were less consistent with the results expected under the IPC facilitation hypothesis: 
Namely, that high CRT scorers would defer more strongly to their political identities when 
reasoning about the validity of the new information. In particular, whereas in some cases we 
observed evidence consistent with this hypothesis (Study 2, Figure 5A; and Study 4, Figure 7, 
left panel A), in other cases we did not (Study 3, Figure 6A; and Study 5, Figure 9). Perhaps 
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more importantly, though, across all studies the interaction between CRT performance and 
political identity in predicting evidence evaluations never survived the modelling of prior 
beliefs. In other words, we observed no evidence that cognitively sophisticated subjects 
deferred more strongly to their political identities per se when reasoning about evidence 
concordant vs. discordant with those identities. Overall, therefore, while our results do not 
challenge the existence of identity-protective cognition in general, they challenge the notion 
that cognitive sophistication facilitates IPC. Table 11 displays a summary of the studies and 
their results as they relate to the relevant hypotheses. 
 
7.1. Theoretical Implications 
 
The theoretical implications of our investigation are twofold. First, the result that subjects who 
scored higher on the CRT deviated less from Bayesian updating (Studies 1 and 2) is 
inconsistent with the notion that individuals update in a fashion that is more biased in favor of 
their political identities; where bias is represented explicitly as deviation from a formal 
normative or optimality criterion, in this case Bayesian rationality (cf. Hahn & Harris, 2014). 
While IPC is generally conceived of as biasing belief formation (Bermúdez, 2018; Kahan, 
2016a; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018), we find that belief updating is more normative (i.e., less 
biased) among subjects who score higher on the CRT. This result appears somewhat at odds 
with the notion that cognitive sophistication facilitates identity-protective cognition. Of course, 
there are numerous notions of “bias” (e.g., reviewed in Hahn & Harris, 2014); not all of which 
relate to (or imply) deviation from Bayesian rationality. For example, the results of Studies 1 
and 2 are silent over the question of whether cognitive sophistication facilitates bias where bias 
means “double standards” (or hypocrisy), as it may be understood by the average person (Ditto 
et al., 2018b). 
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that different models of IPC make different predictions 
about which cognitive processes are biased by political identity; and presumably, therefore, 
which biases may be exacerbated by cognitive sophistication. For example, Kahan’s (2016a) 
model of IPC focuses exclusively on the process of reasoning about the validity of new 
evidence—and explicitly not on the process of integrating that evidence with prior beliefs (i.e., 
belief updating). Other models assume a much broader range of cognitive processes are 
influenced by IPC (e.g., Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). With respect to the latter models, our 
results suggest that belief updating is one cognitive process where cognitive sophistication 
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seemingly does not facilitate bias in favor of political identity; on the contrary, evaluated 
against a Bayesian agent, it is associated with less bias. 
 
The second implication of our investigation is based on the result that subjects who scored 
higher on the CRT deferred more strongly to their prior beliefs when reasoning about the 
validity of new information (Studies 2 through 5). In particular, our results suggest that past 
evidence taken as corroborative of the IPC facilitation hypothesis in the context of reasoning—
whereby cognitive sophistication putatively facilitates deference to political identity when 
individuals reason about information (e.g., Kahan, 2013)—is confounded by deference to prior 
beliefs. That is, our results highlight that cognitively sophisticated individuals may not, in fact, 
defer more to their political identities per se in these cases; but, rather, they defer more to their 
prior beliefs. The distinction is subtle—it appears we are merely trading one “bias” for 
another—but, theoretically speaking, it is crucial. It is crucial because models of identity-
protective cognition posit a particular theoretical mechanism; specifically, an identity-driven 
bias in reasoning, and not bias driven by the prior beliefs of the reasoner. To facilitate clear 
exposition of this implication of our results, in Figure 10 we reproduce the IPC model from 
Kahan (2016a) (with some additions, which are explained below), and map out precisely how 
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Table 11. Summary of Studies and Corresponding Results. 
Study 
Cognitive 





High CRTp = Greater deviation 
from Bayesian posterior beliefs 
conditional on political identity 
- 
Alternative 
High CRTp = Lesser deviation 






High CRTp = Greater deviation 
from Bayesian posterior beliefs 
conditional on political identity 
- 
Alternative 
High CRTp = Lesser deviation 




High CRTp = Evaluation of 
evidence more strongly 
conditional on political identity 
+/- 
Alternative (exploratory) 
High CRTp = Evaluation of 
evidence more strongly 




High CRTp = Evaluation of 
evidence more strongly 
conditional on political identity 
- 
Alternative 
High CRTp = Evaluation of 
evidence more strongly 




High CRTp = Evaluation of 
evidence more strongly 
conditional on political identity 
+/- 
Alternative 
High CRTp = Evaluation of 
evidence more strongly 




High CRTp = Evaluation of 
evidence more strongly 




High CRTp = Evaluation of 
evidence more strongly 
conditional on prior beliefs 
+ 
Note. The negative sign (-) indicates that the prediction was inconsistent with the data; the positive sign 
(+) indicates that the prediction was consistent with the data. Sign (+/-) indicates that the prediction 
was initially consistent with the data, but did not remain so after including the prior belief variables. * 
indicates that this particular result does not bear strongly on the IPC Facilitation Hypothesis (see Study 
5 discussion). CRTp = Cognitive Reflection Test performance. 
 
 





Figure 10. Model of (Political) Identity-Protective Reasoning. The model is adapted from 
Kahan (2016a, in which it is referred to as “Politically Motivated Reasoning”). The model 
shows how political identity, prior beliefs and cognitive sophistication theoretically relate to 
reasoning about the validity of new evidence. Solid orange edges denote direct effects; dotted 
blue edges denote the indirect effect of political identity; and dotted green edges denote the 
facilitating effect of cognitive sophistication. H1 represents the hypothesis that cognitive 
sophistication facilitates a direct effect of prior beliefs on reasoning; H2 represents the 
hypothesis that cognitive sophistication facilitates a direct effect of political identity on 
reasoning; and H3 represents the hypothesis that cognitive sophistication facilitates an 




As described in Kahan (2016a), the model depicted in Figure 10 shows how political identity 
and prior beliefs theoretically relate to reasoning about the validity of new evidence. In 
particular, that political identity exerts (i) a direct effect on such reasoning (solid orange edge 
from political identity → reasoning), and (ii) an indirect effect on such reasoning, via prior 
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beliefs (dotted blue edge from political identity → prior belief → reasoning). Our first addition 
to this model is a direct effect of prior beliefs on reasoning (solid orange edge from prior belief 
→ reasoning); implying that people’s prior beliefs can influence their reasoning independently 
of political identity. The inclusion of this effect is well supported by evidence suggesting that 
people’s prior beliefs affect their reasoning in distinctly non-political domains; for example, 
the numerous “belief bias” experiments discussed in the introduction (e.g., Evans et al., 1983; 
Klauer et al., 2000; Markovits & Nantel, 1989). For simplicity, we exclude the possibility that 
prior beliefs may also influence political identity—and, thus, reasoning indirectly35. Our 
second addition to the model is the putative facilitation effect of cognitive sophistication 
(dotted green edges from cognitive sophistication → …, labelled H1, H2, and H3). 
Accordingly, H1 represents the hypothesis that cognitive sophistication facilitates a direct 
effect of prior beliefs on reasoning; H2 represents the hypothesis that cognitive sophistication 
facilitates a direct effect of political identity on reasoning; and, finally, H3 represents the 
hypothesis that cognitive sophistication facilitates an indirect of political identity (via prior 
beliefs) on reasoning. As is clear, both H2 and H3 represent forms of the IPC facilitation 
hypothesis. 
 
The results from Studies 2 through 5 (concerning reasoning) are inconsistent with H2, for the 
reason that we observed no evidence that the interaction between CRT and political identity 
survived the modelling of the counterpart interaction between CRT and prior beliefs. In other 
words, there was no evidence that subjects who scored higher on the CRT conditioned more 
on their political identities per se—that is, independent of conditioning on their prior beliefs—
when evaluating new information. To put it yet another way: assuming there is a direct effect 
of political identity on reasoning—that is, independent of any effect of prior beliefs—we found 
no evidence that such an effect is facilitated by analytic thinking. This result cannot be 
explained by contesting the assumption of a direct effect of political identity (per se); since, in 
all the relevant studies, we observed evidence consistent with such a direct effect. Specifically, 
in all of the models where political identity and prior beliefs were entered simultaneously as 
predictors, the coefficient on the [treatment x political identity] term was statistically 
                                                 
35 While it is almost certainly the case that prior beliefs influence political identity to some extent, this 
directional effect would seem difficult to distinguish from the reverse directional relationship (i.e., political 
identity → prior beliefs). Furthermore, the model in Kahan (2016a) is silent regarding the influence of prior 
beliefs on political identity; thus, we ignore it here to focus solely on how our results relate to that model (but 
we note that future modelling work should recognize the distinction).  
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significant, large, and in the direction predicted by IPC (see Tables S6, S7 and S9 in the SM)36. 
This underscores our earlier point that our results do not challenge identity-protective cognition 
in general, but, rather, the notion that cognitive sophistication facilitates IPC. Given that 
influential studies bearing on the IPC facilitation hypothesis did not measure, model or 
otherwise account for prior beliefs (e.g., Kahan, 2013; Kahan et al., 2017), it is reasonable to 
conclude that there is currently no compelling evidence that cognitive sophistication facilitates 
a direct effect of political identity on reasoning about the validity of new information. 
 
This leaves H1 vs. H3, and the question of which is more consistent with our results. Recall 
that H3 assumes that political identity causes prior beliefs, which, in turn, influence reasoning 
(Kahan, 2016a). Thus, H3 implies that what looks like stronger conditioning on prior beliefs 
among high CRT scorers is, in fact, stronger conditioning on political identity. Or, put another 
way, analytic thinking facilitates the indirect effect of political identity → prior beliefs → 
reasoning. In contrast, H1 implies that stronger conditioning on prior beliefs among high CRT 
scorers is independent of political identity. Of course, it is reasonable to assume that the prior 
beliefs subjects “bring with them” into the experiment are to some extent dependent on their 
political identities; for example, because of partisan selective exposure to news media (Bolin 
& Hamilton, 2018; Rodriguez et al., 2017), or because people tend to learn from others who 
are politically like them (Kahan, 2015). Insofar as prior beliefs are not totally determined by 
political identity, however, it is clear that H1 and H3 are not mutually exclusive. Given this, 
the question is one of degree: that is, is there evidence—here or elsewhere—to suggest that H1 
can (to any extent) account for our results? We consider the following evidence in favor of H1: 
 
• In Studies 3, 4 and 5, the interaction between CRT and prior beliefs in predicting 
evidence evaluations remained of similar size (and statistically significant) after 
modelling the counterpart interaction between CRT and political identity. This provides 
some evidence that subjects who scored higher on the CRT conditioned on their prior 
beliefs independent of their political identity. However, due to imperfect measurement 
of the relevant constructs—and the associated type I error inflation that results (Westfall 
& Yarkoni, 2016)—this is weak evidence in favor of H1. 
                                                 
36 The same is true of the [treatment x prior beliefs] terms, consistent with a direct effect of both political 
identity and prior beliefs on reasoning about the validity of new information. 
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• In Study 5, as a function of study design, receiving information concordant with prior 
beliefs was only trivially correlated with receiving information concordant with 
candidate preference (a proxy for political identity). In other words, for approximately 
half of the subjects, if the information was concordant with their prior belief it was 
explicitly discordant with their candidate preference. If analytic thinking only facilitates 
an indirect effect of political identity (via prior beliefs), we ought to observe limited—
or no—conditioning on prior beliefs in this case; because prior beliefs and candidate 
preference are decoupled in the aggregate sample of the study. Despite this decoupling, 
we nevertheless observed evidence that subjects who scored higher on the CRT 
conditioned more strongly on their prior beliefs in evidence evaluation (e.g., see Figure 
8B). 
• Across studies, the interaction between CRT and prior beliefs in predicting reasoning 
about evidence appeared more robust than the corresponding interaction between CRT 
and political identity. From a purely pragmatic perspective, this suggests that increased 
“bias” among the cognitively sophisticated may be more reliably diagnosed by 
assuming (and measuring) deference to prior beliefs, rather than political identity. 
• Perhaps the strongest evidence in favor of H1 comes from recent studies conducted by 
Trippas and colleagues (2015, 2018). As described in the introduction, these authors 
investigated the association between cognitive ability, CRT scores and performance on 
belief bias tasks. They found that the reasoning performance of subjects with greater 
cognitive ability—as well as those scoring higher on the CRT—while better overall, 
appeared more influenced by whether the evidence was concordant (vs. discordant) 
with their prior beliefs. Since all the belief bias tasks were explicitly non-political, their 
results imply support for H1: that cognitively sophisticated individuals’ condition more 
strongly on their prior beliefs (per se) when reasoning. 
 
Despite these points, of course, we are unable to satisfactorily discriminate between the relative 
importance of H1 and H3—given the non-experimental nature of the relevant data37. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of our investigation, it is ill-advised to dismiss the possibility that 
                                                 
37 Some readers might wonder why we did not conduct mediation analysis. We did not conduct mediation 
analysis because (i) our data are cross-sectional, and (ii) we did not randomly assign political identity, prior 
beliefs or cognitive sophistication. The validity of the inferences that can be gleaned from mediation analysis is 
extremely limited in this case (Bullock et al., 2010; Stone-Romero & Rosopa, 2008). 
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evidence taken to corroborate H3—if not H2—is, in fact, amenable to explanation by H1 (e.g., 
Kahan, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, there is a related and more general issue highlighted by the above discussion; one 
that, for simplicity of exposition, we have thus far skirted over. That is, the type of experimental 
design often used to infer identity-protective cognition (Kahan, 2016a; for a meta-analysis see 
Ditto et al., 2018a) prohibits causal inferences about the effect of political identity—or, for that 
matter, prior beliefs or cognitive sophistication (see also Kim, 2018). This follows directly 
from the fact that the critical inferential test in the design is a treatment (evidence) by covariate 
(identity) interaction (Gerber & Green, 2012). As the current investigation has highlighted, this 
allows for the random assignment of evidence to not only alter the concordance of the evidence 
with subjects’ political identities—but, also, its concordance with their prior beliefs (and a 
range of correlates besides); an “empirical catch-22”, as noted by Ditto and colleagues (2018a, 
p. 14; see also Ditto et al., 2018b). To convincingly isolate a causal effect of political identity 
in this case, it would be necessary to randomly assign both political identity and evidence 
concordance38. It seems unlikely that such a design is feasible.  
 
Possible workarounds might include designs that equalize prior beliefs across subjects (for a 
review of such attempts in primarily apolitical domains, see Ditto, 2009), random assignment 
of political party cues, rather than political identity per se (e.g., Cohen, 2003), or random 
assignment of threat to (or affirmation of) political identity (e.g., Nyhan & Reifler, 2018). 
Unfortunately, the first workaround is extremely difficult in practice given that the relevant 
prior beliefs are likely to be numerous and embedded in a network of possibly interdependent 
beliefs (e.g., Brandt et al., 2018); all of which may be brought to bear on reasoning (Gershman, 
2018). Regarding the second case (party cues), as noted by Ditto and colleagues (2018b) it may 
be entirely reasonable for people to rely on whether their political party endorse (or oppose) 
the information at hand. In fact, such reliance may reflect the role of prior beliefs—for example, 
beliefs about the trustworthiness of one’s in-party elites—rather than ruling them out. The final 
case—threatening or affirming identity—strikes us as a promising design (in theory) to isolate 
causal effects of political identity on evidence evaluation. Though, in practice, recent attempts 
at this have met with mixed results (e.g., Nyhan & Reifler, 2018; but see Kim, 2018). Overall, 
                                                 
38 Such a design would still prohibit the inference that cognitive sophistication causally affects reasoning 
about the evidence conditional on political identity, because cognitive sophistication is also not randomly 
assigned (e.g., see Gerber & Green, 2012, pp. 301-303). 
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the above discussion highlights the fundamental difficulty in isolating a causal effect of 
political identity—or indeed prior beliefs or cognitive sophistication—on reasoning about 
evidence (see also Ditto, 2009). 
 
7.2. Implications for Convergence on True Beliefs in Politics 
 
In Studies 1 and 2, we found that subjects who scored higher on the CRT tended to update their 
beliefs more normatively; in particular, deviating less from the posterior beliefs of a Bayesian 
agent. In Studies 2-5, we did not assess subjects’ reasoning against a normative benchmark, 
but others have shown that deference to prior beliefs in evaluation of new evidence is consistent 
with Bayesian rationality (Koehler, 1993). Relatedly, it has been argued that such deference is 
rational and appropriate (Baron & Jost, 2018; Gerber & Green, 1999; Jern et al., 2014); in fact, 
that it is “essential for any organism to make sense of, and respond adaptively to, its 
environment” (Lord et al., 1979, p. 2107).  
 
However, whether reasoning or belief updating are consistent with Bayesian rationality does 
not (by itself) mean that individuals will converge in their beliefs, that their beliefs will be more 
accurate (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Jern et al., 2014; Kahan, 2016a) or that they will be 
less prone to undesirable double standards (Ditto et al., 2018b). On the one hand, the notion 
highlighted by our results—that cognitive sophistication may be deployed to assess new 
evidence in light of what the person currently believes to be true—strikes us as more optimistic 
than the alternative: That cognitive sophistication is deployed to disregard and resist identity-
threatening evidence. Yet, practically speaking, insufficient independence between prior 
beliefs and reasoning about new evidence may be similarly problematic if the goal is to achieve 
convergence on true beliefs in politics (Kahan, 2016a). For example, insufficient independence 
may increase belief polarization (Taber et al., 2009), prevent correction of false beliefs (Rabin 
& Schrag, 1999), and otherwise violate desirable standards of judgment; for example, in 
various legal, political or scientific contexts (Ditto et al., 2018b; Koehler, 1993).  
 
Ultimately, in a world where the precise reliability of evidence is often unknown and must be 
inferred, conditioning on prior beliefs when evaluating new evidence may be one of several 
imperfect strategies available to individuals: Recent simulations show that such a strategy can 
confer (limited) accuracy gains in belief formation given certain assumptions, but, also, that it 
may incur significant epistemic costs (Hahn et al., 2018). Regarding the current investigation, 
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whether and to what extent individuals who scored higher on the CRT deferred too much to 
their prior beliefs when evaluating new evidence—compromising the accuracy of their beliefs 
in the long run—is not straightforward to determine (e.g., see Hahn & Harris, 2014). Given 
this, we concur with Hahn and colleagues (2018) that it is of paramount importance to 
safeguard the integrity of the information environment to which individuals are exposed over 
the long-term. Insofar as this is achieved, deference to prior beliefs is less likely to compromise 
the accuracy of belief formation; since those prior beliefs are more likely to be based on 
accurate information in the first place.  
 
7.3. Strength & Limitations 
 
The primary strength of our investigation was our diverse approach. Specifically, we conducted 
five studies—comprising a range of designs, stimuli, analytic approaches, and dependent 
variables—that triangulated on a recurring empirical theme. While our approach was clearly 
not exhaustive, it is an improvement over investigations that rely on a single approach or 
experimental design to answer the research question (Munafò & Smith, 2018). 
 
That said, we limited our operationalization of cognitive “sophistication” to performance on 
the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT); a behavioral measure of reflective/analytic thinking 
(Frederick, 2005; Pennycook et al., 2016). This choice was guided primarily by past work that 
has investigated the relationship between identity-protective cognition and analytic thinking 
(Kahan, 2013). This previous work was central to the investigation we conducted here. 
Nevertheless, our reliance on this measure as an index of cognitive sophistication is a limitation 
of the current investigation insofar as the propensity to think analytically—and rational 
thinking more broadly—is distinct from general cognitive ability (Stanovich et al., 2016). 
Though CRT performance is reliably correlated with measures of the latter (Toplak et al., 
2011), whether our findings generalize to established measures of cognitive sophistication—
for example, a standardized IQ test—is clearly an important question to address. 
 
The two foremost experiments consistent with the idea that cognitive sophistication facilitates 
identity-protective belief formation are reported by Kahan (2013) and Kahan et al. (2017). 
While our findings suggest the former experimental result is confounded by prior beliefs, the 
latter experiment used a different measure of cognitive sophistication than the CRT—i.e., a 
numeracy test—and a different design. Specifically, in that experiment, subjects were tasked 
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with finding the correct answer to a covariance-detection problem. Across the relevant 
experimental treatments, the correct answer to the problem was manipulated to be concordant 
or discordant with subjects’ political identities. Importantly, as a function of the design of the 
experiment, the “heuristic” (most obvious) answer was always incorrect. When the heuristic 
answer was identity-concordant, subjects high in numeracy only did slightly better in 
identifying the correct answer than subjects low in numeracy. In contrast, when the heuristic 
answer was identity-discordant, subjects high in numeracy did much better in identifying the 
correct response than subjects low in numeracy.  
 
The key inference was that high numeracy subjects selectively engaged their superior numeracy 
to solve the problem: When the heuristic answer was concordant with political identity, there 
was less motivation to engage—whereas, when this answer was discordant with political 
identity, there was more motivation to engage (Kahan et al., 2017). Crucially, it was assumed 
that these subjects’ motivation to engage was to protect their political identities; consistent with 
the logic of the IPC facilitation hypothesis. 
 
However, this pattern of results bears close resemblance to that reported in the belief bias 
experiments of Trippas and colleagues (Trippas et al., 2015; Trippas et al., 2018). As described 
above, subjects higher in cognitive ability outperformed subjects lower in cognitive ability at 
discriminating whether a given conclusion logically followed from a set of premises. In 
particular, this superior discrimination among high ability subjects was greater when 
conclusions were discordant (vs. concordant) with prior beliefs. In other words, high ability 
subjects appeared to reason better in the face of evidence that was discordant (vs. concordant) 
with their prior beliefs39. This is qualitatively similar to the pattern observed by Kahan and 
colleagues (2017) in their experiment, but swapping out “political identity” for “prior beliefs”. 
Indeed, as already mentioned, there was no leverage of political identity in the experiment of 
Trippas and colleagues (2015), which exposed subjects to stimuli such as “some animals are 
cats” (p. 435). Considering this similarity between experimental results, the identity-selective, 
or “motivated” reasoning of high ability subjects reported by Kahan and colleagues (2017) is 
perhaps also confounded by an effect of prior beliefs. This is only conjecture, of course, but 
resonates with the results of the current investigation.  
                                                 
39 Perhaps because the mismatch induced cognitive conflict; the detection of which has been associated with 
individual differences in analytic thinking (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015b). 






In this paper, we investigated the hypothesis that cognitive sophistication facilitates identity-
protective processing in political belief formation. Our findings suggested that cognitively 
sophisticated individuals deferred more to their prior beliefs—rather than to their political 
identities per se—when reasoning about information in the political domain. Furthermore, 
benchmarked against a Bayesian agent, we found evidence that these individuals were overall 
less—not more—biased in their belief updating after receipt of such information. These results 
highlight a somewhat more optimistic perspective on the role of cognitive sophistication in 
political belief formation than prior work: That cognitive sophistication may be deployed to 
assess and integrate new evidence in light of what the person currently believes to be true, 
rather than to disregard and resist identity-threatening evidence per se. From a practical 
perspective, however, deference to prior beliefs may be similarly problematic for the prospect 
of achieving convergence on true beliefs in politics. One factor determining this assessment is 
the quality of the information environment (e.g., on social media, claims made by politicians). 
Where prior beliefs about political issues are constructed on the basis of misinformation and 
bad evidence, deference to prior beliefs will cement false beliefs. The upshot highlights the 
paramount importance of safeguarding the integrity of the information environment to which 



















Political Statement Stimuli Selection (Studies 1 and 2) 
 
As described in the main text, we selected political statement stimuli via a three-step pre-testing 
procedure. These stimuli were used in Study 1 and Study 2. 
 
In step 1, we identified 53 political statements from fact-checking websites politifact.com and 
factcheck.org. We focused on two selection criteria in step 1: (i) statements had to be classified 
as unambiguously true or false by the fact-checking websites, and (ii) the pool of statements 
had to be distributed such that we had an approximately equal number that were true and false, 
and pro-Democratic and pro-Republican. 
 
In step 2, we pre-tested the 53 political statements to obtain ratings over four features of each 
statement:  
 
1. The likelihood that the statement was true (from 0-100 in whole integers, anchored 
from “certainly false” to “certainly true”) 
2. Assuming the statement was true, how favorable it would be for Democrats vs. 
Republicans (measured on a 1-5 scale, anchored “More favorable for Democrats”, 
“Somewhat more favorable for Democrats”, “Equally favorable for Democrats and 
Republicans”, “Somewhat more favorable for Republicans”, “More favorable for 
Republicans”) 
3. Assuming the statement was true, how favorable it would be for President Donald 
Trump (measured on a 1-5 scale, anchored “Very unfavorable”, “Somewhat 
unfavorable”, “Neither favorable nor unfavorable”, “Somewhat favorable”, “Very 
favorable”) 
4. Whether the statement was familiar; had participants seen or heard it before (“Yes”, 
“Unsure”, “No”) 
 
For the stimuli pre-test, we recruited N = 201 subjects from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to rate 
each statement according to the above features. In step 3, we selected a subset of 16 statements 
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from the pre-tested set of 53 statements. Our aims were threefold in this step of statement 
selection.  
 
First, we aimed to select 8 true statements, and 8 false statements; half of which were pro-
Democratic and half of which were pro-Republican (giving 4 categories of statement overall: 
False + pro-Republican; False + pro-Democratic; True + Republican; True + Democratic). 
Second, we aimed to select statements whose likelihood values were close to the midpoint of 
50 (i.e., not obviously true or false), and whose partisanship values were close to the extremes 
of 1 or 5 (i.e., unambiguously partisan). Thirdly, we aimed to select statements such that 
subjects who identified with either the Democratic Party or Republican Party rated those 
statements that were politically favorable approximately similar to their political opponents on 
likelihood and extremity of partisanship. In other words, we aimed to ensure that supporters of 
one party did not receive politically favorable statements that were clearly more likely to be 
true or more likely to be false, or that were clearly more partisan, than supporters of the other 
party. 
 
To select the 16 statements according to the aims above, subjects were first categorized as 
either Democrat-leaning or Republican-leaning based on a forced choice between the two 
parties (Democratic and Republican). Mean likelihood and partisanship scores were computed 
separately for subjects identifying as Democrat and Republican. Based on these scores, we then 
selected 16 statements bearing in mind our aims above. In Table S1, we display the mean score 
for each category (i.e., False + pro-Republican; False + pro-Democratic; True + Republican; 
True + Democratic) over the 16 statements on the key pre-test variables. The 16 statements 
themselves (subset by category) are listed below. After each statement listed below, we provide 
the link to the fact-checking webpage from which the statement was obtained. 
 
False + Pro-Republican 
 
1. CNN’s ratings have decreased due to their poor coverage of President Donald Trump. 
https://www.factcheck.org/wp-content/cache/wp-
rocket/www.factcheck.org/2017/08/trumps-phoenix-fiction//index.html_gzip  
2. Expansion of Medicaid through "Obamacare" in Ohio left nearly 60,000 disabled 
citizens stuck on waiting lists for months. https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-





3. Only 10 cents on every dollar from the Clinton Foundation goes to charitable causes. 
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/oct/04/mike-pence/pence-
repeats-false-claim-clinton-foundations-limi/  
4. President Donald Trump signed more bills through the legislature in his first 178 days 




False + Pro-Democratic 
 
1. During a 2017 summer event highlighting problems with “Obamacare”, President 
Donald Trump ignored a disabled child who tried to shake his hand. 
https://www.factcheck.org/2017/08/trump-didnt-ignore-disabled-child/  
2. By 2011, former President Barack Obama had only increased US debt by 16%, 
compared to his Republican predecessor George W. Bush who increased US debt by 
115%. https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/may/19/nancy-
pelosi/nancy-pelosi-posts-questionable-chart-debt-accumul/  
3. Democrat Nancy Pelosi was right when she claimed in 2012 that under “Obamacare” 
everybody in the US will have lower rates, better quality, and better access to health 
care. https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2012/jul/06/nancy-
pelosi/nancy-pelosi-says-everybody-will-get-more-and-pay-/  
4. More jobs were created in the private sector during the first year of the Obama 
administration than during the previous eight years of his Republican predecessor 




True + Pro-Republican 
 
1. During the first six months of President Donald Trump's administration, average 
weekly earnings for all private sector workers went up. 





2. Under President Donald Trump’s administration, unemployment has fallen to a 17-
year low. https://www.factcheck.org/wp-content/cache/wp-
rocket/www.factcheck.org/2017/08/trumps-phoenix-fiction//index.html_gzip  
3. Under the Trump administration’s first six months in charge, over 1 million jobs were 
added to the economy. https://www.factcheck.org/wp-content/cache/wp-
rocket/www.factcheck.org/2017/08/trumps-phoenix-fiction//index.html_gzip  
4. During President Donald Trump’s first quarter in office, American exports of coal 
were up by almost 60% on the previous year. 
https://www.factcheck.org/2017/08/factchecking-trumps-west-virginia-rally/  
 
True + Pro-Democratic 
 
1. During former President Barack Obama’s final 4 years in office, wages of the average 
American worker went up. https://www.factcheck.org/wp-content/cache/wp-
rocket/www.factcheck.org/2017/08/trumps-phoenix-fiction//index.html_gzip  
2. For approximately six years following the signing of “Obamacare” into law, 
American businesses created new jobs every single month - a new record at the time. 
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jan/12/barack-
obama/business-has-created-jobs-every-month-obamacare-be/  
3. After six years of the Obama administration, US job growth was at its fastest pace 
since before the millennium. https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2015/jan/21/barack-obama/barack-obama-says-us-economy-
creating-jobs-fastest/  
4. House speaker Republican Paul Ryan was wrong when he claimed in 2016 that 
Medicare is going broke because of “Obamacare.” Medicare was in better shape 
because of Obamacare. 
https://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2016/dec/23/paul-ryan/repeal-and-
replace-works-paul-ryan-says-obamacare-/ 
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Table S1. Mean Likelihood, Partisanship, Trump favourability, and Familiarity Scores for the Four Categories of Political Statements Used in 
Studies 1 and 2 (16 Statements Total). 
  Likelihood Partisanship Trump favourability Familiarity 
  Mean Diff. from midpoint Mean Diff. from midpoint Mean Diff. from midpoint Mean 
Pro-Democratic True 39.15 10.85 2.04 0.96 2.40 0.60 2.51 
 False 59.57 9.57 1.95 1.05 2.13 0.87 2.41 
Pro-Republican True 40.68 9.32 4.02 1.02 4.05 1.05 2.53 
 False 59.89 9.89 4.00 1.00 4.03 1.03 2.31 
Note. Likelihood judgments were provided on a scale from 0-100; Partisanship was provided on a scale from 1-5 (1=more favorable for Democrats, 5=more 
favorable for Republicans); Trump favourability was provided on a scale from 1-5 (1=very unfavorable for Trump, 5=very favorable for Trump); Familiarity 
was provided on a scale 1-3 (1=Yes, 2=Unsure, 3=No). 
 









Subjects were paid $2 for taking part in Study 1. Subjects who completed the political statement 
pre-test were prevented from taking part in Study 1. 
 
Belief Update Task 
 
Subjects read instructions detailing the task, and were then asked two comprehension questions 
to ensure they understood that signals were accurate, on average, two out of three times. 
Subjects could not begin the task without correctly answering the two comprehension 
questions. During the task instructions, it was emphasized we were interested only in the 
personal opinion of subjects, and thus they were asked not to look up the truth or falsity of the 
statements online. The verbatim task instructions and comprehension questions are available 
on the OSF: https://osf.io/yt3kd/. On P1 and P2 trials, subjects had unlimited time to provide 
their likelihood judgments. Signals were presented for an enforced minimum of 5 seconds, at 
which point subjects were free to continue onto the next trial. 
 
Comparison with Bayesian Agent 
 
Before computing Bayesian posterior beliefs—as detailed in the main text—we recoded all 
prior beliefs (provided by subjects in P1) of 0 and 100 to 0.5 and 99.5, respectively. This is 
because probabilities of 0 and 1 prevent computation of Bayesian posterior beliefs. We did the 
same recoding for subjects’ posterior beliefs (provided in P2). This recoding plan was 
preregistered prior to data collection. To illustrate the maximum raw magnitude of update we 
can expect from a Bayesian agent, assume a subject is totally uncertain whether a particular 
statement is true; that is, their prior belief is P = .5 (50%). They receive a signal that states that 
particular statement is TRUE. The Bayesian posterior belief that this statement is true ≈ .67 
(67%). 
 





The 7 items of the combined CRT administered in Study 1-4 are reported below. The 
distribution of CRT sum scores (summed for each subject) in Study 1-5 are displayed in Figure 
S1. CRT items were presented one per page, and responses provided in open-ended format: 
 
From Shenhav et al. (2012) 
 
1. The ages of Mark and Adam add up to 28 years’ total. Mark is 20 years older than 
Adam. How many years old is Adam?  
2. If it takes 10 seconds for 10 printers to print out 10 pages of paper, how many seconds 
will it take for 50 printers to print out 50 pages of paper? 
3. On a loaf of bread, there is a patch of mold. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 40 days for the patch to cover the entire loaf of bread, how many days would it 
take for the patch to cover half of the loaf of bread? 
 
From Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) 
 
4. If you’re running a race and you pass the person in second place, what place are you 
in? 
5. A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are left? 
6. Emily’s father has three daughters. The first two are named April and May. What is the 
third daughter’s name? 









Figure S1. Distribution of CRT Sum Scores in Studies 1-5. The dashed red line indicates the 
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As described in the main text, we conducted a range of exploratory analyses as a check on the 
robustness of the preregistered test of H1.  
 
Memory errors. Subjects completed a memory test immediately after the belief update task, 
where they were presented with each political statement again and were asked to respond 
whether they saw a TRUE or FALSE signal for that statement. We computed the proportion of 
memory errors for each subject by taking the mean of their incorrect responses over trials 
[correct = 0, incorrect = 1]. Subjects’ proportion of memory errors were correlated with their 
CRT scores (analysis conducted at the level of subjects), τ = -.18, Z = -5.46, p <.001; 
individuals who scored higher on the CRT tended to make fewer memory errors. It is possible 
this difference—rather than differences in updating behavior per se—accounts for the 
relationship between CRT performance and absolute deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs. 
 
We thus conducted nonparametric partial correlations between (i) CRT scores and (ii) mean 
absolute deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs, adjusting for (iii) proportion memory errors 
(using the ppcor package in R, Kim, 2015). The results of this analysis are reported in the main 
text. 
 
Prior beliefs and regression to the mean. Regression to the mean (RTM) describes the 
phenomenon whereby more extreme measurements at Time 1 tend to approach the mean when 
measured again at Time 2. Translated here, more extreme prior beliefs (i.e., closer to the 
likelihood scale ends of 0% and 100%) may be associated with greater RTM measured in the 
posterior beliefs (Yu & Chen, 2015). If the extremity of prior beliefs differs systematically over 
CRT performance, differences in RTM—rather than differences in updating behavior per se—
could account for the association between CRT performance and deviation from Bayesian 
posterior beliefs. We thus computed a variable indexing the extremity of prior beliefs, by 
calculating the distance between the prior belief and the likelihood scale midpoint (50%) on 
each trial. Prior belief extremity could thus range from 0 to 50, where 0 = the least extreme 
prior (i.e., 50% on the likelihood scale) and 50 = the most extreme prior (i.e., 0% or 100% on 
likelihood scale). We computed the mean extremity value for each subject over their 16 trials.  
 
The correlation between mean extremity and CRT performance was small and missed the 
significance threshold, τ = -.02, Z = 0.63, p =.530, suggesting a trivial difference in prior belief 
extremity between subjects who scored higher vs. lower on the CRT. Indeed, conducting 
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nonparametric partial correlations between (i) CRT scores and (ii) mean absolute deviation 
from Bayesian posterior beliefs, adjusting for (iii) the extremity of prior beliefs, closely 
reproduced the results reported in the main text: τ = -.21, Z = -6.80, p <.001 (difference index), 
and τ = -.07, Z = -2.18, p =.029 (ratio index). These analyses were conducted using the ppcor 
package in R (Kim, 2015). Though this suggests that RTM is not responsible for the difference 
in updating between high and low CRT scoring subjects, we note that our design did not include 
a control group (the design gold standard for ensuring RTM does not confound repeated 
measurements). 
 
Median absolute deviation. Computing a mean value for the absolute deviation from Bayesian 
posterior beliefs for each subject is arguably inappropriate. Specifically, because many subjects 
had non-normally distributed absolute deviation scores over their 16 trials. We thus repeated 
the preregistered nonparametric correlations at the level of subjects, but using the median 
absolute deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs for each subject, rather than the mean. The 
results reproduced those of the preregistered test of H1: τ = -.16, Z = -4.94, p <.001 (difference 
index), τ = -.08, Z = -2.55, p =.011 (ratio index). 
 
Linear mixed effects modeling. We anticipated large positive skew in the scores indexing 
subjects’ absolute deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs, and, thus, preregistered 
nonparametric tests as our primary tests of H1. As a further robustness check, however, we 
also fitted two exploratory linear mixed effects models to the data—one for each DV—at the 
trial-level. Fitting a maximal model on the difference index showed that CRT scores—
converted to z-scores for fitting—were negatively associated with absolute deviation from 
Bayesian posterior beliefs, b = -2.93 (SE = 0.54), t211.57 = -5.47, p <.001. Mirroring the pattern 
of results reported in the main text, this association was smaller on the ratio index, b = -0.04 
(SE = 0.03), t277.22 = -1.31, p =.192. Degrees of freedom and p-values were estimated using the 
Satterthwaite approximation via the lmerTest package in R (Kuznetsova et al., 2017).  
 
Political concordance of evidence. A further question of interest is whether the negative 
correlation between CRT performance and absolute deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs 
holds across the political concordance of the signals (evidence) subjects received. To explore 
this question, we computed two absolute deviation scores per subject; one mean computed over 
trials where the signals they received were politically concordant, and the other mean over 
trials where the signals were politically discordant. This variable was computed as a function 
THE INTERSECTION OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & BELIEF FORMATION 
 
247 
of the subject’s political party preference (Democrats, Republicans), the partisanship of the 
statement (Democrat-favor, Republican-favor), and the evidence (signal) they received on that 
trial (see Table 2 in the main text). Two subjects did not report their political party preference, 
so these analyses are based on N = 490. The results of this analysis are reported in the main 
text alongside the preregistered test of H1. 
 





For both DVs, model fitting proceeded in the following steps: 
 
1. We fitted random intercepts on participants and political statement stimuli. 
2. We added separate fixed effects denoting CRT z-scores (zCRT) and political 
concordance of the evidence (i.e., the main effects). 
3. We then added the key interaction term: zCRT x political concordance. 
4. We statistically evaluated – by Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) – the reduction in model 
deviance (i.e., improvement in model fit) between steps 2 and 3. 
5. We then fitted correlated random slopes – a maximal model (Barr et al., 2013) – to the 
step 3 model. 
6. Finally, we dropped the key fixed-effect interaction term from the step 5 model, and 
conducted an LRT comparison between this model and the step 5 model. This test 
evaluated reduction in model deviance contributed by the key fixed-effect interaction 
term in the presence of a maximal random effects structure, and, thus, constitutes the 
critical inferential LRT bearing on H2 (reported in the main text). 
 
As reported in the main text, the random effects structure for both DV maximal models was 
slightly mis-specified in the preregistered protocol for the test of H2. In particular, we specified 
the [zCRT x political concordance] interaction as a random slope on subjects in the maximal 
model, but this is incorrect; only the within-subjects main effect—political concordance—
should be specified as a random slope on subjects (Brauer & Curtin, 2017). However, for full 
transparency, we also fitted these incorrect models and reported the relevant results in the main 
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text. Parameter estimates and model fit indices from the correctly-specified models are reported 




Table S2. Linear Mixed Effects Model Output in Study 1. 
    Difference index   Ratio index 
    B std. Error p   B std. Error p 
Fixed Effects 
(Intercept)   2.29 1.34 .087   0.14 0.05 .009 
CRT   -0.76 0.89 .391   -0.05 0.04 .234 
Political concordance   -3.51 0.93 <.001   -0.06 0.05 .202 
CRT x Political concordance   1.74 0.88 .047   0.10 0.04 .011 
Random Effects 
σ2   782.953   1.366 
τ00, Subject   271.741   0.485 
τ00, Stimuli   16.462   0.025 
ρ01   -0.755   -0.631 
NSubject   490   490 
NStimuli   16   16 
ICCSubject   0.254   0.258 
ICCStimuli   0.015   0.013 
Observations   7586   7586 
R2 / Ω02   .004 / .217   .002 / .239 
Deviance   73038.555   24978.641 
Note. The ratio index model is estimated via ML because REML did not converge (the difference index 
model is estimated via REML). P-values in the table are estimated via Wald test. CRT = Cognitive 
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As reported in the main text, to increase the sensitivity of the H2 test we also fitted models 
where political identity was represented continuously (i.e., not dichotomized into a preference 
for Democratic or Republican Party). To define political identity as a continuous variable, we 
referred to subjects’ social and economic political views (each provided on scales from 1 = 
strongly liberal to 5 = strongly conservative) and political party affiliation (provided on a scale 
from 1 = strong Democrat to 7 = strong Republican). Social and economic views were 
combined by computing the mean across the two responses; we then standardized this 
combined variable and centered it at the scale midpoint (new variable: conserv_ideology_z). 
We also standardized and midpoint-centered the party affiliation variable (new variable: 
party_z). Finally, these two new variables were summed; creating a variable (conserv_rep) 
ranging from -3.48 to +3.48 where values greater than zero denote more 
conservative/Republican identity, and values less than zero denote more liberal/Democrat 
identity (M = -0.76, SD = 1.90). 
 
We fitted two exploratory linear mixed effects models at the trial-level – one for each DV 
(difference index, ratio index) – with three IVs. The first IV was CRT performance (z-score). 
The second IV was evidence type i.e., whether the signal favored Democrats or Republicans, 
and was computed via combination of signal received (TRUE, FALSE) and the partisanship of 
the statement (Democrat-favor, Republican-favor) (see Table 2 in the main text). The third IV 
was the (continuous) political identity of subjects i.e., the new variable, conserv_rep. The focal 
exploratory test bearing on H2 is a three-way interaction between these variables.  
 
We attempted to fit maximal models for both DVs, but these would not converge; the models 
were too complex for the data, given the extra variable. Thus, both models were estimated with 
random intercepts, as well as the random slope of evidence type on subjects and stimuli, and 
the random slope of CRT x evidence type x political identity—the critical three-way 
interaction—on stimuli. The models were fitted with restricted maximal likelihood, and 
degrees of freedom and p-values for the three-way interaction are estimated using the lmerTest 
package (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). 
 
In the difference index model, the three-way interaction missed the significance threshold, 
t108.30 = 1.51, p =.134, b = 0.70 (SE = 0.46). In the ratio index model, the three-way interaction 
was statistically significant, t114.70 = 2.10, p =.038, b = 0.04 (SE = 0.02). The predicted values 
from these models are displayed in Figure S2. The predicted values are estimated with the 
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political identity variable set at -3 (i.e., strong liberal/Democrat) and +3 (strong 
conservative/Republican), respectively. Visual inspection of the values shows a pattern largely 
consistent with that produced by the models which treated political identity as a dichotomous 
variable (i.e., as a preference for Democrats or Republicans). Thus, we conclude that the 
preregistered use of a binary political identity variable (for the test of H2 reported in the main 
text) is not obscuring identity-protective deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs among those 











Figure S2. Predicted magnitude and direction deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs as 
a function of CRT performance, evidence type, and political identity (Study 1). Predicted 
values are estimated from the two models (one per DV) with political identity as a continuous 
variable, fitted as an exploratory test of H2 (Study 1). Political identity is set at -3 (strong 
liberal/Democrat) and 3 (strong conservative/Republican). The dashed line at y = 0 indicates 
Bayesian posterior beliefs: Relative to Bayesian, y-axis values greater than zero imply over-
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Distributions of Posterior Beliefs 
 
In figure S3, we plot the distributions of posterior beliefs as a function of the political statement 
stimuli (panels 1-16) and signal received (TRUE or FALSE, denoted by colour). As the figure 
shows, there is little evidence that the posterior beliefs are stacking on 33% or 67% following 




Figure S3. Distributions of posterior beliefs as a function of political statement stimuli 
(panels 1-16) and signal received (colour) in Study 1. The dashed black lines intersect the x-














Subjects received $1.50 for taking part in Study 2. The discrepancy in fees between Study 1 
and 2 is because Study 2 was shorter. Subjects who completed the political statement pre-test 
or Study 1 were prevented from taking part in Study 2. 
 
Belief Update Task 
 
The task was identical to Study 1, except for the key adjustments outlined in the main text. 
There were several other minor differences. Specifically, signals were described as “clues” 
(rather than “signals”) and, upon receipt of each signal, subjects were free to continue onto the 
next trial as soon as they had provided their signal accuracy rating (from 1 to 5) on that 
particular signal (i.e., they were not required to wait for 5 seconds). The verbatim task 








As described in the main text, we repeated the exploratory analyses conducted in Study 1 (H1) 
as a check on the robustness of the preregistered test of H1 (Study 2); except for memory errors, 
since those data were not collected in Study 2. 
 
Prior beliefs and regression to the mean. The correlation between mean prior belief extremity 
and CRT performance was small but below the significance threshold, τ = -.05, Z = -2.31, p 
=.021, suggesting that subjects who scored higher on the CRT had slightly less extreme prior 
beliefs on average. As in Study 1 (H1), however, nonparametric partial correlations between 
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CRT performance and absolute deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs—adjusting for prior 
belief extremity—closely reproduced the preregistered results: τ = -.19, Z = -8.77, p <.001 
(difference index), and τ = -.06, Z = -2.77, p =.006 (ratio index).  
 
Median absolute deviation. Taking the median—rather than the mean—absolute deviation 
from Bayesian posterior beliefs over subjects’ 16 trials reproduced the preregistered results: τ 
= -.14, Z = -6.23, p <.001 (difference index), τ = -.07, Z = -3.08, p =.002 (ratio index). 
 
Linear mixed effects modelling. Fitting a maximal model on the trial-level data showed that 
CRT z-scores were negatively associated with absolute deviation from Bayesian posterior 
beliefs, b = -1.91 (SE = 0.25), t75.55 = -7.71, p <.001 (difference index), b = -0.03 (SE = 0.01), 
t57.27 = -2.79, p =.007 (ratio index); reproducing the preregistered results. 
 
Political concordance of evidence. Nonparametric correlations showed that the negative 
correlation between CRT performance and absolute deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs 
is present across both evidence types; these results are reported in the main text. Two subjects 
did not receive any signals that could be classified as politically concordant; thus, the politically 
concordant analyses are based on N = 990 (not N = 992). 
 
H2: High CRT Scorers Deviate from Bayesian Updating Conditional on their Political 
Identities 
 
Preregistered Tests  
 
For both DVs, model fitting proceeded in the same steps as in Study 1 (unlike in Study 1, 
however, in Study 2 the maximal random effects structure was specified correctly in the 
preregistered analysis plan).  
 
As stated in the main text, the maximal model fitted on the ratio index DV failed to converge. 
In line with the preregistered analysis plan, we thus iteratively modified the random effects 
structure to attain convergence while keeping the model as maximal as possible. After 
achieving convergence, we attempted model comparison by dropping the key fixed-effect 
interaction term and performing a LRT. However, dropping this term caused the model to fail 
convergence. In line with our preregistered analysis contingencies, we thus estimated the df 
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and p-value on the key fixed-effect interaction term using the lmerTest package in R 
(Kuznetsova et al., 2017). The final models (with parameter estimates and model fit indices) 
are presented in Table S4. 
 
Exploratory Tests  
 
As reported in the main text, to increase the sensitivity of the Study 2 H2 test we fitted models 
where political identity was instead represented continuously (i.e., not dichotomized into a 
preference for Democratic or Republican Party). In contrast to Study 1, in Study 2 we did not 
collect social or economic political views from participants; only their political party affiliation 
(provided on a scale from 1 = strong Democrat to 7 = strong Republican). As in Study 1, we 
standardized and midpoint-centered this variable (new variable: party_z, M = -0.20, SD = 1). 
 
We fitted two exploratory linear mixed effects models at the trial-level – one for each DV 
(difference index, ratio index) – with three IVs. The first IV was CRT performance (z-score). 
The second IV was evidence type i.e., whether the signal favored Democrats or Republicans, 
and was computed via combination of signal received (TRUE, FALSE) and the partisanship of 
the statement (Democrat-favor, Republican-favor) (see Table 2 in the main text). The third IV 
was party_z. The focal exploratory test bearing on H2 is a three-way interaction between these 
variables.  
 
Both models were estimated with random intercepts, as well as random slope of [evidence 
type] on subjects and stimuli, and the random slope of [CRT x evidence type x political 
identity]—the critical three-way interaction—on stimuli. The models were fitted with restricted 
maximal likelihood, and degrees of freedom and p-values for the three-way interaction are 
estimated via the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). 
 
In the difference index model, the three-way interaction missed the significance threshold of p 
<.05, t60.10 = 1.85, p =.069, b = 0.84 (SE = 0.46). Similarly, in the ratio index model, the three-
way interaction missed this significance threshold, t251.80 = 1.70, p =.091, b = 0.03 (SE = 0.02). 
Thus, as in Study 1, we conclude that the preregistered test of H2 is not obscuring identity-
protective deviation from Bayesian posterior beliefs by treating political identity 
dichotomously. 
 






Table S4. Linear Mixed Effects Model Output in Study 2 (Hypothesis 2). 
    Difference index   Ratio index 
    B std. Error p   B std. Error p 
Fixed Effects 
(Intercept)   -11.99 0.83 <.001   -0.33 0.03 <.001 
CRT   0.47 0.44 .291   -0.01 0.01 .498 
Political concordance   0.04 0.52 .939   -0.04 0.02 .030 
CRT x Political concordance   1.02 0.52 .048   0.03 0.02 .053 
Random Effects 
σ2   457.424   0.882 
τ00, Subject   99.647   0.084 
τ00, Stimuli   8.486   0.008 
ρ01   -0.554   -0.403 
NSubject   992   992 
NStimuli   16   16 
ICCSubject   0.176   0.086 
ICCStimuli   0.015   0.008 
Observations   15526   15526 
R2 / Ω0
2   .002 / .170   .001 / .099 
Deviance   140739.370   43212.822 
Note. The ratio index model is estimated via ML because REML did not converge (the difference index 
model is estimated via REML). P-values in the table are estimated via Wald test (note that the Wald 
test p-value for the interaction in the difference index model is .048, but the preregistered LRT p-value—




H3: High CRT Scorers Evaluate Evidence Conditional on their Political Identities 
 
Preregistered Tests  
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The model fitting procedure was the same as in the test of H2 (except that, in H3, the DV was 
signal accuracy ratings). The maximal model parameter estimates and fit indices are presented 




Table S5. Linear Mixed Effects Model Output in Study 2 (Hypothesis 3). 
    Signal accuracy ratings 
    B std. Error p 
Fixed Effects 
(Intercept)   3.08 0.03 <.001 
CRT   -0.03 0.02 .134 
Political concordance   0.61 0.05 <.001 
CRT x Political concordance   0.06 0.03 .054 
Random Effects 
σ2   1.089 
τ00, Subject   0.251 
τ00, Stimuli   0.011 
ρ01   -0.749 
NSubject   992 
NStimuli   16 
ICCSubject   0.186 
ICCStimuli   0.008 
Observations   15872 
R2 / Ω02   .067 / .227 
Deviance   48296.821 
Note. The model is estimated via ML because REML did not converge. P-values in the table are 









Sensitivity analysis. As described in the main text, we fitted a linear mixed effects model where 
political identity was represented continuously rather than dichotomously (as in the 
preregistered test of H3). For this analysis, we midpoint-centered and standardized the 1-7 
political party affiliation variable (new variable: party_z) (original scoring: 1=strong 
Democrat, 2=Democrat, 3=lean Democrat, 4=Independent, 5=lean Republican, 6=Republican, 
7=strong Republican).  
 
The model was estimated with three IVs: CRT z-score, party_z, and whether the signals 
favored Democrats or Republicans (signal type) (see Table 2 in the main text). The DV was 
signal accuracy ratings. The test of interest is on the three-way interaction between the IVs. 
The maximal model did not converge, and so the model was fitted with random intercepts on 
both subjects and stimuli, random slope of [signal type] on subjects, and random slope of [CRT 
x party_z x signal type] on stimuli. A Likelihood Ratio Test showed that, unlike in the 
preregistered test of H3, in this model the fixed-effect interaction improved model fit at p <.05, 
2 (1) = 4.76, p =.029, b = 0.07 (SE = 0.03). These results are reported in the main text. 
 
Prior beliefs analysis. For this analysis, we first determined whether signals were concordant 
or discordant with subjects’ prior beliefs by the following method (recall that prior beliefs were 
provided on a 0-100 scale):  
 
Signal concordant with prior belief 
Prior belief < 50 & signal = FALSE; OR prior belief > 50 & signal = TRUE 
 
Signal discordant with prior belief 
Prior belief < 50 & signal = TRUE; OR prior belief > 50 & signal = FALSE 
 
This provided a dichotomous variable [0=discordant, 1=concordant]. Trials on which the prior 
belief was exactly 50 were excluded from this analysis (N trials = 1024, 6.45%). To represent 
how extreme (strong) subjects’ prior beliefs were, we used the prior belief extremity variable 
previously computed in Study 1. Recall that this variable was computed by taking the absolute 
distance of subjects’ prior beliefs on each trial from the scale midpoint. Thus, values ranged 
from 1 to 50, where 1=minimum prior belief extremity (i.e., 49 or 51 on the likelihood scale: 
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min. strength prior) and 50=maximum prior belief extremity (i.e., 0 or 100 on the likelihood 
scale: max. strength prior).  
 
We then proceeded to jointly model the three-way interaction between (i) CRT scores and these 
two new prior belief variables, and (ii) CRT scores, political party affiliation [party_z], and 
whether the signals favored Democrats or Republicans [signal type]. Given the complexity of 
this joint model, we fitted only random intercepts on subjects and stimuli (i.e., no random 
slopes).  
 
Prior to fitting the joint model, we checked that the three-way interaction between CRT scores, 
political party affiliation [party_z], and signal type significantly improved fit in this new joint 
model. This was necessary because, in the new joint model, we had to exclude trials on which 
prior beliefs were equal to 50 (see preceding paragraph) and, in addition, the random effects 
structure was very different than in the sensitivity analysis reported above (i.e., we no longer 
modelled random slopes). It was thus necessary to rule out that these model changes were not 
responsible for the elimination of the [CRT x party_z x signal type] interaction reported in the 
main text (rather than the modelling of prior beliefs per se). The results suggested they were 
not. In the new joint model—before modelling prior beliefs—consistent with the sensitivity 
analysis reported above, the three-way interaction [CRT x party_z x signal type] was 
statistically significant and positive, t14417 = 3.42, p <. 001, b = 0.06 (SE = 0.02). Thus, we 
proceeded with fitting the joint model that also included prior beliefs. The relevant results of 
this model are reported in the main text. 
 
Distributions of Posterior Beliefs 
 
In figure S4, we plot the distributions of posterior beliefs as a function of the political statement 
stimuli (panels 1-16) and signal received (TRUE or FALSE, denoted by colour). As in Study 
1, the figure shows there is little evidence that the posterior beliefs are stacking on 33% or 67% 










Figure S4. Distributions of posterior beliefs as a function of political statement stimuli 
(panels 1-16) and signal received (colour) in Study 2. The dashed black lines intersect the x-










Subjects received $0.60 for completing the study. Given that Study 3 comprised a different 
design, stimuli, and variables than Study 1 and 2, we did not prevent subjects who took part in 
those studies taking part in Study 3. 










Table S6. Linear Regression Model Output in Study 3 (Hypothesis 3). 
    (1) 
    B std. Error p 
(Intercept)   4.25 0.07 <.001 
Treatment   -0.10 0.10 .300 
Political identity   -0.08 0.04 .024 
CRT   -0.27 0.07 <.001 
Prior belief   -0.53 0.07 <.001 
Treatment x Pol ID   0.17 0.05 <.001 
Treatment x CRT   0.13 0.10 .179 
Pol ID x CRT   0.01 0.04 .732 
Treatment x Prior   0.92 0.10 <.001 
CRT x Prior   -0.17 0.07 .014 
Treatment x Pol ID x CRT   -0.03 0.05 .621 
Treatment x CRT x Prior   0.20 0.09 .035 
Observations   1200 
R2 / adj. R2   .175 / .167 
Deviance   2648.314 
Note. The DV is agreement that the test supplies good evidence of how open-minded someone is (higher 














Subjects received $1 for completing the study. The distributions of the political party 




Parameter estimates from the preregistered model in H3 are reported in Table S7. 
 
 






Figure S5. Histogram of political party identification and political ideology variables in the 
Study 4 sample. N = 2052 for political party identification; N = 2053 for political ideology. 




THE INTERSECTION OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY & BELIEF FORMATION 
 
264 
Table S7. Linear Regression Model Output in Study 4 (Hypothesis 3). 
    (1) 
    B std. Error p 
(Intercept)   4.59 0.05 <.001 
Treatment   -0.13 0.07 .082 
Political identity   -0.09 0.03 .002 
CRT   -0.11 0.05 .037 
Prior belief   -0.28 0.05 <.001 
Treatment x PID   0.16 0.04 <.001 
Treatment x CRT   -0.12 0.07 .093 
PID x CRT   -0.02 0.03 .521 
Treatment x Prior   0.42 0.07 <.001 
CRT x Prior   -0.04 0.06 .423 
Treatment x PID x CRT   0.06 0.04 .111 
Treatment x CRT x Prior   0.15 0.08 .049 
Observations   2052 
R2 / adj. R2   .066 / .061 
Deviance   4744.732 
Note. The DV is agreement that the test supplies good evidence of how open-minded someone is (higher 








Parameter estimates from the regression models reported in the main text—prior beliefs 
analysis (Table S8) and political identity/joint analysis (Table S9) are displayed below.  
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Table S8. Linear Regression Model Output in Study 5 (Prior Beliefs Analysis). 
    (1)   (2) 
    B 
std. 
Error 




(Intercept)   4.45 0.40 <.001   4.73 0.41 <.001 
Treatment   -0.17 0.50 .732   -0.68 0.53 .204 
Prior belief   0.71 0.70 .312   -0.37 0.80 .648 
Prior belief strength   0.03 0.01 .012   0.02 0.01 .099 
CRT   0.12 0.20 .556   -0.07 0.21 .751 
Treatment x Prior   -0.56 0.79 .481   1.23 1.03 .232 
Treatment x Strength   -0.02 0.01 .131   -0.00 0.01 .740 
Treatment x CRT   -0.07 0.27 .782   0.30 0.30 .313 
Prior x Strength   -0.05 0.02 .008   -0.02 0.02 .428 
Prior x CRT   -0.25 0.34 .461   0.51 0.44 .245 
Strength x CRT   -0.01 0.01 .151   -0.00 0.01 .734 
Treatment x Prior x Strength   0.07 0.02 <.001   0.02 0.03 .535 
Treatment x Prior x CRT   0.31 0.28 .271   -1.07 0.58 .067 
Treatment x Strength x CRT   0.00 0.01 .708   -0.01 0.01 .273 
Prior x Strength x CRT   0.00 0.01 .746   -0.02 0.01 .088 
Treatment x Prior x Strength x 
CRT 
       0.05 0.02 .007 
Observations   443   443 
R2 / adj. R2   .149 / .121   .163 / .134 
Deviance   852.383   838.184 
Note. The DV is judgment that polling data are informative (higher values = more informative). CRT 
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Table S9. Linear Regression Model Output in Study 5 (Political Identity and Joint Analysis). 
    (1)   (2) 
    B 
std. 
Error 




(Intercept)   5.58 0.22 <.001   5.55 0.50 <.001 
Treatment   -1.39 0.31 <.001   -2.11 0.63 <.001 
Preference   -0.92 0.30 .002   -0.87 0.32 .006 
CRT   -0.20 0.13 .130   -0.31 0.26 .226 
Treatment x Preference   1.82 0.41 <.001   1.76 0.42 <.001 
Treatment x CRT   0.26 0.18 .143   0.86 0.36 .016 
Preference x CRT   0.05 0.18 .778   0.25 0.19 .185 
Treatment x Preference x CRT   -0.37 0.25 .133   -0.71 0.26 .006 
Prior belief        -1.14 0.84 .173 
Prior belief strength        0.01 0.01 .570 
Treatment x Prior        2.44 1.06 .022 
Treatment x Strength        0.01 0.02 .489 
Prior x Strength        0.01 0.02 .689 
CRT x Prior        0.80 0.46 .079 
CRT x Strength        0.00 0.01 .812 
Treatment x Prior x Strength        -0.03 0.03 .394 
Treatment x CRT x Prior        -1.59 0.60 .008 
Treatment x CRT x Strength        -0.02 0.01 .090 
CRT x Prior x Strength        -0.03 0.01 .026 
Treatment x CRT x Prior x 
Strength 
       0.06 0.02 <.001 
Observations   443   443 
R2 / adj. R2   .084 / .069   .199 / .163 
Deviance   917.712   802.151 
Note. The DV is judgment that polling data are informative (higher values = more informative). CRT 
= Cognitive Reflection Test (sum score). 
 





This thesis presented an empirical investigation at the intersection of moral psychology— 
people’s perceptions of good and bad, right and wrong—and belief formation—how people 
evaluate evidence and update their beliefs. The investigation comprised two main parts. In Part 
I, across 6 studies I investigated (i) people’s beliefs about their own moral goodness relative to 
the average person—I asked whether and to what extent such beliefs are irrational—and (ii) 
people’s beliefs about the moral goodness of their political in-party relative to their political 
out-party. Using economic games, I subsequently tested whether people’s beliefs regarding (i) 
and (ii) predicted behavioural outcomes. Finally, I tested whether people’s motivation to “do 
the morally right thing” underpins their prosocial behaviour in economic games. In Part II, also 
comprising 6 studies, I investigated several factors purported to influence political belief 
formation. Specifically, I investigated (i) whether belief updating was biased by people’s prior 
beliefs or by their desired political outcomes (or both), and (ii) the extent to which cognitive 
sophistication facilitates biased information processing such that people who are more 
sophisticated are more likely to form factual beliefs favourable to their political identities. In 
the following sections, I present (i) a brief summary of the main results, (ii) a critical discussion 
of these results and suggested directions for future research, and (iii) my overall conclusions. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
Part I: Perceived Moral Superiority and Moral Behaviour 
 
In Part 1.1, I adapted a method of measuring self-enhancement that accounts for uncertainty in 
social perception and thereby enables isolation of residual or “irrational” self-enhancement. 
My central finding was that such irrational self-enhancement was largest in the moral domain 
(vs. the nonmoral domains of agency and sociability). However, the magnitude of irrational 
moral self-enhancement was only trivially and non-significantly correlated with self-esteem, 
opposite to the predictions of influential prior theory. 
 
In Part 1.2, I tested whether the magnitude of irrational moral self-enhancement (“superiority”) 
identified in Part 1.1 predicted behaviours commonly considered moral; freely helping others, 
and reciprocating trust. My central finding was robust support for the null hypothesis: strength 
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of self-perceived moral superiority did not meaningfully predict giving in either the Dictator 
Game or Trust Game. However, I found some evidence that perceptions of one’s own moral 
goodness—not superiority over others per se—predicted giving behaviour (albeit weakly). 
 
In Part 1.3, I extended the investigation of perceived moral superiority to Democratic and 
Republican partisans in the US. I tested whether the disparity in moral evaluation between the 
in-party and out-party—referred to here as moral polarization—predicted behavioural hostility 
toward the out-party. I found that moral polarization per se was large—larger than polarization 
in nonmoral domains of evaluation—but I observed somewhat unconvincing evidence that it 
predicted behavioural expressions of out-party hostility. These results strike an optimistic 
chord and converge with recent work in political science on the limits of partisan prejudice. 
 
Finally, in Part 1.4 I conducted an improved and extended test of the morality preference 
hypothesis. This hypothesis states that prosocial behaviour is motivated by people’s preference 
for “doing the morally right thing”. I corrected confounds that I identified in prior work and 
extended their design to answer several unresolved questions relevant to this hypothesis. I 
convincingly replicated support for the morality preference hypothesis. However, through my 
extension of the original design I found evidence contrary to influential psychological theory. 
 
Part II: Desires, Identities and Bias in Political Belief Formation 
 
In Part 2.1, I attempted to tease apart two “biases” in belief updating that are often confounded: 
referred to here as confirmation bias and desirability bias. I conducted a study capitalizing on 
the context of the 2016 US presidential election—where many people held preferences (e.g., 
for Donald Trump) at odds with their belief about who was likely to win (e.g., Hillary Clinton). 
I recruited groups of people whose preferences and beliefs were congruent or incongruent, and 
I randomly assigned evidence emphasizing either that one or the other of these candidates were 
more likely to win; thereby, decoupling the predictions of confirmation bias and desirability 
bias in the aggregate sample. Subsequently, I found evidence to suggest that people updated 
their beliefs by a greater magnitude if the new information was desirable (vs. undesirable). In 
contrast, I found little evidence for the corresponding asymmetry in updating for information 
that confirmed (vs. disconfirmed) prior beliefs. 
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In Part 2.2, I conducted a comprehensive test of the hypothesis that cognitive sophistication 
facilitates identity-protective bias in political belief formation. The logic of this hypothesis is 
that people with distinctive cognitive resources are expected to bring those resources to bear 
on information that threatens their political identities; specifically, to resist and disregard it. I 
tested this hypothesis in the context of two processes relevant to belief formation: (a) belief 
updating—that is, how beliefs change after receipt of evidence—and (b) reasoning/evidence 
evaluation—beliefs about the validity or quality of the evidence itself. I inferred cognitive 
sophistication from scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), a behavioural measure of 
the propensity to think analytically. Regarding (a), I observed that—contrary to the target 
hypothesis—people who scored higher on the CRT deviated less from the posterior beliefs of 
a Bayesian agent; implying less bias in belief updating. Regarding (b), I found evidence to 
suggest that people who scored higher on the CRT conditioned more strongly on their prior 
beliefs—rather than on their political identities per se—when evaluating the new information.  
 
Critical Analysis of Findings and Future Directions 
 
In the following critical analysis, to avoid repetition I group my discussion by broad themes 
that interlink different subparts of the thesis rather than focusing on the individual studies one 
at a time—because this was already done within each paper/subpart. I also outline directions 
for future work. 
 
Perceived Moral Superiority and Behavioural Outcomes 
 
Taken together, the results of Part I present a compelling case for a two-fold conclusion. First, 
that perceived moral superiority—both at the level of the individual (Parts 1.1 and 1.2) and the 
(US) political party (Part 1.3)—is prevalent, large in magnitude, and larger in magnitude than 
superiority perceived in nonmoral domains of social perception. Second, however, that these 
perceptions are not straightforwardly associated with behavioural outcomes, as predicted by 
theory and past work.  
 
In particular, in Part 1.1 the magnitude of “irrational” moral superiority was convincingly not 
associated with self-esteem (albeit, a self-report measure of self-esteem). This result stands in 
contrast to an influential hypothesis that assumes that perceptions of superiority are prevalent 
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because they protect and/or enhance wellbeing (Taylor & Brown, 1988; see also Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2008). This result was all the more puzzling, given that self-esteem did correlate with 
irrational superiority perceived in the nonmoral domains of perception (agency and sociability). 
This implies there may be something special about the moral domain in this case. I speculated 
that this something special may be the asymmetric costs/benefits that accrue to people who 
underperceive—versus overperceive, or, perhaps even accurately perceive—the morality of 
unknown others. For example, mistaking another person as trustworthy, when in fact they are 
not, may be associated with greater fitness costs than the reverse error. Under such conditions, 
individuals may tolerate a loss in judgment accuracy—systematically underestimating others’ 
morality—for gains made elsewhere (cf. Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2006). This suggestion is 
bolstered by the fact that the magnitude of self-perceived moral superiority was driven mainly 
by variance in people’s perceptions of the average person, rather than themselves—a pattern 
in evidence in both Parts 1.1 and 1.2.  
 
This proposition, however, is at odds with evidence that people are fairly accurate in estimating 
the moral behaviour of others (Epley & Dunning, 2000, 2006), and, furthermore, the argument 
that behavioural biases—for example, the behavioural tendency not to entrust others with 
secrets or money—do not entail cognitive biases—the tendency to believe that others are 
untrustworthy (McKay & Efferson, 2010). This undercuts the rationale for the above 
suggestion that self-perceived moral superiority persists because of an advantageous and 
systematic underestimation of the morality of other people.  
 
With the benefit of hindsight, then, here I offer an alternative explanation—based on moral 
signaling. Given the myriad social benefits that accrue to people who are perceived by others 
to be moral—that is, fair, trustworthy, and so on—individuals are prone to signal their moral 
qualities, in numerous different contexts and by various different routes (e.g., Jordan, Hoffman, 
Bloom, & Rand, 2016a; Jordan, Hoffman, Nowak, & Rand, 2016b). For example, in one recent 
experiment, people used—and observers interpreted—the time taken to decide whether to help 
someone else as a signal of trustworthiness (cf. Jordan et al., 2016b). Consequently, observers 
tended to trust people who chose to help a third-party without hesitation more than those who 
took longer to decide; even if the latter helped after deliberating. Furthermore, beyond directly 
signaling one’s own moral quality in this way, recent evidence suggests that people are also 
willing to denigrate the morality of others in order to make themselves look morally better 
(Pleasant & Barclay, 2018).  




The upshot of this research is the following: Faced with judging themselves and the average 
person on various moral traits—as in Parts 1.1 and 1.2 of this thesis—it may be expected that 
people are simply prone to report an exaggerated estimate of the moral traits they themselves 
possess, and a less rosy estimate of the average persons’; primarily—and straightforwardly—
in order to signal that they are high quality partners for cooperation. Indeed, the subjects in 
Parts 1.1 and 1.2 faced no disincentive to adopt such a reporting strategy. In other words, the 
prevalence of self-perceived moral superiority may, in part, be conceived of as a form of “cheap 
talk” (Farrell & Rabin, 1996). Importantly, this conception does not entail that people’s true 
beliefs are, in fact, what they report. This allows for the possibility that people have an 
underlying accurate perception of the morality of others (cf. Epley & Dunning, 2000, 2006) 
and, at the same time, sidesteps the criticism that behavioural bias (i.e., cheap talk) does not 
entail cognitive bias (a truly biased belief that one is morally superior to others) (cf. McKay & 
Efferson, 2010).  
 
A particular strength of the cheap talk explanation for the prevalence of self-perceived moral 
superiority is that it can account for the behavioural results reported in Part 1.2, as well. Recall 
that I found compelling support for the null hypothesis of no association between self-
perceived moral superiority and either (a) freely helping others or (b) reciprocating trust. In 
those cases, I used economic games—the Dictator Game and Trust Game—to measure 
behaviour, where there were real financial stakes involved. These are exactly the kinds of 
situations (i.e., financially incentivized) where cheap talk is revealed to be just that (cf. Farrell 
& Rabin, 1996). In other words, cheap talk provides a poor guide as to how people will behave 
when there is money—or some other quantity of importance—at stake. Given this, the moral 
signaling/cheap talk hypothesis would predict the null result that I observed in the studies 
reported in Part 1.2.  
 
What about the results of Part 1.3? There, recall that I found unconvincing evidence of an 
association between moral polarization—the tendency for partisans to view co-partisans’ 
moral character positively and opposing partisans’ negatively—and behavioural expressions 
of out-party hostility. Here, too, the cheap talk hypothesis may help explain the empirical 
results. As referenced in the general introduction of this thesis, a growing body of work in 
political science suggests that partisan cheerleading—expressing support for one’s political 
party in responses to survey questions—is likely to inflate estimates of bias in political belief 
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formation and polarization (Bullock et al., 2015; Khanna & Sood, 2018; Prior et al., 2015; 
Schaffner & Luks, 2018). Partisan cheerleading, then, is essentially a politics-specific version 
of “cheap talk”. Following this logic, in the context of moral polarization, partisans may be 
expected to morally champion the in-party and denigrate the out-party. Furthermore, given that 
I used economic games in Part 1.3 to measure out-party hostility, the expectation of the cheap 
talk hypothesis in this case would likely be a null, or, at least, a small association between 
moral polarization (self-report) and out-party hostility (financial stakes). In particular, because 
“putting money on the line” reveals people’s self-reported expressions to be only weakly 
indicative of their behaviour with stakes. Indeed, this is exactly what I observed in those 
studies: moral polarization per se was an order of magnitude larger than the relationship 
between moral polarization and expressions of out-party hostility.  
 
Finally, the results of the study reported in Part 1.4 are broadly consistent with the moral 
signaling/cheap talk hypothesis advanced as an explanation for the results in Parts 1.1 and 1.2. 
In the former study, I used moral frames to manipulate the behaviour of people in economic 
games. There, I found that simply framing one or the other behaviour as morally appropriate—
by labelling the focal choice fair or generous, or the counterpart choice unfair or ungenerous—
profoundly affected people’s choices. Specifically, while approximately 70% of people chose 
one option when that choice was framed as morally appropriate, this dropped to 40% when the 
alternative choice was framed as morally appropriate; a swing of 30%, and a reverse in the 
majority decision. Given this large swing toward the behaviour framed as morally appropriate, 
this result is entirely consistent with the assumption that people are behaving so as to signal 
their moral quality; that is, fitting with the moral signaling/cheap talk explanation outlined 
above. Of course, a particular weakness of this explanation is that people in the economic 
games used in Part 1.4 were not directly observed by other people when making their decisions. 
As a result, their patterns of decision-making may thus reflect self-signaling, that is, signaling 
one’s moral quality to oneself (Grossman, 2010; Mijović-Prelec & Prelec, 2010), as much as 
they reflect social signaling—that is, signaling aimed at other people. 
 
To determine whether social signaling (vs. merely self-signaling) can account for the results of 
Part 1.4, I propose an experiment that adapts the design of the aforementioned moral signaling 
studies (Jordan et al., 2016a, 2016b). It will help to describe that design here. In those studies, 
people completed a two-step task, where each step was comprised of a different economic 
game. In the first step, some people (the “choosers”) played a Helping Game, where they were 
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given money and had the choice of whether to donate some of their endowment to a third-party 
who received nothing. In the second step, the choosers played a Trust Game in the role of 
trustee—where a new person (the trustor) decided how much money to transfer to them (the 
chooser). The crucial part of the design was that, in the first step, the choosers were randomly 
assigned to one of two treatments. In one treatment, choosers were informed that the trustor in 
the subsequent game (i.e., in the Trust Game) would be able to condition their transfer decision 
on the choice made by the chooser in the first (i.e., Helping) game. This provided strong 
incentive for the choosers to help—and help without hesitation—in the first game; that is, so 
they appeared trustworthy to the trustor in the second game. In other words, so as to signal 
their trustworthiness. In the other treatment, in contrast, the choosers’ decision to help (or not) 
was not observable by the trustor in the second game—removing the social signaling incentive 
to help in the first game. Therefore, any difference in the decision-to-help rate among choosers 
between treatments constitutes evidence that the social signaling incentive had a causal effect 
on their moral decision-making in the first game.  
 
In my proposed experiment, I will integrate this design with the design of the study reported in 
Part 1.4. Specifically, people will complete a two-step task as above. In the first step, people—
choosers—will play the Trade-Off Game (TOG), where they must decide between one of two 
choices about how to distribute money between themselves and two helpless third-parties (I 
refer back to Part 1.4 for greater detail about the TOG). In one treatment, one choice will be 
framed as morally appropriate—while, in the other treatment, the alternative choice will be 
framed as morally appropriate. Then, in a second step, the choosers will play a Trust Game in 
the role of trustee, with a new person (the trustor) who will decide how much money to transfer 
them; exactly as in Jordan et al. (2016b). As before, too, I will randomly assign the choosers 
in the TOG to one of two signaling treatments. In one treatment, I will inform the choosers that 
their decision in the TOG is observable by their to-be partner (trustor) in the subsequent Trust 
Game. In the other treatment, in contrast, choosers’ TOG decisions will not be observable by 









Figure 1. Design for proposed moral signaling experiment. First, people (i.e., choosers) are 
randomly assigned to either one or the other moral framing treatment (either Choice A or 
Choice B is framed as the morally appropriate one). Subsequently, but before making their 
choices, these choosers are again randomly assigned; this time, to receive either a trustor who 
will observe their TOG decision vs. will not observe their TOG decision for the purposes of the 




As can be seen in Figure 1, the design results in four treatment groups40. First, consider the 
number of people switching from choice A to B in the no-signal treatments (#2 and #4). This 
difference indicates the effect of the moral frame on choices in a private context, that is, where 
choices are not observable. Based on the results of the study reported in Part 1.4, I would 
predict a roughly 30% swing from one choice to the other—since treatments #2 and #4 
essentially replicate the design of that study. The test of the social signaling hypothesis, 
therefore, concerns the number of people switching from choice A to B in the signal treatments 
(#1 and #3). In particular, if this difference is greater than the difference in the no-signal 
treatments—a statistically significant interaction between moral frame and signal factors—one 
                                                 
40 In the actual experiment, there would also be control treatments to allow a comparison to baseline. This is 
important, because people’s choices may change as a function of the no-signal vs. signal treatment—
irrespective of the moral framing treatment. Put another way, absent any moral frames, people’s choices may 
change by virtue of the signaling treatment itself. A control group allows one to observe and account for this 
change. I omitted discussion of the control group in-text to simplify exposition of the proposed design. 
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can infer that people’s response to the moral frame is, in part, motivated by a desire to signal 
to others (not just themselves) that they are a moral person. In contrast, a failure to reject the 
null hypothesis of no interaction (assuming high statistical power) would provide support for 
the inference that the results in Part 1.4 are due to self-signaling. Data collection for this study 
is already underway (with collaborators). 
 
Bias in Political Belief Formation 
 
The results of the studies reported in Part II imply several conclusions. I consider these in turn. 
First, a key result of Part 2.1—in particular, the lack of an association between people’s prior 
beliefs and their incorporation of new evidence into their posterior beliefs—stands in contrast 
to the famous “attitude polarization” result reported by Lord and colleagues (1979). In that 
study, people provided their prior beliefs before receiving two pieces of evidence—one that 
was belief-consistent, and one that was belief-inconsistent. After evaluating the evidence, 
people reported whether their prior beliefs had become more extreme, less extreme, or stayed 
the same. As described by those authors, people tended to report that their prior beliefs had 
become more extreme. Lord et al. (1979) concluded from this that people’s belief updating was 
asymmetric; they incorporated new evidence into their posterior beliefs more if the evidence 
was consistent (vs. inconsistent) with their priors. A crucial design choice in their study, 
however, was that instead of asking people to directly provide their posterior beliefs—on the 
same scale as they provided their prior beliefs—people were asked to judge whether their prior 
beliefs had, in fact, become more extreme. In other words, the researchers asked people to 
estimate the causal effect of the evidence on their own beliefs—a meta-belief, of sorts.  
 
This is crucial, for three reasons. First, because in Part 2.1—in contrast to Lord et al. (1979)—
I asked subjects to directly report both their prior and their posterior beliefs—that is, using the 
same scale. I then inferred belief change as the difference between these values. Second, the 
measurement strategy used by Lord and colleagues (1979) provides misleading estimates of 
belief polarization—compared to direct measurement of beliefs in randomized experiments, 
arguably the gold-standard (Graham & Coppock, 2018). Third, and relatedly, investigations 
conducted after the publication of Lord et al. (1979) found that “attitude polarization” did not 
replicate on these more appropriate, direct measures of belief change (Guess & Coppock, 2018; 
Kuhn & Lao, 1996; Miller et al., 1993; Munro & Ditto, 1997). In other words, where 
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polarization is defined as actual divergence in the posterior beliefs—and not people’s meta-
perceptions of said divergence—asymmetric updating conditional on prior beliefs is 
unobserved. The findings of my investigation in Part 2.1—the lack of an association between 
people’s prior beliefs and their incorporation of new evidence into their posterior beliefs—are 
thus consistent with these latter studies. On the other hand, my findings are also consistent with 
the hypothesis that people’s prior beliefs and preferences were confounded in Lord et al. 
(1979); and, thus, that decoupling these factors in my study revealed that asymmetric updating 
conditional on priors was not driving their original result. Rather, perhaps, it was asymmetric 
updating conditional on preferences. Future work could directly compare these two hypotheses 
by designing an experiment that both (i) manipulates the measurement method—i.e., direct 
measurement of prior/posterior beliefs vs. meta-perception of belief change—and, in addition, 
(ii) decouples people’s prior beliefs and preferences. 
 
The second key result of Part 2.1, as highlighted above, was that of a belief updating asymmetry 
conditional on people’s political preferences. Specifically, after decoupling preferences from 
prior beliefs (in the aggregate sample), I observed that receipt of politically desirable evidence 
caused a greater magnitude of change in the posterior beliefs than receipt of otherwise-identical 
undesirable evidence. On the basis of this asymmetry, I inferred bias on behalf of people’s 
belief updating. However, whether this asymmetry does, in fact, constitute evidence of biased 
belief updating depends crucially on the conception of “bias”. Where bias is taken to mean an 
asymmetry in the measurement of people’s posterior beliefs given evidence, this inference is 
valid. But this is unsurprising, since one could argue that it merely restates the phenomenon. 
As argued at length by Hahn and Harris (2014, see also Shah et al., 2016), a stronger case for 
bias in belief updating demands demonstration of systematic deviation from some verifiably 
optimal or normative benchmark. For example, in the case of putative bias in belief updating, 
evidence of systematic deviation from Bayesian rationality.  
 
Bayesian rationality follows from the laws of probability, and offers a normative account of 
how beliefs ought to update given evidence (Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2018). Most important 
here is that Bayesian rationality does not entail that people’s prior beliefs—given the same 
evidence—will update by the same amount (as measured via self-report scales) (Gerber & 
Green, 1999; Hahn & Harris, 2014); nor, in fact, that they will converge in the posterior beliefs 
(Jern et al., 2014). This stems in part from the fact that people may have different models of 
the world—affecting their interpretation of new evidence—as well as from the multiplicative 
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(nonlinear) nature of Bayes’ rule, which lies at the heart of Bayesian inference. With respect 
to the results of Part 2.1, therefore, the evidence is undiagnostic as to whether people’s belief 
updating was biased, where bias is conceived of as deviation from the prevailing normative 
standard of belief updating, Bayesian rationality (Hahn & Harris, 2014). In particular, because 
people’s patterns of belief updating in Part 2.1 were not obviously inconsistent with Bayesian 
principles. On the contrary, there is evidence that human belief updating—explicitly compared 
against this normative benchmark—fairly well approximates Bayesian inference in various 
contexts (e.g., Barron, 2016; Cao, Kleiman-Weiner, & Banaji, 2018; Coppock, 2016; Coutts, 
2018; Gotthard-Real, 2017; Hill, 2017; Hornikx, Harris, & Boekema, 2018; but see Bowers & 
Davis, 2012 for a critique).    
 
Unfortunately, in Part 2.1 it was not possible to construct a Bayesian estimate of the posterior 
beliefs in order to provide comparison with the observed (i.e., subject) posterior beliefs. This 
is because such an estimate requires knowledge not only of the prior beliefs, but also, crucially, 
the likelihood of the evidence (Hill, 2017). That is, how diagnostic the evidence is taken to be 
one way or the other. This information was not readily available in the study design of Part 2.1. 
Recognizing this limitation, the relevant studies in Part 2.2 were designed such that I provided 
people with objective likelihoods—in Study 1—and, in addition, in Study 2 I obtained their 
subjective likelihoods. This allowed comparison of the observed patterns of belief updating 
against the Bayesian predictions.  
 
The benefits of this approach are aptly illustrated in the results of those studies. In particular, 
recall that in Part 2.2 I tested the hypothesis that people who score higher on the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT) are more biased in favour of their political identities when forming their 
beliefs—following the logic of identity-protective cognition (e.g., Kahan, 2016a; Van Bavel & 
Pereira, 2018). However, in studies 1 and 2 (in Part 2.2) I found that individuals who scored 
higher on the CRT in fact tended to converge on the posterior beliefs of a Bayesian agent—
implying the opposite of exacerbated bias, and thus contrary to the target hypothesis. In the 
absence of this comparison with the Bayesian expectation, the raw magnitudes of belief 
updating in those studies may well have suggested that high CRT individuals were indeed more 
biased in favour of their political identities; in line with the target hypothesis. For example, 
relative to people who scored low on the CRT, people who scored high tended to update to a 
greater extent in raw magnitude terms towards politically favourable—vs. unfavourable—
evidence (for more detail I refer back to studies 1 and 2 in Part 2.2). Only in the light of the 
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comparison with a normative (Bayesian) expectation do the latter individuals appear overall 
less biased. 
 
In studies 3-5 of Part 2.2, I investigated a different outcome variable relevant to political belief 
formation and identity-protective cognition; that is, people’s beliefs about the validity of the 
new evidence itself—in other words, evidence evaluation (as opposed to updating a belief upon 
which that new evidence bears, as was the focus of studies 1 and 2). Accordingly, my findings 
suggested that people who scored higher on the CRT conditioned more on their prior beliefs 
when evaluating the new evidence, rather than conditioning on their political identities per se. 
Indeed, in the General Discussion section of Part 2.2, I argued at length that the evidence often 
cited in favour of the hypothesis that cognitively sophisticated people are more biased when 
evaluating political information is relatively undiagnostic. Primarily, because that evidence 
consists in a treatment by covariate interaction, and thus precludes the inference that political 
identity—and not some other variable, such as prior beliefs—causes the “biased” evidence 
evaluation (e.g., see Gerber & Green, 2012). By the same token, such designs also preclude the 
inference that cognitive sophistication causes more biased evidence evaluation—for the reason 
that cognitive sophistication is also not randomly assigned, and, therefore, is also likely subject 
to numerous confounding variables. Rather than recapitulating those arguments here, however, 
I will discuss instead what I consider to be a broader, unresolved issue with the phenomenon 
of “biased” evidence evaluation—often referred to as “biased assimilation” in the literature—
that was brought to my awareness by the results of Part 2.2. 
 
Biased assimilation is a classic phenomenon in psychology and political science. It consists in 
the well-documented observation that people are prone to evaluate new evidence conditional 
on its congeniality to their prior beliefs, political preferences and/or identity commitments (e.g., 
Corner et al., 2012; Ditto et al., 2018; Kahan, 2016a; Koehler, 1993; Lord et al., 1979; Taber 
& Lodge, 2006; Thesis Part 2.1, Supplemental Material; Part 2.2, studies 2-5). In particular, 
people evaluate congenial evidence more favourably than otherwise-identical uncongenial 
evidence. The measurement method that is overwhelmingly used to infer biased assimilation 
is people’s self-reported judgments of new information—indeed, that is the approach I used in 
studies 2-5 in Part 2.2 of this thesis. Specifically, people’s self-reported judgments about how 
reliable the evidence is; how valid it is; how trustworthy it is. Critically, these judgments are 
explicitly assumed to reflect the “weight” people assigned the new evidence for the purposes 
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of learning from it and updating their beliefs—that is, directly akin to the “likelihood ratio” in 
Bayesian inference (cf. Ditto et al., 2018; Kahan, 2016a). 
 
Remarkably, however, this measurement assumption has never been tested. This is remarkable 
because of the extent and impact of research purporting to show biased assimilation of new 
evidence. For example, the original Lord et al. (1979) paper has been cited over 4000 times, 
and a Google Scholar search returns 166,000 hits for the phrase “biased assimilation”41. It is 
also consequential, for two reasons. First, because several scholars have recently questioned 
this measurement assumption (Gerber & Green, 1999; Kim, 2018); suggesting that it is too 
strong. Specifically, these critics claim it is implausible that classic biased assimilation results 
perfectly—or even reliably—reflect the weight people assigned the evidence for the purposes 
of learning from it. Second, there exists a substantial body of research in tension with biased 
assimilation—specifically, research showing “parallel updating” in the mass public. This work 
reveals that Democrats and Republicans in the US update their beliefs about numerous political 
matters approximately in parallel over time (for a review, see Coppock, 2016, Chapter 1). This 
implies that, in the aggregate, partisans in the US weigh new evidence roughly commensurately 
when updating their beliefs—in direct contradiction to the phenomenon of biased assimilation.  
 
Given this, I propose a series of experiments that will provide a comprehensive and direct test 
of the biased assimilation measurement assumption. In these experiments, I will obtain a direct 
measure of the weight people assigned the new evidence—by consulting the extent to which 
the evidence changed their beliefs. In fact, this is the definition of the “weight” assigned new 
evidence. I will derive this weight formally, and in a principled manner via Bayesian inference. 
Bayes’ rule dictates that the weight/diagnosticity of new evidence—the likelihood ratio—is a 
function of two quantities: the prior odds that a hypothesis is true (i.e., before seeing the 
evidence) and the posterior odds that it is true (after seeing the evidence). Bayes’ rule in odds 
form is given by, 
 
𝑃(𝐻 = 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸 | 𝐷)




 ×  
𝑃(𝐷 | 𝐻 = 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸)
𝑃(𝐷 | 𝐻 = 𝐹𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐸)
 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠    =      𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠     ×      𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
                                                 
41 Both these figures are according to a Google Scholar search conducted 21st November 2018. 




Where the posterior odds that a hypothesis is true (given data) lies to the left of the equality, 
followed by the prior odds that it is true (in the middle); and, finally, the likelihood ratio—the 
probability of the data given that the hypothesis is true over the probability of the data given 
that the hypothesis is false. As can be seen from this equation, dividing the posterior odds by 
the prior odds gives the likelihood ratio, 
 
𝑃(𝐷 | 𝐻 = 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸)
𝑃(𝐷 | 𝐻 = 𝐹𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐸)
=  
𝑃(𝐻 = 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸 | 𝐷)





To obtain estimates of individuals’ subjective likelihood ratios, in my proposed experiments I 
will measure people’s prior beliefs on a 0-1 belief scale before providing them with new 
evidence that bears on those beliefs. People will then be randomly assigned to one of two 
treatments42. In one treatment, I will subsequently measure their posterior beliefs (on the same 
0-1 belief scale as the priors); whereas, in the other treatment, I will ask subjects to evaluate 
the new evidence on self-report scales—the classic biased assimilation method. For subjects 
in the former treatment, using their prior and posterior beliefs—converted to odds form—I will 
infer their subjective likelihood ratios via the above equation. That is, I will infer the actual 
weight they assigned the evidence as revealed by the extent to which they updated their beliefs. 
I will compare this quantity to people’s self-reported judgments of the new evidence provided 
in the latter treatment; that is, the classic measure of biased assimilation. Figure 2 illustrates 
this design.  
 
First and foremost, I expect to replicate the classic biased assimilation result. In other words, I 
expect people to evaluate the new evidence more favourably if it is congenial to their prior 
beliefs. In the context of Figure 2, for example, people who believe that gun control laws reduce 
crime (prior belief > 0.5) will evaluate evidence that shows that such laws do indeed reduce 
crime more positively than otherwise-identical evidence that shows such laws do not reduce 
                                                 
42 As before, in the actual experiment there will be control groups. This is necessary in order to prevent 
regression to the mean confounding my inference of people’s subjective likelihood ratios (e.g., see Yu & Chen, 
2015). Specifically, given that people’s prior and posterior beliefs are subject to natural variation (i.e., variation 
not due to the evidence treatment), I aim to “partial out” this natural variation and isolate the likelihood ratios as 
they correspond only to the effect of the evidence treatment. A control group achieves this aim. Here, I omit 
discussion of the control groups to simplify exposition of the design. 
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crime. Specifically, for these people, evidence ratings will be more favourable in treatment #2 
vs. treatment #4; a statistically significant difference.  
 
For the people in treatments #1 and #3, in contrast, I will conduct the same analysis but on their 
subjective likelihood ratios—inferred from the change in their prior and posterior beliefs, as 
outlined above. If the pattern of these likelihood ratios diverges from the classic biased 
assimilation result, I will infer a violation of the measurement assumption underlying biased 
assimilation. That is, a violation of the assumption that self-reported evaluations of evidence 
track the weight people assigned the new evidence. The magnitude of this violation will be 
determined by the (i) size and (ii) direction of the difference in subjective likelihood ratios. For 
example, in the case of gun control advocates (prior beliefs > 0.5), if I fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference in likelihood ratios between treatments #1 and #3—assuming high 
statistical power—I will infer that these advocates weighted the congenial and uncongenial 
evidence commensurately for the purposes of updating their beliefs. This would be rather 
damning for the classic result of biased assimilation; which, as mentioned already, is explicitly 
assumed to show that people condition the weight of new evidence on their prior beliefs (cf. 
Ditto et al., 2018; Kahan, 2016a). Of course, it is also possible that the subjective likelihood 
ratio analysis will closely reproduce the size and direction of the discrepancy in self-reported 
evidence evaluations—validating the key measurement assumption of the classic biased 









Figure 2. Design for proposed biased assimilation experiment. First, subjects provide their 
prior belief on a continuous scale from 0-1 where 0 = False and 1 = True. Subjects are then 
randomly assigned to receive evidence that is either for or against the belief. They are then 
randomly assigned again to either (i) provide their posterior belief after seeing the evidence 
or (ii) evaluate the evidence on self-report scales (i.e., classic biased assimilation measure). 





On the basis of the research reported in this thesis—and the preceding critical analyses—I draw 
four main conclusions from my investigation. First, perceptions of moral superiority—both at 
the level of the individual and the (US) political party—are prevalent, large in magnitude, and 
larger in magnitude than trait superiority perceived in nonmoral domains of social perception. 
Second, however, these perceptions do not appear meaningfully associated with behavioural 
outcomes where there are stakes—for example, money—involved. A plausible explanation for 
this disconnect is that expressions of moral superiority over the average person, and over one’s 
political rivals, to some extent reflect “cheap talk” and “partisan cheerleading”, respectively. 
Furthermore, these phenomena may be underpinned by the more general motivation to signal 
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specific things about oneself in responses to survey questions; for example, that one is a moral 
person, or a loyal partisan group member. I outlined a novel experiment designed to test this 
hypothesis that is currently in the data collection phase.  
 
My third main conclusion is that the hypothesis that cognitive sophistication facilitates identity-
protective bias in political belief formation is profoundly underdetermined by current evidence. 
Primarily, because the designs of oft-cited studies do not permit causal inferences regarding 
the role of identity or cognitive sophistication, and thus face glaring confounds—not least, the 
prior beliefs of subjects. More generally, too, because such studies rarely attempt to evaluate 
the observed patterns of results with respect to an optimal or normative benchmark—such as 
that offered by Bayesian rationality. This segues into my fourth, and final, conclusion: I concur 
with recent arguments that reasonable inferences of “bias” in human belief formation demand 
evidence of systematic deviation from well-specified normative standards. I have highlighted 
one example where such evidence appears absent; that is, in the case of biased assimilation 
research. I proceeded to outline a novel experimental design that tests the key measurement 
assumption of classic biased assimilation results—a design situated explicitly with respect to a 
Bayesian framework, and one currently being piloted by myself and collaborators. It is my 
desire to continue in this line of work and help advance scientific understanding of when (and 
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